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Chapter 1
Active Debris Removal: A Joint Task 
and Obligation to Cooperate for the Benefit 
of Mankind
Valentin Degrange
Abstract This analysis aims to prove that the cooperation of all spacefaring nations 
for the removal of space debris is not only a necessity in terms of the sustainable 
development of a limited natural resource, but could also constitute an obligation 
under international law. Furthermore, the establishment and observance by the 
international community of rules concerning space debris removal, as well as the 
creation of a dedicated international organization charged with dealing with these 
matters, could be one of the next steps in the development of mankind’s space capa-
bilities. The importance of securing humanity’s doorstep to outer space cannot be 
overstated and should indeed be a priority for all nations. But will the international 
community take such a step?
1.1  Introduction
The cold war space race, which arguably began in 1957 with the launch of the first 
artificial satellite Sputnik 1, was an ideological race and involved only two real 
actors: the ex-USSR and the United States of America. At the time, the USA and the 
USSR both tried to assert their technical and scientific superiority over the other, 
which led to great advances from a technological as well as a legal point of view. 
The present situation is notably different.
First, the objectives have changed and the avowed goal of contemporary space 
exploration is mostly of a commercial nature. The pre-eminence of telecommunica-
tions in our modern society, and the increasing development of private activities in 
the space sector, have highlighted the intrinsic value of the “spectrum-orbit resource” 
and have seen the development of the commercialization of outer space by states. 
The exploitation of outer space for both scientific and economic purposes in the 
future is therefore more likely to rely on the private sector.
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2Second, new players have emerged alongside the traditional space powers: 
China, India and Japan, for example, have considerably developed their space 
 capabilities in recent years. They join the USA, Russia and the Member States of the 
European Space Agency in the fairly closed circle of spacefaring nations. Taking 
Europe as one “launching state”, for calculation purposes, the number of states that 
actually engage in/license private companies to perform launches from their terri-
tory amounts to a total of 12 launching states.1
As space activities are undergoing a rapid development, the emergence of new 
prospects for the utilization and exploitation of outer space are making it increas-
ingly “contested, congested and competitive”.2 Many aspects of our daily lives have 
already come to depend on our occupation of Low Earth Orbits (LEO) and 
Geostationary Earth Orbits (GEO). As the number of space-related activities 
increases exponentially, most notably for commercial purposes, so does the number 
of orbiting space debris that threaten to cause potentially irreparable damages. The 
“big sky” theory, which protected airborne travellers for almost two decades before 
becoming obsolete, will soon suffer the same fate in regard to space travel.
The future of space activities partially depends on the answer from the interna-
tional community to this problem. As the number of space activities and debris 
grows exponentially, not only is it necessary to guarantee the sustainable develop-
ment of outer space and Earth orbits, a limited natural resource, but it could also 
constitute an obligation under both international space3 law and international law 
for spacefaring nations to cooperate in order to accomplish this. Furthermore, inter-
national involvement in the regulation-making process for space traffic manage-
ment and space debris removal has been sparse, if not non-existent, save for a few 
non-binding documents. The adoption of an international treaty on space debris 
removal and the creation of a dedicated international organization is therefore an 
option that merits rapid consideration.
1.2  The Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities
As the number of actors involved in space exploration as well as the scope of their 
activities continues to increase, so does the number of space debris. Space traffic is 
increasing in a comparable way to that of air traffic during the twentieth century, but 
1 Peter Van Fenema, “Legal aspects of launch services and space transportation”, Handbook of 
Space Law, Frans Von Der Dunk (dir.) with Fabio Tronchetti, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 
1100 p., p. 409.
2 Lt. Col. S.  Hunter, “How to reach an International Civil Aviation Organization role in Space 
Traffic Management” (November 5, 2014), Space Traffic Management Conference, 21p., p.  5. 
URL: http://commons.erau.edu/stm/2014/wednesday/21.
3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967 (entered into force on 10 October 
1967), Article IX. URL: http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_21_2222E.pdf.
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3dangerous debris was never an issue for the latter. While aviation collisions between 
two aircraft were extremely rare at first, as demonstrated by the “big sky” theory,4 
commercial aviation forced airways and air traffic control facilities to develop in 
order to keep pace with the increased activity. Accidents such as the 1956 mid-air 
collision between United Airlines and Trans World Airlines passenger airliners in 
uncontrolled airspace (resulting in 128 fatalities)5 made evident the potential danger 
to the public and to aviation as a whole. Incidents such as the January 2007 Chinese 
ASAT test6 or the February 2009 collision between the commercial Iridium and 
Russian Cosmos communications satellites7 have had a similar impact on spacefar-
ing nations, highlighting the need to consider how best to conduct safe and respon-
sible operations in space and to promote those practices internationally. This 
realization is in addition to the fact that space debris accumulate and increasingly 
endanger the conduct of space activities in the Earth’s orbits. These “man-made 
objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the 
atmosphere, that are non-functional”8 constitute a problem because of their high 
velocity (7500  m/s or much higher). They can pose a threat to functional space 
objects and, although it is relatively rare, even to structures or people on the ground 
when they de-orbit if they are large enough or contain hazardous materials,9 such as 
radioactive substances.
Unregulated space activities could indeed have dire consequences on humanity’s 
ability to travel through space. The absence of a regulatory framework could lead to 
an exponential increase in the number of collisions between (potentially manned) 
space objects, resulting not only in the loss of materials and human lives, but reduce 
access to the space domain as well. Furthermore, the number of dangerous space 
debris present in Earth’s orbit has drastically increased since the beginnings of space 
exploration, reaching the hundreds of thousands. These may not only cause mal-
functions, sometimes beyond repair, on our satellite constellations, but also pose the 
threat of triggering the “Kessler syndrome”. Also called the Kessler effect, colli-
sional cascading or ablation cascade, this theory was proposed by the NASA scien-
tist Donald J. Kessler in 1978. It is a scenario in which the density of objects in LEO 
is so high that collisions between objects could cause a cascade where each collision 
generates space debris that increases the likelihood of further collisions.10 One 
4 In aviation, the idea is that two randomly flying bodies are very unlikely to collide, as the three-
dimensional space is so large relative to the bodies.
5 Lt. Col. S. Hunter, op. cit., note 2, p. 5.
6 T. S. Kelso, “Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT Test and the Impact of its Debris on the Space 
Environment”, AMOS Conference, 2007, 10 p. URL: https://www.celestrak.com/publications/
AMOS/2007/AMOS-2007.pdf.
7 Lt. Col. S. Hunter , op. cit., note 2, p. 5.
8 Technical Report on space debris, United Nations General Assembly. Technical report of the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on space debris. UN Doc. A/AC.105/720, 1999.
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris#To_Earth.
10 Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palais, “Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The 
Creation of a Debris Belt”, Journal of Geophysical Research, 1978, 83, pp. 2637–2646.
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4implication is that the distribution of debris in orbit could render space activities and 
the use of satellites in specific orbital ranges infeasible for many generations. The 
resultant effects on world economies, information systems, and national security 
systems, are now fully acknowledged by spacefaring nations.
Space traffic management and space debris removal are not dealt with in the pres-
ent body of space law and are thus left to either separate international agreements or 
to national laws and policies for two reasons. First, there is neither a  dedicated inter-
national organization, nor a trade association, responsible for the creation, and per-
haps implementation, of an international space code of conduct. Second, as national 
space launches mostly do not involve entry into foreign airspace, spacefaring nations 
usually apply their own national safety regulations to their governmental and/or pri-
vate launch activities. This phenomenon can be assimilated into the “tragedy of the 
commons” theory,11 as the benefits of individual space missions accrue primarily to 
the entities conducting these activities while the detrimental impact of space exploita-
tion can have negative consequences for all those involved in the sector and even 
others. As a consequence, regulations adopted by a single or multiple states to fight 
off the harmful environmental effects of space activities would be ineffective. Space-
faring nations adhering to debris mitigation requirements may find themselves at a 
competitive disadvantage against those who do not observe similar measures.
On the international scale, the U.N. space treaties do not address the issue of 
space debris, mostly because there was no issue at the time the treaties were adopted. 
Actual international dialogue concerning the regulation of space debris started in 
the early 1980s, and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 
(IADC) was established in 1993 upon the initiative of the world’s major space agen-
cies. After several years, the IADC developed space debris mitigation guidelines in 
2002, which served as the basis for the space debris mitigation guidelines developed 
and adopted by UNCOPUOS in 2009.12 A few other non-binding documents con-
cerning such matters have also been issued, including the International Academy of 
Astronautics (IAA) Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management of 2006,13 and The 
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation of 2002,14 but today 
a more radical approach seems necessary.
These guidelines are indeed not legally binding under international law and work 
only on a voluntary basis. Still, most national space agencies have been implement-
ing the guidelines for years. Moreover, several states have included provisions on 
space debris mitigation and prevention in their national space legislation, such as 
11 Hardin Garrett, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, in Science, Vol. 162, n° 3859, 13 December 
1968, pp. 1243–1248.
12 Uncopuos, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
2010, http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/bst/COPUOS_SPACE_DEBRIS_MITIGATION_
GUIDELINES.pdf.
13 IAA, Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management, 2006, 96 p. URL: https://iaaweb.org/iaa/
Studies/spacetraffic.pdf.
14 UN, Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, General Assembly, 2002, 
URL: http://www.hcoc.at/documents/Hague-Code-of-Conduct-A_57_724-English.pdf.
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5the US Debris Mitigation Standard Practices,15 based on the NASA Safety Standard, 
developed by NASA and the Department of Defense. These standard practices have 
four objectives: control of debris release during normal operations; minimization of 
debris generated by accidental explosions; choice of safe flight profile and opera-
tional configuration; post-mission disposal of space objects, either by re- or 
 de- orbiting. The European Union Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,16 
which was published by the EU in 2008 with a revised draft released in September 
2010, is an instrument intended to be applicable to the space activities of the sub-
scribing states and nongovernmental entities under their jurisdiction. It also 
addresses the issue of space debris and contains several measures aiming to prevent, 
reduce and mitigate the creation of space debris. While these various national regu-
lations have helped to improve the mitigation of space debris, they might not consti-
tute an optimal solution in the long run.
The need for the coordination of these activities, the harmonization of national 
rules and policies, as well as the development of a space debris clean-up plan by the 
international community has recently been emphasized by the aforementioned inci-
dents as well as several scientific studies.17 This might represent the only viable 
solution to ensure that all actors of the space sector, governments and private enti-
ties alike, act in such a way as to ensure the protection of the space environment as 
well as the safety of space objects. But it would be necessary to demonstrate the 
existence of an international obligation to cooperate, in order to force nations of the 
world to protect a limited natural resource and mankind’s access point to outer 
space.
1.3  An International Obligation to Cooperate for the Benefit 
of Mankind
The importance of cooperation has often been pointed out, especially after the cold 
war, as a necessity to ensure the rule of law, including relevant norms of space law 
that play a prominent role in international cooperation for the exploration and use of 
outer space for peaceful purposes. In 1994, the UNGA emphasized the general 
interest of this principle in inviting states that were not yet parties to the Outer Space 
15 US Government, Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, December 2000, URL: https://
orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/usg_od_standard_practices.pdf.
16 DRAFT International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, European Union (September 
16, 2013). URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st14455.en10.pdf.
17 National Research Council. Orbital Debris: A Technical Assessment, 1995, 224 p.; Scientific and 
Technical subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS. Technical Report on Space Debris. United Nations, 
New York, 1999; National Research Council. Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An 
Assessment of NASA’s Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs. Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press, 2011.
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6Treaty to consider ratifying or adhering to it.18 It was only in 1996 that a more gen-
eral statement19 was specifically dedicated to international cooperation for space 
activities, repeating the provisions of the previous texts, but emphasizing the need 
to take into account the needs of developing countries. If this resolution had a com-
mendable objective, it is regrettable that its provisions are, for the majority, non- 
binding, and are in fact only suggestions, leaving states free to follow them or not. 
There are however several principles in the corpus spatialis, as well as other 
branches of international law, that could be used as a basis for the existence of an 
international obligation to cooperate for the benefit of mankind. These various dis-
positions stem not only from international space law, but from telecommunications 
and environment policies as well.
First, it is necessary to address the principles of space law that could constitute 
the basis for an international obligation to cooperate. As such, the “Common 
Interest” principle is particularly interesting. This principle appeared very early dur-
ing the first space race through three resolutions of the UN’s General Assembly,20 
and was then consecrated in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 by both articles I et 
IX.21 Two main rules result from these different texts: first, the exploration and use 
of outer space should be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all coun-
tries, and second, that it should be carried out in due regard of the corresponding 
interests of all states parties to the Treaty.22
However, the scope of this “Common Interest” principle is still the object of 
controversies, especially concerning the word “countries”, which has no legal con-
sistency. The United States government, in particular, objected that while Article I 
“would serve as a guide for space powers in developing their programs and con-
ducting their activities in space […] it does not undertake to set any terms and 
conditions on which international cooperation would take place”.23 Furthermore, 
the U.S.  Department of State added that considering the vague formulation of 
Article I, it carries no legal obligation and is therefore not self-executing, a claim 
that has been supported by several authors.24 Others however, consider that the use 
of the word “shall” in the wording of Article I reveals the intention the parties had 
to give this disposition a binding value.25 In any case, the “Common Interest” prin-
18 UNGA, International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, A/RES/48/39, 10 
December 1993.
19 UNGA, Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of 
Developing Countries, A/RES/51/122, 4 February 1997.
20 UNGA Res. 1348 (XIII) 15 December 1958; UNGA Res. 1472 (XIV) 12 December 1959; 
UNGA Res. 1721 (XVI) 20 December 1961.
21 Op. cit., note 3, Articles I & IX.
22 M. Couston, Droit spatial, Ellipses, Paris, 2014, p. 103.
23 UN doc A/AC.105/85, Annex 1, p. 9, 3 July 1970.
24 S.  Gorove, “Interpretations of international space law for private enterprise”, ADAS, 1982, 
p. 319.
25 L. Peyrefitte, Droit de l’espace, Précis Dalloz, Paris, 1993, p. 59.
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7ciple entails significant practical measures, such as mutual assistance, and some26 
consider that it could constitute the basis for an international public service, as 
defined by Charles Chaumont.27 All in all, the “Common Interest” principle does not 
seem to be self-executing in and of itself. However, it can be conceived that it could 
form the basis of an international obligation to cooperate for active debris removal, 
just as it was used to found the creation of UNCOPUOS in 1958.28
Secondly, it should be noted that the Earth’s orbits are subject to specific rules, not 
only thanks to the current international body of space law, but to the rest of interna-
tional law as well. Article III of the Outer Space Treaty indeed stipulates that states 
parties shall carry on their space activities in accordance with international law.29 This 
formulation, while seemingly obvious, objectively determines the outlines of certain 
concepts and other principles. It also means that while states parties must abide by 
space law, they are not exempt from other principles of international law simply 
because their activities happen in outer space. Indeed, several provisions of interna-
tional law should be mentioned for their potential applicability to Active Debris 
Removal. For example, Article 33§2 of the ITU convention of Malaga Torremolinos—
which most closely concerns the management of Earth’s orbits—highlights the fact 
that “radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural 
resources” and that they must be used “efficiently and economically”.30 This article is 
the basis for the ITU’s Orbit/Spectrum Allocation Procedure, ensuring an equitable 
allotment of limited natural resources to all nations. But considering the essential 
nature of geostationary orbits for all kinds of telecommunications in contemporary 
society, it seems crucial not only to use them in an efficient manner but also to ensure 
the sustainable development of these orbits for the future. Arguably, mitigating the 
effects of the tragedy of the commons,31 and preventing a catastrophic implementation 
of the Kessler syndrome, fits well within such a goal. Thus it seems logical to consider 
that member states of the ITU should be legally bound to not only reduce to a mini-
mum their production of space debris, but to partake in active debris removal as well.
Finally, the UN space treaties have very little to say about pollution issues, and 
even the Moon Treaty, which is arguably the most advanced of these from an envi-
ronmental standpoint, has gained no more than 15 states parties, which renders the 
instrument practically meaningless. It could be argued however that principles taken 
direct from international environmental law might be applied to the Earth’s orbits as 
26 M. Couston, op. cit., note 22, p. 105.
27 C. Chaumont, “Perspectives d’une théorie du service public à l’usage du droit international con-
temporain”, in La technique et les principes du droit public. Études en l’honneur de Georges 
Scelle, t. 1, Paris, LGDJ, 1950, pp. 115–178.
28 UNGA, Question of the peaceful use of outer space, res 1348 (XIII), 13 December 1958.
29 Op. cit., note 3, Article III.
30 International Telecommunications Convention, 25 October 1973, (entered into force on 1 
January 1975), Malaga Torremolinos, Art. 33. URL: http://search.itu.int/history/
HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/5.10.61.en.100.pdf.
31 Lotta Viikari, “Environmental aspects of space activities”, Handbook of Space Law, Frans Von 
Der Dunk (dir.) with Fabio Tronchetti, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 1100 p., p. 717.
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8the foundation of a joint task, and most precisely the principle of sustainable devel-
opment. The concept was first introduced in 1987 in the Brundtland Commission’s 
report “Our Common Future”.32 According to the definition given in that report, 
sustainable development is development that “meets the needs of the present gen-
eration without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs”. The Stockholm Declaration of 197233 frequently referred to sustainable 
development, and two decades later the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development34 set out the concept in more detail. Though it had no binding effect 
on its own, the principle of sustainable development has since attained widespread 
endorsement and has been incorporated in various other international instruments as 
well as legally binding treaties.
It could also be argued that obligations of international environmental law may 
have an erga omnes value, especially those pertaining to the protection of the global 
environment, as was addressed by the ICJ in the 1974 Nuclear Tests cases.35 The 
principle of sustainable development was even directly referred to by the ICJ in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case of 1997.36 In this last case, Hungary tried to have an 
erga omnes value applied to the precautionary principle in order to invalidate a 1977 
Treaty concluded with Slovakia, an argument that was later rejected by the court. It 
can be concluded that, currently, there is no international obligation that develop-
ment be sustainable, especially in space law, although it has been argued that protec-
tion of the space environment is an obligation erga omnes.37 It could however easily 
acquire a binding value if integrated in the corpus spatialis, thus founding an inter-
national obligation to cooperate for active debris removal.
While none of the aforementioned principles drawn from the different bodies of 
international law could on their own form the legal basis to set up a joint task of 
Active Debris Removal with the objective of ensuring the safety of Earth’s orbits 
and the sustainable development of Mankind’s space activities—or at the very least 
justify the adoption of a legally binding document—a combination of these might 
be able to. Indeed, it seems today that the adoption of an international agreement is 
the only viable option to ensure safety for future space activities. Such a document 
would not only need to increase the level of cooperation between states, but also 
devise a way to efficiently manage space debris removal. The adoption of a legally 
binding treaty thus seems unavoidable.
32 World Commission on Environment and Development.
33 UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 15 December 1972, A/
RES/2994, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1c840.html [accessed 12 November 
2017].
34 UNGA, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 12 August 1992, A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol. I).
35 Lotta Viikari, The environmental element in Space Law: assessing the present and charting the 
future, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2008, p. 140.
36 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7.
37 Lotta Viikari, op. cit., note 35, p. 149.
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91.4  The Implementation of a Specialized International 
Treaty
The issues of contemporary space activities mainly focus on the establishment of 
the sustainable development of human activities in a precious environment. As pre-
viously said, a few key items have already been the subject of several attempts to 
formulate rules of different form, including a variety of recommendations, charters, 
guidelines, and codes of conduct, but could benefit from being integrated into a 
more compelling international regime. As such, it would seem relevant to make all 
the aforementioned soft law into a comprehensive and binding treaty. This regime, 
adopted on the basis of the existence of an international obligation to cooperate in 
order to ensure the sustainable development of outer space activities, would need to 
deal with the following issues.
First, it seems imperative to resolve the matter of the absence of a clear definition of 
“space debris”. Current international law states that “[t] he term of ‘space object’ 
includes component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts 
thereof”.38 It should be noted that these space objects are the only subjects of the 
Liability Convention and Registration Convention, as well as Article VII (state liability 
for damage) and VIII (registration of space objects) of the Outer Space Treaty, while 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty only regulates “activities in outer space”.39 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the subject matter designated as “space object” 
is a dedicated description for the purposes of the Liability and Registration Conventions, 
that is to say only a part of the body of international space law.40 While satellites, launch 
vehicles, and trans-orbital vehicles (including rovers), obviously fall into the aforemen-
tioned definition, space debris are far more ambiguous. The fact that they are neither 
registered nor registrable, and that they are out of any sort of control, makes it that much 
harder for a state to apply the liability regime in order to receive damages.
Lucien Rapp identifies several major difficulties with the application of the stan-
dard liability regime to space debris.41 First, assimilating ‘space debris’ into the 
term ‘space object’ would seem to be a far too extensive interpretation of existing 
space law, especially considering both the nature and number of these debris. 
Additionally, Rapp points out the difficulty of proving a causal link between dam-
age suffered by a standard space object and debris in orbit, as well as the question 
of the identification of a liable state. And lastly, the absence of any mandatory inter-
38 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 March 1972, 
961 UNTS 187; 24 UST 2389; 10 ILM 965 (1971) (entered into force 1 September 1972), art 1(d), 
URL: http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_26_2777E.pdf; Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, 6 June 1975, 28 UST 695, 1023 UNTS 15 (entered into force 
15 September 1976), art 1(b), URL: http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_29_3235E.pdf.
39 Op. cit., note 3, Articles VI, VII & VIII.
40 Yu Takeuchi, Legal aspects of international regime for space traffic management, Institute of Air 
and Space Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University, 2014, 100p., p. 59.
41 Lucien Rapp, “Repenser le contentieux relatif aux débris spatiaux”, in Laurence Ravillon, Le 
règlement des différends dans l’industrie spatiale, LexisNexis, 2016, p. 251.
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national standard, from which it would be possible to assess the behaviour of the 
state concerned and determine whether or not this behaviour is at fault, makes it 
nearly impossible to deal with space debris in the same way as a regular space 
object. This further highlights the need for an update of international space law.
Second, some authors42 have suggested that an ADR regime should be modelled 
on the 2007 Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks.43 This 
specific regime is based on three principles: the liability of the wreck’s owner for the 
costs of locating, signalling and removing said wreck; the requirement for insurance 
to compensate for a possible failing of the owner, with verification by the state of 
registration; and the right of the state to take direct action against the insurer or any 
other person from whom the financial guarantee covers the liability of the owner. 
This regime would certainly have to be adapted to the specificity of active debris 
removal, mainly for two reasons44: wrecks—contrary to most space debris—may 
still have commercial value, and they are notably easier to remove. According to 
Rapp, the solution might lie in the fostering of commercial interests and the advent 
of space debris removal as a lucrative activity. It has also been suggested by some45 
to simply create a commercial activity equivalent to that of the removal of wrecks. 
Rapp adds that such an activity could be financed by an international fund financed 
by launching states and operators, in a “Pay or Play” fashion akin to electronic com-
munications.46 He then suggests that the future multiplication of space debris-related 
disputes would most probably be met with two answers.47 The first possibility is that 
these disputes, based on national policies, would be dealt with by national jurisdic-
tions, which eliminates the need for an intervention by the international community. 
The second possibility, inspired by three Japanese authors,48 is to substitute a liabil-
ity for fault with a liability of each operator for a defective product. The failure of 
the operator to fulfil its obligation of removal would then be construed as a defect of 
the product itself.
Finally, a dedicated international treaty would need to address the gaps in the 
state responsibility and liability regime for damages caused by space activities. The 
current liability system of international space law establishes fault-based liability 
for in-orbit damages and absolute liability for ground damages.49 But both provi-
42 Ibid., pp. 258–261.
43 International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, Nairobi, 18 May 2007 (entry into force 14 
April 2015). URL: http://www.bahamasmaritime.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Nairobi-
International-Convention-on-the-Removal-of-Wrecks-2007.pdf.
44 Lucien Rapp, op. cit., note 41, p. 259.
45 W. Munters and J. Wouters, “The road not yet taken for defusing potential conflicts in Active 
Debris Removal: a Multilateral Organization”, 4th Manfred Lachs International Conference on 
Conflicts in Space and the Rule of Law, 27–28 May 2016.
46 Lucien Rapp, op. cit., note 41, p. 260.
47 Ibid., pp. 262–263.
48 S. Kozuka, M. Uchitomi and H. Kishindo, “The international regime for space debris remedia-
tion in light of commercialized of space activities”, Proceeding IISL, 2013.
49 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 March 1972, 
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sions leave gaps in regard to contemporary space activities. First, the gap between 
the state exercising jurisdiction and control over a space activity (or “State of regis-
try”), as per Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, and the state authorizing and 
supervising the activity, as per Article VI of said Treaty. For example, if a private 
company in state A were to contract with a launch operator from state B to launch a 
space object, state A would normally consult with state B regarding the object’s 
registration in accordance with Article II.2 of the Registration Convention.50 
However, a problem could occur if state B were to transfer the satellite’s operation 
to a third state (state C) after having operated it for a certain amount of time. Since 
the “State of registry” is assumed to be the launching state,51 how can state C exer-
cise its jurisdiction and control over the satellite?
The problem with the concept of “launching state” is that the liability regime of 
the UN space treaties does not seem to consider that the operation of a spacecraft 
could be conducted by a different state. This discrepancy between the role of a 
launching state and an “operating State”, as well as generally insufficient coordina-
tion among launching states, highlights the need to entrust certain responsibilities to 
the appropriate states.52 As for in-orbit damages, as the case of Cosmos-Iridium 
pointed out, identifying the liable state is relatively difficult because of the labori-
ousness of collecting objective data on the circumstances of the collision. The 
implementation of an SSA data sharing regime, part of a future treaty, could help 
determine liability more easily.
Finally, concerning ground damages, the Liability Convention of 1971 doesn’t 
address the potential risk of damaging daily activities on the ground as—sometimes 
critical—systems malfunction might occur due to in-orbit collision. Should ground 
damages be considered fault liability, or should in-orbit damages be considered the 
sole liability? The lack of major accidents involving third party damages on the 
ground has kept this issue from being resolved by the international community, but 
the question calls for an answer. An international treaty could clarify the situation as 
well as the responsibility and liability regime that weighs or does not weigh on 
states for debris-related damages.
It seems that most issues that contemporary space activities suffer from could be 
resolved by the adoption of an international regime focused on the management of 
orbit pollution and space debris. Not only would it help to develop international 
cooperation regarding the exchange of information and data on Space Situational 
Awareness, but also on space debris mitigation and removal as well, allowing for 
safer orbits for all space activities and actors. Moreover, developing the liability 
system of the UN space treaties to incorporate Space Traffic Management would 
961 UNTS 187; 24 UST 2389; 10 ILM 965 (1971) (entered into force 1 September 1972). URL: 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_26_2777E.pdf.
50 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 6 June 1975, 28 UST 695, 
1023 UNTS 15 (entry into force 15 September 1976). URL: http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/
ARES_29_3235E.pdf.
51 Ibid., Art. I.
52 Yu Takeuchi, op. cit., note 40, p. 68.
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enable states to conduct their space operations without fear of not being compen-
sated for potential damages. Such a treaty would make outer space safe enough to 
sustain the further development of space activities.
1.5  The Creation of a Dedicated International Organization
But, is an international treaty sufficient to ensure that these requirements are met 
with? Could a dedicated international organization be created with the purpose of 
implementing the principles of such a treaty? Should it be? The idea here would be 
to establish an inter-governmental organization based on the early INTELSAT 
model to foster the development of the technology(ies) for active debris removal 
and on-orbit satellite servicing, and subsequently to perform removal and servicing 
operations on a commercial basis. Such an organization could not only act as a 
clearinghouse charged with collecting and redistributing SSA information and data, 
but could actively coordinate the launches of space objects around the world, as well 
as the management of space debris in orbit, in order to avoid collisions and maintain 
control over the re-orbiting or de-orbiting of said debris. If appropriate, it could also 
settle disputes between states according to new rules of responsibility and liability 
and, ultimately, enact regulations relevant to its domain of competence.
The first issue to address is the need for a comprehensive Space Situational 
Awareness Information and Data Sharing legal framework, in order to settle politi-
cal challenges and assure the effective and transparent provision of unified SSA 
information and data to spacecraft and space object operators on a global scale. To 
accomplish that, it seems crucial to consider the establishment of an international 
clearinghouse for data and information sharing, based on Article X of the Outer 
Space Treaty of 1967, which promotes international cooperation by asking states 
parties to consider requests to observe space objects launched by other states par-
ties. The Space Data Association Limited (SDA), which was founded by the three 
major worldwide satellite operators (Inmarsat, Intelsat and SES), could be used as a 
model for such a clearinghouse, since the necessity of this type of structure is widely 
recognized by both commercial and civil governmental operators. While in Air 
Traffic Management the provision of services from states is achieved by dividing 
airspace into multiple flight information regions (FIR), the nature of space activities 
does not allow for the same system. Indeed, satellites in LEO can go around the 
Earth in about ninety minutes, passing over a country in a few seconds. Using a 
similar technique as flight information regions for STM would not be realistic, espe-
cially since the concept implies the mutual recognition of every state having “com-
V. Degrange
13
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”,53 which does 
not exist in international space law.54
Therefore, it seems more efficient to designate a clearinghouse as the central data 
provider for STM, instead of requiring each state to directly provide information for 
its own space operations.55 This Data Sharing Center56 would be charged with gath-
ering observation and operation data from SSA entities and operators in order to 
then provide the information necessary for space activities to the operators con-
cerned with space traffic. This clearinghouse could also delete, or anonymise sensi-
tive information and data (for example relative to matters of national security) upon 
request from data providers. For now, only the respective militaries of the U.S. and 
Russia can provide comprehensive information and data for SSA, but the limited 
ability of other states (such as Australia, China, France, Germany or Japan) could 
still be used to increase data accuracy. Data provision from concerned states could 
be on a voluntary basis at first, but eventually it would have to become a legal obli-
gation in order to achieve constant data gathering on an equal basis among all space-
faring nations. A new international treaty would be needed to impose such 
obligations on states.
Second, after setting up a regime imposing obligations on states parties, it would 
be needed to create a dispute settlement organism charged with dealing with matters 
of responsibility and liability according to the updated Corpus spatialis. The cre-
ation of a supranational judicial body on the basis of a legal corpus, which can be 
very limited (such as the international body of space law), is likely to produce an 
efficient legal system.57 It is no longer possible to ignore the fact that new sources of 
law have emerged,58 beyond the usual procedure of international negotiation 
between governments. In the specific context of space law, it can also be noted that 
no international jurisdiction except the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is com-
petent to settle space-related disputes. The creation of a specialized supranational 
judicial body could then be a sufficiently flexible method of creating standards to 
accommodate the evolution of space technologies and activities. Such a judicial 
body could be chaired by specialized judges, but also allow non-states parties, such 
53 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295, ICAO Doc 7300/6 
(entered into force 4 April 1947), Art. 1, URL: http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_
orig.pdf.
54 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 205, 18 UST 
2410, TIAS No 6347, 6 ILM 386 (entered into force on 10 October 1967), rt. 2, URL: http://www.
unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_21_2222E.pdf.
55 Yu Takeuchi, op. cit., note 40, pp. 52–53.
56 Ibidem.
57 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, “Le droit, source et forme de régulation mondiale”, in Jacquet Pierre, 
Pisani-Ferry Jean, Tubiana Laurence (eds), Gouvernance mondiale, (Rapport du conseil d’Analyse 
économique n°37, La documentation française, 2010) p. 313.
58 For example, the creation of private international law at the initiative of enterprises, and the 
intensification of the production of public international law following the establishment of the 
World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
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as private firms, to make their cases before the court. Moreover, the creation of such 
a judicial body could become a necessity considering that the increase in space 
activities will most certainly be accompanied by an increase in the number of dis-
putes. However, the ICJ is not equipped to deal with a potentially huge number of 
cases. The creation of a space-related judicial body, if not only a space debris-related 
court, would allow for more efficient management of litigation and for the increase 
of the body of space law through jurisprudence.
The idea of a World Space Organization was proposed for the first time in 1968 in 
Vienna at UNISPACE-I, and then finally postponed in 1982 (UNISPACE-II). The 
subject appeared again in 1999 during UNISPACE-III, when the representative of 
the Greek delegation, M. Vasily Cassapoglou, raised the fact that space activities 
and space exploration were increasingly escaping from effective control by interna-
tional institutions, and that one could almost call this “new global neo-colonialism”.59 
Ms. Simone Courteix was a supporter of the creation of a WSO60 in the creation of 
which states would participate and under which they would continue to work 
together to establish long term goals. The CERDE has already identified several 
areas and themes that might require the creation of such an organization, including 
the implementation of programs of launch services that could benefit developing 
countries (transfer of technology, creation of spatial data bank or specialized staff 
training), as well as the coordination and control of the growing and sometimes 
alarming number of objects launched into space.61
Furthermore, as part of the development of the exploitation of resources in outer 
space, project OASIS62 has developed the idea of a spaceport network infrastructure 
enabling, in the long term, the exploitation of resources on Mars. The first step of 
the project would be to build a “node” in LEO, capable of offering in-orbit services 
(refuelling, reparation, etc.) that would work under the authority of an International 
Spaceport Authority (ISPA) and offer services via a Spaceport Company (SCP). The 
ISPA would be created through a public-private partnership (PPP), following the 
example of Arianespace, and the SCP would have member states as shareholders.63 
Such an Authority could be able to fulfil the role of the aforementioned 
WSO. However, the idea of creating this ISPA through a PPP could be problematic: 
while the example of Arianespace offers some hope, it should be recalled that the 
European Union failed to finance the GALILEO GNSS program through a private- 
59 Juan Manuel de Farimiñan Gilbert et Claudio Zanghi, “L’organisation mondial de l’Espace, un 
défi oublié?”, in Armel KERREST, L’adaptation du droit de l’espace à ses nouveaux défis, 
A. Pedone, 2007, 318 p.
60 Ibidem.
61 Ibidem.
62 Clegg et  al., ISU Team OASIS (September 2012) Operations and Service Infrastructure for 
Space. Team Project: Spaceports, Final Report Edition, SSPI2, Strasbourg, France, International 
Space University (ISU), 105 pages.
63 Mueller et al., “Effective Utilization of Resources and Infrastructure for a Spaceport Network 




public partnership, and was even slowed down by the subsequent disagreements 
that sprung from the discussions.64
The creation of such an organization would encounter some difficulties as, of 
course, such programs are generally established by individual states, and that such 
activities can concern important economic and industrial interests, but also national 
security, etc. All these considerations explain the reluctance so far of states to par-
ticipate in large-scale cooperation in this area, and the preference for international 
agreements of limited scope. For all these reasons, it now seems important to focus 
on contemporary and future forms of cooperation in space and their influence on 
space Law, both domestic and international.
1.6  Conclusion
To conclude this paper, it should be reminded that the Corpus spatialis established 
by the UN space treaties holds some lacunae of law. While various new issues did 
not exist at the time of negotiation of these treaties, the recent development of tele-
communications and the promise of new prospects for the exploration and exploita-
tion of outer space (space tourism, deep space mining, etc.) reveal the gaps left by 
States during the first Space Race and the need for an update of international space 
law. The subsequent increase of both space traffic and the number of space debris 
therefore has to be dealt with in an efficient manner, preferably with the participa-
tion of all space-faring nations as the existence of an international obligation to 
cooperate has previously been proven. The development of national regulations 
hold out until now and will probably still hold for at least a few years on specific 
issues, but an international treaty would be ideal to deal with other issues that can’t 
be settled by individual States such as the need to ensure the sustainability of Earth’s 
orbits and to make outer space in general a safer environment to conduct 
operations.
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Chapter 2
Dispute Resolution in the Context of ADR: 
A Public International Law Perspective
Valentina Nardone
Abstract Bearing in mind that there are currently no dedicated instruments 
dealing with dispute settlement in the area of ADR, States and/or private entities 
can resort to other available dispute settlement mechanisms in international law, 
such as diplomatic means or adjudicative methods. After an examination of the 
pros and cons of existent mechanisms, this paper will advocate the creation of a 
specialized International Governmental Organization tasked with the develop-
ment and operation of active debris removal technology and equipped with a 
specialized body or tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction over ADR related 
disputes.
2.1  Introduction
Active Debris Removal (hereinafter, ADR) is one of the commonly known regimes 
proposed to start cleaning-up outer space, by targeting debris already orbiting 
around the Earth. In addition to mitigation efforts, which address, conversely, the 
rate of the creation of new pieces of space debris, ADR projects are currently being 
elaborated by space agencies around the world in order to undertake the precaution-
ary action against the potential catastrophic consequences that collisions between a 
space object and space debris could generate in outer space and on Earth alike.1 In 
this sense, ADR strategies are a significant tool to ensure outer space security, safety 
and sustainability.2
1 For a technical discussion on the application of the precautionary principle to the outer space 
environment, see O. de Oliveira Bittencourt Neto, Preserving the Outer Space Environment: The 
“Precautionary Principle” Approach to Space Debris, in Proceedings of the International Institute 
of Space Law, The Hague, 2013, p. 341 ss.
2 For a further analysis about space sustainability, see R. A. Williamson, Assuring the sustainability 
of space activities, in Space policy, 2012, p. 154 ss.
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More precisely, based on a new concept of environmental protection, ADR strat-
egies address outer space sustainability in more than one way. First, in the short 
term, the gradual elimination of dangerous debris in orbit enhances the confidence 
of satellite operators that the services they offer will be secure from interruption or 
malfunction; second, in the long term, it helps safeguard outer space availability for 
future generations, assuring its effective sustainable use.
Far from being a purely technical matter, ADR entails economic, policy and legal 
concerns, thus necessitating a multidisciplinary approach. Here, the legal question 
of dispute resolution will be addressed. As ADR is a very dangerous and complex 
activity, differences of opinion among involved actors can easily arise, including 
both States and private entities. In fact, along with public bodies, such as space 
agencies and governments, private entities can also be involved in this brand-new 
activity, which is considered an attractive business opportunity. For this reason, in 
particular, it is important to understand the current dispute settlement mechanisms 
that are available for disputes over ADR matters, and to assess their accessibility 
and efficiency.
Moreover, such mechanisms are of the utmost importance as their presence con-
tributes to the establishment of a clearer framework that is easy to resort to in case 
of necessity, thus minimizing the risk of countermeasures that could be very danger-
ous, given the main characteristics of the space domain. In this sense, and as an 
integral part of ADR strategies, dispute settlement mechanisms can be seen, mutatis 
mutandis, as another means of ensuring the security, safety and sustainability of 
outer space activities.
Given the international character of the area in which ADR actions would take 
place, as well as the potential multinationalism of the actors involved, the most 
appropriate perspective to be assumed is the international law perspective. Before 
drawing some conclusions on dispute settlement characteristics in the context of 
ADR, and in the light of the lack of dedicated instruments, the following pages will 
assess the suitability of current mechanisms of dispute settlement in international 
(space) law, highlighting some critical points; then, building on the proposal to 
establish a specialized ADR International Governmental Organization (hereinafter, 
IGO),3 it will be argued that it will eventually need to be equipped with specific 
competences on compulsory dispute settlement.
3 This idea has been recently proposed in this contribution: W. Munters, J. Wouters, The road not 
yet taken for defusing conflicts in active debris removal: a multilateral organization, Working 




2.2  Current Mechanisms and Their Accessibility
Before going into detail, it should be clarified that the analysis here proposed 
focuses mainly on the accessibility of the mechanisms concerned. In other words, 
current dispute settlement means in international (space) law are classified on the 
basis of their personal scope, i.e. whether they are accessible only by States or also 
by private entities.
2.2.1  Inter-States Litigation
As it is well known, space law has thus far paid little to no attention to dispute settle-
ment. Among the five international treaties establishing a binding legal framework 
concerning the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,4 only one 
contains explicit procedural provisions on compensation for damage caused by 
space objects in outer space as well as on Earth. In fact, the 1972 Liability Convention 
provides for the possibility of setting up a body (a “Claim Commission”) when a 
dispute fails to be settled through direct negotiations. However, even if this provi-
sion is a significant step forward, its potential weight is undermined by the fact that 
a Claim Commission’s decisions have a recommendatory nature, i.e. they are not 
binding on the parties to a dispute concerning compensation.5
Setting aside liability issues, which not always at stake in a dispute concerning 
space activities in general, and potentially ADR in particular,6 space treaties are not 
very helpful in defining the means for dispute settlement. However, the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty (hereinafter, OST) contains a very important disposition that deals 
with the applicability of international law and the Charter of the United Nations to 
the outer space domain. Apart from Article I.2, that also deals with international 
law,7 Article III of the OST reads as follows:
4 Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 UNTS 205 (1967) (Outer Space Treaty); 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, 672 UNTS 119 (1968); Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 961 UNTS 187 (1971); Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, 1023 UNTS 15 (1975); Agreement Governing the Activities of States 
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1363 UNTS 3 (1979).
5 For a more detailed overview of dispute settlement means in space law, see M. Williams, Dispute 
resolution regarding space activities, in F. Von Der Dunk, F. Tronchetti (eds.), Handbook of space 
law, Cheltenham, 2015, p. 995 ss.
6 For further information about liability for space debris, see H.  Kazemi, A.  A. Golroo, 
H. Mahmoudi, Liability for Space Debris in the Framework of Private International Space Law, in 
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2013, p. 367 ss.
7 Article I.2 of the OST reads as follow: “2. Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a 
basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas 
of celestial bodies”.
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States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, includ-
ing the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and 
security and promoting international cooperation and understanding (emphasis added).
As has been acknowledged, this Article implies that the international law appli-
cable to outer space includes “not only long-established rules of customary interna-
tional law, such as the principles of good faith and of pacta sunt servanda, but also 
basic and explicit tenets of international law that have found their way into the UN 
Charter. Examples are the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and […] 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes (emphasis added)”.8
This finding is supported by two important considerations. On the one hand, 
space law is not a self-contained regime in international law.9 On the other hand, 
recent initiatives aimed at facilitating transparency and confidence-building in outer 
space activities have recalled the importance of the principle of peaceful settlement 
of disputes: for example, point 12 of the Preamble of the (moribund?) Draft 
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities promoted by the European 
Union calls on subscribing States to reaffirm “existing commitments to resolve any 
dispute concerning activities in outer space by peaceful means”. After all, according 
to some prominent scholars, the obligation of peaceful settlement of international 
disputes has acquired the status of customary international law, being the natural 
consequence of the prohibition on the threat or use of force.10
In the light of the aforementioned considerations, it is evident that international 
rules on the peaceful settlement of disputes that are in force even in outer space, 
must also apply to disputes concerning ADR activities. More precisely, according to 
Article 33 of the UN Charter, States parties to a dispute concerning ADR activities 
8 O. Ribbelink, Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K.-U. Schrogl 
(eds.), Cologne Commentary on Space Law. Volume 1: Outer Space Treaty, Köln, 2009, p. 67. The 
same author talking specifically about the applicability of UN Charter underlines that “[i]t is undis-
puted that a very substantial part of the Charter of the United Nations is applicable to human activi-
ties in outer space. This includes […] obligations which can be found in Chapter VI, Articles 
33–38, on ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’ […]”.
9 The term “self-contained” entered the domain of international law thanks to the decision on the 
S.  S. Wimbledon case (Case of the S.S “Wimbledon”, (Brittany, France, Italy and Japan (with 
Poland as intervener) v. Germany) 17 August 1923, PCIJ) adopted by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ); the first case in which the entire locution “self-contained regime” was 
used is the Teheran Hostages case (Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff 
in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), 24 May 1980, ICJ) rendered by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). In this famous case the Court found that rules on diplomatic law constitute 
a self-contained regime provided with autonomy, not needing the help of the rules on State respon-
sibility contained in the dedicated ILC Draft. However, the Court failed to define the main charac-
teristics of such a regime, leaving on legal scholars the burden to answer the question. For an 
authoritative explanation of what a self-contained regime in international law is, see B. Simma, 
D.  Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law, in 
European Journal of International Law, 2006, pp. 483–529.
10 A. Cassese, Diritto internazionale, Bologna, 2006, p. 316 ss.
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have the freedom to have recourse by mutual consent to two categories of 
mechanisms.11
On the one hand, States can resort to negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilia-
tion or good offices, which together are commonly referred to as diplomatic means 
of dispute settlement, involving only the parties to a dispute or even a neutral third 
party that helps them to ascertain the facts and/or to reach a solution. These means 
are non-binding in nature and they result in the adoption of non-compulsory propos-
als for the settlement of the dispute. Given the sensitive nature of information about 
space assets and satellites, States will be inclined to choose diplomatic means, prob-
ably negotiations, to be able to ensure the confidentiality of the information con-
cerned. This is the method Russia and Canada decided to follow in the Kosmos 954 
case.
Conversely, States are free to resort to adjudicative methods of dispute settle-
ment, i.e. arbitration or judicial settlement. In this case, the third party involved 
would be an official arbitrator (or a panel of arbitrators) or a tribunal; at the same 
time, the solution adopted would be contained in an award binding upon the parties 
to the dispute.
As far as judicial means are concerned, we should not forget the significant role 
that the International Court of Justice (hereinafter, ICJ) could play in the interpreta-
tion of space law, reinforced by the possibility of creating ad hoc specialized cham-
bers in order to treat particular or technical cases.12 However, the potential function 
of the ICJ as a major center for dispute settlement in ADR related matters is under-
mined by two major factors. First, none of the space treaties inserted a jurisdictional 
clause on the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ stating that if parties disagree over 
the interpretation of application of them one may refer the dispute to it.13 Second, 
11 For a complete overview of the international jurisprudence dealing with space-related matters, 
see M.  Hofmann, Space Activities in the Jurisprudence of International Dispute Settlement 
Institutions, in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2014, p. 745 
ss.
12 Article 26 of the Statute of the ICJ reads as follows: “1. The Court may from time to time form 
one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges as the Court may determine, for dealing 
with particular categories of cases; for example, labor cases and cases relating to transit and com-
munications. 2. The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The 
number of judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval 
of the parties. 3. Cases shall be heard and determined by the chambers provided for in this article 
if the parties so request”.
13 Article 36 of the ICJ Statute: “1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the par-
ties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in 
treaties and conventions in force. 2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare 
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any 
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concern-
ing: the interpretation of a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact which, 
if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; the nature or extent of the 
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 3. The declarations referred to 
above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
states, or for a certain time. 4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of 
2 Dispute Resolution in the Context of ADR: A Public International Law Perspective
22
none of the spacefaring nations have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court provided for in Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.14 More generally, these fea-
tures limit the potential role of the ICJ in space law as a whole.15
Different is the case of arbitration. Thanks to the adoption of the 2011 PCA 
Outer Space Rules, matters can change significantly. However, given its importance 
for private entities participating in space activities, it will be discussed in the next 
paragraph.
2.2.2  The Position of Private Entities
The negative impact of the absence in international law of compulsory dispute set-
tlement mechanisms specifically designed to deal with space activities is amplified 
by the fact that none of the means traditionally available in international law and 
adaptable to ADR disputes are accessible to private parties: locus standi before 
international courts is normally allowed only to subjects of international law, i.e. 
States and IGOs.16 In fact, this “situation contributes to a climate of uncertainty 
potentially discouraging to private investors and companies interested in being 
involved in space activities”.17
Moreover, due to the progressive commercialization of outer space activities, it 
is impossible to deny that private entities are now at the center of the space arena; 
this feature has rocked the paradigm of the State-centric regime on which the entire 
corpus iuris spatialis internationalis has been based so far, and advanced mecha-
nisms of dispute settlement have proven to be necessary.18
As was anticipated, thanks to the adoption of the Optional Rules for Arbitration 
of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities (hereinafter, Outer Space Rules) 
made by the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the 
the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the 
Registrar of the Court. 5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the 
present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms. 6. In the event 
of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of 
the Court”.
14 Cfr. supra.
15 For a technical discussion, see G. M. Goh, Dispute Settlement in International Space Law. A 
Multi-Door Courthouse for Outer Space, Leiden-Boston, 2007, pp. 130–133.
16 An important exception are human rights courts and tribunals.
17 F. Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy, New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London, 
2013, p. 48.
18 For a more detailed discussion on the involvement of private entities in space debris remediation, 
see S. Kozuka, M. Uchitomi, H. Kishindo, The International Regime for Space Debris Remediation 
in Light of Commercialized Space Activities, Proceedings of the International Institute of Space 
Law, The Hague, 2013, p. 395 ss.
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6th December 2011, private entities now have the opportunity to access a means to 
solve disputes internationally.
After all, one of the main reasons on which the PCA based its decision to start a 
study on the feasibility of ad hoc rules for dispute settlement was exactly the lack of 
a valid means for settling disputes in the space sector, available to all the parties 
involved in space activities. As explained by the Advisory Group in charge of pre-
paring the Report accompanying the adoption of the Outer Space Rules, a major 
lacuna of international space law was the gap between norms and the novel charac-
teristics of the space sector, acquired in its evolution along three key standards: 
privatization, commercialization and internationalization. More precisely, the lim-
ited material and personal scope of existing rules and mechanisms of dispute settle-
ment were described as the most important deficiency. Besides, years earlier the 
same shortage was highlighted by the International Law Association (hereinafter, 
ILA) that, between the 1980s and 1990s, tried to elaborate two draft conventions on 
dispute settlement in the space sector.19
Even if a complete examination of these rules goes beyond the scope of the pres-
ent analysis,20 it is however important to sum up their key points.
First, they are voluntary in nature: this means that the Outer Space Rules do not 
constitute a compulsory mechanism for dispute settlement, and parties to a dispute 
are free to refer, or not, the controversy to the PCA, unless they previously decided 
to insert a compulsory clause in a contract or international treaty establishing a spe-
19 It is the case of the Convention on the Settlement of Space Law Disputes (1984) and its revision 
Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Related to Space Activities (1998). For the texts, see 
respectively ILA Report of the Sixty-First Conference, Paris, 1984, pp. 325-355, and ILA Report of 
the Sixty Eighth Conference, Taipei, 1998, pp. 239–275.
20 For a further analysis of this instrument, see, among others, C. Arbaugh, Gravitating Toward 
Sensible Resolution: The PCA Optional Rules for the Arbitration of Disputes relating to Outer 
Space Activities, in Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, p.  848 ss.; G.  J. 
Duberti, Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA). An Excellent Opportunity for Progressive Development of Space Law, 
in Proceeding of the International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2013, p. 143 ss.; C. Guzman 
Gomez, The Optional Rules of Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, a Real Option for the Solution of Conflicts in Space Matters?, in 
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2012, p. 756 ss; F. Pocar, An 
Introduction to the PCA’s Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes relating to Outer Space 
Activities, in Journal of Space Law, 2012, p. 185 ss.; F. Tronchetti, The PCA Rules for dispute 
settlement in outer space: A significant step forward, in Space Policy, 2013, p. 181 ss.; L. Viikari, 
Towards More Effective Settlement of Disputes in the Space Sector, in Lapland Law Review, 2011, 
p. 226 ss. For a more technical discussion concerning the validity of PCA Optional Rules for spe-
cific satellite services, see, A. Loukakis, The New HPCA’s Optional Rules for Arbitration and 
Their Relevance to Dispute Arising From Erroneous Navigational Signals, in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2014, p. 53 ss.; Macedo Scavuzzi Dos Dantos, 
The PCA’s Optional Rules for the Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities and 
Dispute Resolution in the ITU Regulatory System, in Proceeding of the International Institute of 
Space Law, The Hague, 2013, p. 157 ss.; F. Von Der Dunk, About the New PCA Rules and their 
Application to Satellite Communication Disputes, in M. Hofmann (ed.), Dispute resolutions in 
satellite communications and space law, Baden-Baden, 2015, p. 118 ss.
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cific duty in this sense. Another major merit of this instrument is that the decision 
taken by the arbitrator (or the panel of arbitrators) established according to the rules 
set forth in the Optional Protocol, is binding upon the parties. Third, arbitration is a 
flexible mechanism, and applicable law is decided by the parties.21
Moreover, this mechanism is appropriate as it preserves the confidentiality of the 
information at stake, as the decision is not made public, unless otherwise agreed. 
This feature is particularly important because of security concerns: States are nor-
mally reluctant to share their sensitive information on space assets, which are nor-
mally dual use. Private enterprises also prefer to keep space assets’ data secret, for 
example due to their interests in intellectual property rights. Another important 
aspect that should not be neglected is that the PCA Outer Space Rules take due 
account of the technical nature of space activities and the necessity for specialized 
experts to provide legal and technical support during arbitral proceedings. For this 
reason, Article 10(4) states that the PCA Secretary-General for the purpose of assist-
ing the parties in appointing arbitrators will make available a list of persons consid-
ered to have expertise in space legal matters. Similarly, Article 29(7) refers to a list 
of experts in scientific or technical matters.
In the light of the aforesaid characteristics, the PCA Outer Space Rules seem to 
be a valid instrument for the settlement of disputes related to ADR. Notwithstanding, 
the success of these rules in connection to ADR activities is dependent on the suc-
cess of the rules as a whole. In particular, as has been authoritatively acknowledged, 
“their success depends entirely on how much confidence they can inspire in the 
international community”.22 The main argument in favor of their success is twofold: 
on the one hand, PCA Optional Rules can successfully contribute to the develop-
ment of international space law under the auspices of the principle of legal certainty. 
On the other hand, we can expect that the Outer Space Rules will be as successful 
as other sets of special rules designed by the PCA and the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.23
21 Article 35 PCA Outer Space Rules: “1. In resolving the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall apply 
the law or rules of law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. 
Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the national and/or interna-
tional law and rules of law it determines to be appropriate. 2. The arbitral tribunal shall decide as 
amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono only if the parties have expressly authorized the arbitral 
tribunal to do so. 3. In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of 
the contract, if any, and shall take into account any usage of trade applicable to the transaction”.
22 F. Pocar, An Introduction to the PCA’s Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes relating to 
Outer Space Activities, in Journal of Space Law, 2012, p. 185 ss.
23 Moreover, it seems that Brazil and Argentina are negotiating an accord in which the would 
include an arbitration clause explicitly referring to the Outer Space Rules. Apparently even the 
European Space Agency declared its willingness to insert a similar clause in future contracts. In 
this sense, see F. Tronchetti, The PCA Rules for dispute settlement in outer space: A significant 
step forward, in Space Policy, 2013, p. 187. One legal scholar suggested the possibility for the 
International Telecommunication Union to the same choice: “Finally, the Rules could easily be 
implemented within the ITU regulatory system at two different levels: (1) either directly by chang-
ing the ITU instruments to include these Rules for use either on an optional or mandatory basis, or 
(2) indirectly, whereby States and satellite service operators could include in their service agree-
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However, more than 6 years after the adoption of these rules, there is no evidence 
of their practical implementation, as observed by members of the ILA Space Law 
Committee at the Johannesburg Conference in 2016.24 Additionally, in the 2015 
PCA Annual Report, after a brief reference to the Outer Space Rules, it is affirmed 
that in the last years the PCA has seen a growing number of investor State arbitra-
tions in the area of outer space activities, referring to cases related to the issuance, 
approval, and suspension of licenses, alleged nationalizations, and tax reassess-
ments in the context of satellite communications. One pending case involves a bilat-
eral investment treaty claim against India relating to the allocation of the S-band 
spectrum for satellite communications.25 However, it should be underlined that even 
though this case concerns space activities, the application of UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules has been requested. What happens in the future will thus demonstrate whether 
this is a symbol of the weakness of the Outer Space Rules, or a sign that States and 
private entities prefer to employ other procedural rules, whose functioning is 
well-known.26
ments leases, or contracts specific provisions mandating the use of PCA’s Space Rules to resolve 
conflicts that occur as a result of their activities in Outer Space”, in J.  Macedo Scavuzzi Dos 
Dantos, The PCA’s Optional Rules for the Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space 
Activities and Dispute Resolution in the ITU Regulatory System, in Proceeding of the International 
Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2013, p. 174.
24 In its conclusions concerning Dispute Settlement “[t]he Chair points out that it is extremely dif-
ficult to prove a universal negative, even more so regarding even the application of the PCA Rules. 
We should therefore continue exploring whether these Rules have ever been made effective, that is 
to say, if they have ever been applied -for better or worse- anywhere in the world to date. As recom-
mended by Masson-Zwaan the PCA could be of assistance in this quest. (In fact, the Chair had 
asked PCA officers about their awareness on the application of the Rules, and they had answered 
in the negative). She agrees we should approach organizations such as ESA, and private companies 
as well, to provide them with more information on the Rules, especially their positive aspects 
which make them consistent with the present scenarios. This is in line with Freeland’s and 
Marboe’s suggestion of further examining the pros and cons of the PCA Rules in certain cases. The 
recommendation is therefore to continue our task on this matter during the next biennium”.
25 CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Telcom Devas 
Mauritius Limited v. The Republic of India.
26 In order to spread the knowledge of this new instrument, the PCA is organizing many informative 
round, even in cooperation with important institutions. In the 2015 Report it is said that “[i]n 2015, 
the PCA continued its engagement with industry representatives, practitioners, and academics in 
the field of space law. In collaboration with the Space Law, Communications Law, and Arbitration 
committees of the International Bar Association, Senior Legal Counsel Judith Levine co-chaired 
and moderated a panel on the suitability of arbitration for the effective resolution of diverse space-
related disputes for the IBA’s annual conference in Vienna. Also in 2015, the European Space 
Agency attended a PCA information seminar for intergovernmental organizations focusing on the 
PCA’s dispute resolution services”.
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2.2.3  Questions That Remain Open
Even if it has been possible to establish that States and private entities can refer to 
some international mechanisms in order to settle their disputes concerning ADR 
activities, some other questions still remain to be answered.
Without claiming to be exhaustive, the first question to be addressed is the appli-
cable law conundrum. As is well known, international space law does not include 
any treaty dealing with space debris management. Additionally, since there is not 
even an agreed legal definition of what a space debris is, the applicability of space 
treaties is questioned because there is no consensus as to whether space debris can 
fall within the definition of a space object. Eventually, a detailed legal definition of 
space debris is necessary to make it possible to clearly identify removable objects 
and to actually define a more precise framework to manage ADR operations effec-
tively and deal with space disputes, too.
Other problems also arise, for example, regarding the interpretation of the juris-
diction and control principle, as well as the rights and duties of the State of 
registry.
Ultimately, however, an award rendered by an international court interpreting 
space law in the light of ADR will be important to establish an authoritative inter-
pretation, concurring or not with the positions expressed by legal scholars so far. 
Besides, the fact that no consensus about these questions has yet been achieved, 
means that other disputes on the interpretation of space treaties and application in 
the context of ADR can be easily triggered.27
27 More detailed analysis concerning legal issues at stake in relation to ADR are contained in the 
following research papers: J.  Chatterjee, Legal Issues Relating to Unauthorized Space Debris 
Remediation, in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2014, p. 13 
ss.; M.  K. Force, Legal Implications of Debris Removal, in Proceedings of the International 
Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2012, p. 727 ss.; M. K. Force, When the Nature and Duration 
of Space Becomes Appropriation: “Use” as a Legal Predicate for a State’s Objection to Active 
Debris Removal, in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2013, 
p.  405 ss.; V.  Gopalakrishnan, M.  Y. S.  Prasad, Space Debris Remediation  – Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility, in Proceedings of the international Institute of Space Law, The 
Hague, 2013, p. 379 ss.; O. S. Stelmakh, Space Debris – Emerging Challenges, Common Concern 
and Shared Responsibility: Legal Consideration and Directions towards Secure and Sustainable 
Space Environment, in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2013, 
p. 353 ss. E. Vitt, Space Debris. Physical and Legal Considerations, in Space Policy, May 1989, 
p.  129 ss.; O.  Volynskaya, G.  Zhukov, Long-Term Sustainability of Space Activities versus 
Imminent Danger from Space: Is Space Law Ready to Meet the Challenge?, in Proceedings of the 
International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2013, p. 359 ss.
V. Nardone
27
2.3  The Way Forward
Moving from the status quo, which can be absolutely improved, it is interesting to 
speculate on what would be the optimum, i.e. the best practicable solution to be 
implemented in order to acquire an efficient framework for the management of 
ADR activities, eventually equipped with mechanisms to solve disputes.
In particular, this paragraph responds to a recently presented proposal concern-
ing the creation of an IGO tasked with the development and operation of active 
debris removal technology: an international Active Debris Removal Organization 
(hereinafter, ADRO).28
The author understands that the creation of a new specialized IGO would entail 
extended and politically difficult multilateral negotiations. After all, consensus on 
space related topics is not easy to achieve, as shown by international space law his-
tory: the five space treaties were concluded a long time ago, and subsequent norma-
tive production has always taken the form of non-legally binding soft law 
instruments, shaped by the ever-changing international relations, and the differen-
tiation of actors involved. But in thinking about a new paradigm to be implemented, 
this is one of the best possible.
In the minds of the authors,29 the ADRO would be a means to cooperate peacefully 
and reduce multilateral actions with the purpose of pushing States and stakeholders 
beyond the current legal impasse. In particular, the ADRO could cumulatively
(i) accommodate the legal gaps on space debris in current international space law; (ii) share 
costs and liabilities; (iii) instigate renewed discussions and bypass political deadlocks in 
relevant forums; (iv) act as an institutionalized Transparency and Confidence-Building 
Measure in a nascent and uncertain domain of space activities, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly; (v) contribute to rapid amelioration of the space debris environment for the benefit 
of all mankind.30
In this sense, an ADRO could resolve most of the problems recalled above. In 
particular, it could be a means through which applicable law to ADR activities can 
be clarified once for all.
The main idea on which the proposed creation of an ADRO is actually based, i.e. 
the prominent role played nowadays by IGOs in the space arena, is shared by the 
writer, who recently proposed an analysis concerning the importance of IGOs, espe-
cially the International Telecommunication Union (hereinafter, ITU), in the imple-
mentation of Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in outer space 
activities.31
28 W. Munters, J. Wouters, The road not yet taken for defusing conflicts in active debris removal: a 
multilateral organization, Working Paper n°183, May 2017, available at https://ghum.kuleuven.be/
ggs/publications/working_papers/2017/wp183munters.pdf (23.11.17).
29 Cfr. supra.
30 Cfr. supra, pp. 27–28.
31 V. Nardone, The Implementation of TCBMs in Outer Space Activities: from the OST Principles 
to the International Space Governance Action, in Proceedings of the International Institute of 
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Taking the above into account, it is believed that the proposal concerning the 
creation of an ADRO could be efficiently updated with an additional characteristic, 
i.e. the provision of a tribunal or dispute settlement body with compulsory jurisdic-
tion on matters concerning disputes on ADR among Parties to the Organization, 
which should be open not only to States, but also to private entities and stakehold-
ers, as is the case in the ITU since the 1992/1994 institutional reform. Similar 
 proposals have been frequently advanced in the field of space law, due to the lack of 
a specialized tribunal for space matters.32
2.4  Conclusions
This analysis has aimed at giving an overview of dispute settlement mechanisms in 
the context of ADR, from the perspective of public international law, bearing in 
mind that no dedicated instruments are available.
Current mechanisms have been analyzed based on their accessibility.
On the basis of the obligation of to settle disputes peacefully, States have the 
freedom to solve their controversies through diplomatic channels or adjudicative 
methods, including the brand-new PCA Outer Space Rules. Even if adjudicative 
methods of dispute settlement are preferable as they result in binding decisions, 
rather than proposals or recommendations, as is the case for diplomatic means, in 
the event of disputes concerning ADR, States may favor opting for political solu-
tions that are able to preserve the confidentiality of space asset information. 
Nonetheless, it should be recalled that current adjudicative methods for dispute 
settlement are not compulsory.
As far as private entities are concerned, the PCA Outer Space Rules are the only 
accessible means. Even if their effectiveness has not yet been demonstrated, they 
constitute a valid instrument to be included in future contracts or treaties as a com-
pulsory dispute settlement clause.
Space Law, 2017, (forthcoming). There, it is said that due to the difficulties connected with the 
creation of new binding treaties and IGOs mandated with space security, safety and sustainability 
issues, IGOs already existent can effectively try to support the implementation of TCBMs updating 
or renewing their mandate. Conversely, the idea here proposed is based on a different assumption, 
supporting the creation of a new specialized ADRO as an idea able to promote the advancement of 
the legal impasse around ADR legal framework. However, the importance of IGOs in outer space 
activities’ management remains unchanged.
32 In this sense, see G.  M. Goh, Dispute Settlement in International Space Law. A Multi-Door 
Courthouse for Outer Space, Leiden-Boston, 2007; V. Veshchunov, E. Morozova, Establishment of 
a Specialized Tribunal under the International Telecommunication Union to Adjudicate Disputes 
as a Means to Improve the Efficiency of the Management of the Radio Frequency Spectrum, in 
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law, The Hague, 2013, p. 151 ss.
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Speculating on an optimal solution in the future, the creation of an ADRO, 
equipped with a specialized tribunal or body provided with compulsory jurisdiction 
on disputes concerning ADR, has been supported.
Valentina Nardone holds a Ph.D. in Public, Comparative and International Law. Valentina’s 
areas of interest are space and telecommunications law, in particular the issue of harmful interfer-
ence, human rights and asylum law. She has published in all these areas.
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Chapter 3
Jurisdiction and Control Aspects of Space 
Debris Removal
Gordon Chung
Abstract In recent years, the unrestrained creation of space debris by space-faring 
nations has gradually converted the outer space into an extraterrestrial dumping site. 
In view of this ongoing concern, legalising space debris removal by a non- registering 
state, under the existing international space law regime, is essential to invert such 
growing trends in debris population. While Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty 
(“OST”) merely confers “jurisdiction and control” over a space object to the “State 
of registry,” three specific aspects of this jurisdictional clause merit special atten-
tion, namely: the qualification of debris as a “space object”, the distinction between 
“identifiable” and “unidentifiable” objects, and the continuity of the granted “juris-
diction and control.” Particularly important is whether the granted “jurisdiction and 
control” attaches permanently to the registering state, or lapses with the conclusion 
of effective physical control. This article suggests that a balancing between the pro-
visions of the OST, especially Articles I and IX, seemingly favours the latter view 
and, at the end of the day, the establishment of a hierarchy of needs is necessary to 
be able to prioritise the conflicting interests of states under modern space law.
3.1  Introduction
Space debris has been a prominent environmental problem associated with space 
activities for the past few decades.1 In the late 1990s, the joint study by the Space 
Transportation Association (“STA”) and NASA already expressed concern about 
the possible collisions of space debris.2 In fact, the imaginings of science fiction 
may now be becoming a reality: following two major debris-generating break-up 
1 Lotta Viikari, Environmental Aspects of Space Activities, in handbook of space law 719 (Frans 
von der Dunk ed. 2015).
2 Daniel O’Neil et al., General Public Space Travel and Tourism, vol. 2, Workshop Proceedings, 
NASA/CP-1999-209146, 7–8, 10, 12–13 (1999).
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incidents,3 over 5500 debris particles were officially catalogued in July 2012.4 
Particularly given the absence of any binding international norms governing 
space debris,5 humanity is currently living in a world where the sky has become 
a “celestial dumping ground,” with many thousands of discarded satellites or 
unwanted space objects.6 It should be noted that space debris, due to its high 
velocity,7 endangers space assets by posing a significant collision threat to inter-
national space stations, spacecraft and other functional space objects.8 In addi-
tion, space debris may also be dangerous to those on the Earth—a refrigerator-sized 
early ammonia servicer jettisoned from the International Space Station fell to 
Earth in 2008.9
Today, in light of the ever-increasing amount of debris, legalising space debris 
removal can facilitate greater space security. In fact, studies already show that the 
capability to remove existing space debris is essential to reverse growth trend in the 
debris population that lies in orbit around the Earth.10 Some scholars go even further 
to argue that the mitigation of space debris has begun to be elevated into norms of 
customary international law, particularly in view of the ongoing commitment from 
several states to reduce debris.11 Yet, from a legal point of view, is the act of remov-
ing or deorbiting space debris considered legitimate under current international 
space law?12 This first begs the question of which state is legally entitled to remove 
space debris.13 Indeed, the answer to this question must begin with an understanding 
3 Early in 2007, China carried out an anti-satellite (ASAT) test through the destruction of its polar-
orbiting weather satellite. Two years later, the first accidental hypervelocity collision between 
Iridium 33 and Cosmos-2251 happened.
4 Viikari, supra note 1, 721.
5 Fabio Tronchetti, Fundamentals of space law and policy 20–21 (2013). The Inter-Agency Space 
Debris Coordination Committee (“IADC”) had developed space debris mitigation guidelines in 
2002, which later served as the basis for the formulation of the non-legally binding guidelines 
adopted by UNCOPUOS in 2009.
6 Dirk C. Gibson, Commercial space tourism: impediments to industrial development 97 (2012). 
See also David Ashford, Spaceflight Revolution 6, 48, 53, 92, 96, 152 (2002).
7 They can move around the Earth at a high speed of 7500 m/s.
8 Tronchetti, supra note 1, 20.
9 Drik C. Gibson, Terrestrial and Extraterrestrial Space Dangers: Outer Space Perils, Rocket Risks 
and the Health Consequences of the Space Environment 41 (2015).
10 Alessandro Chiesa et al., Enabling Technologies for Active Space Debris Removal: The Cadet 
Project, in Space Safety is no Accident: The 7th IAASS Conference 29 (Tommaso Sgobba & 
Isabelle Rongier eds. 2015).
11 See Ram S. Jakhu & Joseph N. Pelton, Global Space Governance: An International Study 345–
346 (2017); I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor & Vladimír Kopal, An Introduction to Space Law 9–10 
(2008): Michael Lobban, Custom, Common Law Reasoning and the Law of Nations in the 
Nineteenth Century, in The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical 
Perspective 274 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds. 2007).




of the nature of the fundamental “jurisdiction and control” concept in the current 
space law regime.
3.2  An Overview of Article VIII: The Fundamental 
“Jurisdiction and Control” Clause in International Space 
Law
Most fundamentally, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”) constitutes a 
customary law obligation14 and explicitly grants “jurisdiction and control” of a 
space object to the State of registry15 for an indeterminate period of time.16 Notably, 
this expression evolved from paragraph 7 of the 1963 UN Declaration,17 which skil-
fully avoids any reference to a more sensitive notion of state sovereignty or national 
territoriality in an extraterrestrial context.18 Accordingly, although the OST clearly 
prohibits national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty,19 a state is still entitled 
to exercise its sovereignty over its registered space objects.20 It is also noteworthy 
that Article VIII does not even prescribe any time factor limiting the retention of a 
State’s jurisdiction and control over the space objects under its registry. Seemingly, 
the provisions of Article VIII imply that, as a general rule, “no State is entitled to 
telecommand, divert or destroy space objects not subject to its jurisdiction, except 
by agreement, for good cause …”21
As far as terminologies are concerned, the expression “jurisdiction and control” 
is an aspect of sovereignty.22 Under Article VIII, “jurisdiction” and “control” should 
be read in totality and not in parts, as scholar Gabriel Lafferranderie has already 
pinpointed the inseparable nature of these two concepts—“jurisdiction should 
induce control, and control should be based on jurisdiction.”23 More specifically, the 
14 Bin Cheng, Studies in international space law Ch7 (1997).
15 OST, art. VIII.
16 Lotta Viikari, The environmental element in space law: assessing the present and charting the 
future 82 (2007).
17 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, annexed to the UNGA Resolution 1962 (XVII), ¶ 7.
18 Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Stephan Mick, Article VIII, in I Cologne Commentary on Space 
Law – Outer Space Treaty 520–521 (Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Kai-Uwe Schrogl 
eds. 2017).
19 OST, art. II.
20 Schmidt-Tedd & Mick, supra note 18, 520.
21 Clarence Wilfred Jenks, Space Law 238 (1965) (emphasis added).
22 See Vladlen S.  Vereshchetin, International Space Law and Domestic Law: Problems of 
Interrelations, 9 Journal of Space Law 31, 32 (1981).
23 Gabriel Lafferranderie, Jurisdiction and Control of Space Objects and the Case of an International 
Intergovernmental Organization (ESA), 54 German Journal of Air and Space Law (ZLW) 228, 231 
(2005).
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term “jurisdiction” here is understood to mean the “legislative, executive and juridi-
cal power” exercised by the State of registry in relation to personnel and objects in 
outer space.24 In contrast, the term “control” refers to the “exclusive right and the 
actual possibility to supervise the activities” of a space object or person and,25 in 
particular, activities that are aimed at “monitoring the technical condition of the 
space object,”26 thereby allowing states to fulfil their obligations under Article VI of 
the OST.27 Hence, due to the implicit constraint imposed by Article VIII, if a state, 
or a state licensed actor, desires to remove a space object, it can only legally do so 
“if it has legal jurisdiction and control over that space object or prior permission 
from the State of registry.”28 This then prompts the question of how a state can be 
qualified to be a “State of registry” in accordance with Article VIII, especially in the 
context of space debris removal.
3.3  Compelling Criteria for the Grant of “Jurisdiction 
and Control” Over Space Debris Under Article VIII
3.3.1  Condition 1: Is Space Debris Qualified as a “Space 
Object”?
As a starting point, one must note that Article I (d) of the Liability Convention (LC) 
defines a “space object” as including the “component parts of a space object as well 
as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”29 This first begs the question of whether 
space debris can actually amount to “component parts” and thus fall squarely within 
the definition of a “space object” under international space law. However, the defini-
tion provided under the LC is merely considered as a “partial definition.”30 Since 
there is no clear definition31 of the term “space object,” space law scholars attempt 
to answer this question by resorting to the application of two legal theories—the 
24 See Howard Baker, Space Debris: Legal and Policy Implications 68 (1989); Vereshchetin, supra 
note 21. See further Schmidt-Tedd & Mick, supra note 18, 521 (notably, a threefold distinction 
between “territorial,” “quasi-territorial” and “personal” jurisdiction is generally made under public 
international law).
25 Schmidt-Tedd & Mick, supra note 18, 521.
26 See Baker, supra note 24, 68.
27 Schmidt-Tedd & Mick, supra note 18, 521–522.
28 Ram Jakhu, Active Debris Removal  - An Essential Mechanism for Ensuring the Safety and 
Sustainability of Outer Space, 49th Session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 14 (2012).
29 LC, art. I(d).
30 Stephen Gorove, Toward a Clarification of the Term “Space Object”: An International Legal and 
Policy Imperative?, 21 J. Space L. 11, 13–14 (1993).




spatialist and the functionalist approaches.32 The spatialist approach, seeking to 
identify a physical boundary between airspace and outer space, interprets this 
generic term to cover any spacecraft, space vehicles and satellites that are physically 
located in an extraterrestrial environment.33 Simply put, anything launched by man 
for a mission into outer space can be properly regarded as a “space object.”34 To the 
contrary, the functional approach35 defines “space objects” as “any space instrument 
in its operational state,” regardless of its physical location.36 William Wirin adds to 
this definition by construing the expression to mean objects used in outer space “for 
collecting and transmitting information or for transportation and manufacturing 
processes […]”37 Accordingly, under both the spatialist38 and functionalist 
approaches,39 it seems that space objects should, at a minimum, include those 
located and functioning on the Moon or other celestial bodies.
While there has been no universal definition of what actually constitutes a “space 
debris,”40 it is understood to cover all man-made objects, including fragments and 
elements thereof, which are “non-functional” in outer space and thus serve no use-
ful purpose.41 More specifically, “non-functional spacecraft and orbital operations,” 
debris generated by accidental collisions or intentional destruction of space objects, 
as well as “debris accidentally or deliberately released during normal mission oper-
ations”, are all caught by the definition of “space debris.”42 At first sight, this ele-
32 Jakhu & Pelton, supra note 11, 54–55.
33 Bin Cheng, Space Activities, Responsibility and Liability for, 11 Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law 299–303 (1989); CHENG, supra note 14, 462. See also the Draft definitions 
submitted to Legal Sub-Committee of the Liability Convention, in which they agree that “space 
object must be designed for movement in outer space.”
34 See John Qu, Alfred Powell & M.V.K. Sivakumar eds, Satellite-Based Applications on Climate 
Change (2013); Vladimír Kopal, Some Remarks on Issues Relating to Legal Definitions of “Space 
Object,” “Space Debris,” and “Astronaut,” Proceedings 37th Colloquium 99–108 (1994).
35 See Baker, supra note 24.
36 Id.
37 William B. Wirin, Space Debris and Space Objects, 34 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Sp. 45, 46 (1991).
38 See Cheng, supra note 14, 425 (there is a clear line between air and space, although no consensus 
as to where boundary should be drawn); Vernon Nase, Delimitation and the Suborbital Passenger: 
Time to End Prevarication, 77  J.  Air L. & Com. 747, 754 (2012) (“geographical” boundary 
between airspace and outer space).
39 See Baker, supra note 24.
40 Jinyuan Su, Control Over Activities Harmful to the Environment, in Routledge Handbook of 
Space Law 79 (2016).
41 See, e.g., Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines, IADC-02-01, Revision 1, 5 (2007); United Nations, Technical Report on Space Debris, 
A/AC.105/720 1999, ¶ 6; I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Harm Producing Events by Fragments of 
Space Objects (Debris), Proceedings of the 25th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space of the 
IISL, 1-4 (1982); I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Legal Aspects of Environmental Protection in 
Outer Space Regarding Debris, Proceedings of the 30th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space of 
the IISL, 131 et seq (1987).
42 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 24, 3–9; Detlef Alwes, Marietta Benkö & Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Space 
Debris: An Item for the Future, in international space law in the making: current issues in the UN 
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ment of “non-functionality” falls short of fulfilling the functionalist definition and 
thus should, in theory, deprive space debris of its status as a “space object.” But to 
do so would ignore the practical realities of space exploration: in particular, exclud-
ing space debris—the most common and hazardous form of potential damage asso-
ciated with space activities—from the definition of “space object” would give rise 
to loopholes that undermine space safety and render the international space law 
regimes, including the Liability Convention, largely meaningless.43 Further, the cri-
terion of “technical functionality” is not a desirable determinant for distinguishing 
space debris from other objects, as even inactive man-made objects can be valuable 
in the sense that they may be reserved for future space activities.44 In any event, a 
practical interpretation of “space object” seems more appropriate in view of the 
increasing dangers posed by space debris today.45 Accordingly, as far as jurisdiction 
and control aspects are concerned, a more reasonable proposition is that any object 
that is launched into outer space and satisfies the spatialist approach constitutes a 
“space object” for the purpose of Article VIII.46
3.3.2  Condition 2: The General Capability of Being Identified?
3.3.2.1  Distinction Between “Identifiable” and “Unidentifiable” Objects
Furthermore, there is a second limitation on the applicability of the “jurisdiction and 
control” clause in the context of space debris removal—the origin of the debris 
concerned must be capable of being identified.47 In particular, in ascertaining the 
space-object nature of any space debris, the distinction between “identifiable” and 
“unidentifiable” objects must first be made.48 In fact, this theoretical distinction has 
long appeared in international maritime law, under which a state is only entitled to 
destroy any “unidentifiable flotsam and jetsam,” but is prohibited from damaging 
derelict vessels that still carry indicia of national origin unless consent is duly 
obtained from the owner and its insurance company.49 Following this analysis, com-
mentator Cargill Hall concluded that:
Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space 234 (Marietta Benkö & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds. 
1993); Heiner Klinkrad, Space Debris: Models and Risk Analysis 18–27 (2006).
43 Viikari, supra note 1, 736.
44 Id, 719.
45 Viikari, supra note 16, 71.
46 Diederiks-Verschoor & Kopal, supra note 11, 9.
47 Wayne White, The Legal Regime for Private Activities in Outer Space, in Space: the Free-Market 
Frontier (Edward Lee Hudgins & David Boaz eds. 2002) 88 (emphasis added).
48 Id.
49 Cargill Hall, Comments on Salvage and Removal of Man-Made Objects from Outer Space, 
33 J. Air L. & Com. 288, 294 (1967).
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[I]t is reasonable to infer from maritime law that title to identifiable, inactive, man-made 
objects in space is retained by the flag state and is not affected by abandonment. This is 
made explicit in Article VIII of the treaty on outer space.50
In other words, once the origin of a space debris is determined, it can be properly 
be classified as a “component part,”51 and is thus capable of attracting protection 
under Article VIII. At the end of the day, a close reading of Article VIII indicates 
that the power to remove or destroy identifiable space debris is ultimately confined 
to the State of registry.52 This brings us to the practical importance of the identifica-
tion process of registered space objects.
3.3.2.2  The Identification Process and Registration of Space Objects
To facilitate the identification of space objects for the purposes of Article VIII, all 
states and private entities should register the details of their space missions with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.53 Identification of space objects mainly 
involves two processes: detection and identification—only the latter of which is 
partially addressed by the registration mechanism provided under the Convention 
on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Registration Convention”),54 
where “a dual system of national and international registration” has been estab-
lished.55 As a starting point, the launching state shall register its space object that is 
launched into earth orbit or beyond in a national registry.56 More unprecedentedly, 
the Registration Convention created, for the first time in history, an international 
registry57 and required states to supply certain information regarding their space 
object to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.58 Notably, by virtue of Article 
VIII, it is only the State of registry that shall have exclusive jurisdiction and control 
over the respective space object as well as the sole authority to remove its debris 
from outer space.
In other words, the most compelling incentive for registration is that the register-
ing state can more effectively regulate activities connected to the space object, 
50 Id, 295.
51 White, supra note 47.
52 Hall, supra note 49, 295–296 (emphasis added).
53 H.A. Wassenbergh, Principles of Outer Space Law in Hindsight 74 (1991).
54 Howard Baker, Regulation of Orbital Debris  – Current Status, in Preservation of near-earth 
space for future generations 182 (John A. Simpson ed. 2007).
55 A.A. Cocca, Registration and Space Objects, in Manual on Space Law 180 (N. Jasentuliyana & 
R.S.K. Lee eds. 1979).
56 Registration Convention, art. II(1).
57 Cocca, supra note 55, 180.
58 Stephen Gorove, Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space: Analysis 
and Commentary, 19 IISL 292 (1976).
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impose conditions on private operators,59 and even make national laws applicable to 
both the space object and its personnel.60 If an object has not fulfilled the require-
ment of registration, the act of launching and the ownership of the object may 
become highly relevant in determining the state with “jurisdiction and control” over 
it.61 Supplemental to these rules of registration, Article VI of the Registration 
Convention further requires “States possessing space monitoring and tracking facil-
ities” to aid in the identification of space debris that has caused damage.62 But in any 
event, the act of registration would offer better protection to the State of registry and 
its registered space object (or its debris) under international space law.
3.4  The Continuity of Jurisdiction: A Permanent “State 
Property” or An Abandoned Space Object?
Most importantly, as far as the issue of space debris removal is concerned, there has 
been a long-standing debate on whether the jurisdictional power granted by Article 
VIII “attaches permanently regardless of an absence of continued control, effective 
physical control or the state of being of the object,” or “lapses with the conclusion 
of effective physical control – an abandonment of the object – as in maritime law.”63 
The outcome of this debate is highly critical for the legitimacy and feasibility of 
space debris removal, and it thus merits special attention.
3.4.1  The Traditional View: Absolute or Exclusive Nature 
of Jurisdiction
Indeed, the majority of literature veers towards the view that space objects almost 
invariably remain under the jurisdiction of the State of registry.64 Early in the 1980s, 
Vitaliy Bordunov took a firm stance to formulate the so-called “principle of the 
59 Irmgard Marboe, Small is Beautiful? Legal Challenges of Small Satellites, in Private law, Public 
Law, Metalaw and Public Policy in Space: A Liber Amicorum in Honor of Ernst Fasan 10 (Patricia 
Margaret Sterns & Leslie I. Tennen eds. 2016).
60 See Julian Hermida, Legal Basis for a National Space Legislation 63 (2004); Julian Hermida, 
Space Registry, 24 International Business Lawyers 383 (1996).
61 Jakhu & Pelton, supra note 11, 344.
62 Registration Convention, art VI. See also National Research Council et al., Orbital Debris: A 
Technical Assessment 186 (1995).
63 Hall, supra note 49, 290–291.
64 See, generally, Wayne White, Salvage Law for Outer Space, Engineering, Construction, and 
Operations in Space III, Space ‘92, Proceedings of the Third International Conference, Denver, 
Colorado 2412, 2417 (1992); I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, The Increasing Problems of Space 




immunity of space objects” which would “rule out the use of force … by one state 
in regard to the space object which is the property of another.”65 Following this 
proposition, Article VIII guarantees the right of disposal to be reserved and, in 
effect, transforms a registered space object into a “state property,” which prohibits 
other states from “tampering with the orbit, capturing it or putting it out of the 
commission.”66 In fact, the arguably indisposable nature of the jurisdictional power 
can be further deduced from the language of Article VIII itself, which explicitly 
stipulates that “[o]wnership of objects launched into outer space, including objects 
landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not 
affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to 
the Earth.”67 In other words, Article VIII entitles a state to possess a space object for 
the mere purpose of returning it.68
Under this interpretation, even the unilateral declaration of any state to consider 
a registered space object “derelict” would have no effect on the jurisdiction of its 
State of registry. Notably, a “derelict” space object has been defined as “one which 
is abandoned and deserted by those who were in charge of it, without hope on their 
part of recovering it and without intention of returning to it.”69 Based on this defini-
tion, space debris could be properly described as an abandoned space object and 
may thus constitute a “res derelicta”—meaning that the owner has already given up 
the ownership of his possession.70 Nonetheless, in international space law, owner-
ship is entirely irrelevant in determining the appropriate state under the obligation 
to register a space object.71 Hence, there is no correlation between “ownership” of a 
space object and the state which has “jurisdiction and control” over it.72 In other 
words, even a cross-border transfer of ownership could not justify replacement of 
the original State of registry.73
This proposition is further supported by the fact that there is “no apparent legal 
basis” in the five UN Treaties on Outer Space expressly allowing the transfer of 
registration of—and thus jurisdiction and control over—a space object from one 
state to another during its operation in orbit.74 Consequently, in the absence of any 
65 Vitaliy D. Bordunov, Rights of States as Regards Outer Space Objects, in 24 Colloquium L. Outer 
Space 89, 91 (M. Schwartz ed. 1981).
66 Id, 91.
67 OST, art. VIII (emphasis added).
68 D.M.  Wanland, Hazards to Navigation in Outer Space: Legal Remedies and Salvage Law, I 
J. Astrolaw 1, 27 (1985).
69 Id.
70 George T. Hacket, Space Debris and the Corpus Iuris Spatialis 194 (1994).
71 Schmidt-Tedd & Mick, supra note 18, 540.
72 J. Sztucki, Legal Status of Space Objects, 9 Proc. Coll. L. of Outer Space 108, 115 (1967).
73 Schmidt-Tedd and Mick, supra note 18, 540.
74 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”), Responses to the set of Questions 
provided by the Chair of the Working Group on the Status and Application of the Five United 
Nations Treaties on Outer Space, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2012/CRP.11, 4-5 (22 March 2012) 
(hereinafter Responses to the set of Questions) (see, particularly, the opinions of Belgian 
delegation).
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mechanism under present space law regimes to transfer jurisdiction, control or lia-
bility of a space object,75 a state by merely renouncing its rights of ownership “is not 
released from those obligations which rest upon it as the result of launching the 
object or from the further consequences thereof.”76 At the end of the day, a literal 
reading of Article VIII seemingly suggests that a space object is theoretically inca-
pable of being abandoned to become a res nullius because it, in theory, permanently 
remains the property of the State of registry. Even though there is some suggestion 
that the provisions of Article VIII can possibly be extended to international organi-
zations, they could at most only exercise limited jurisdiction and control over a 
registered space object and its personnel,77 according to the principle of spécialité 
légale, which “restricts the sovereign powers of an organization of public interna-
tional law to no more than the powers and mandates for which the organization was 
established.”78
Following this line of reasoning, the doctrine of “permanency of jurisdiction and 
control” apparently applies to space debris.79 Because of the absolute nature of 
jurisdiction, the inspection of space objects cannot be performed without the regis-
tering state’s consent.80 Article 20 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility reflects 
the basic international law principle of consent, stating that “valid consent by a State 
to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that 
act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits 
of that consent.”81 However, the consent must be expressed by the state rather than 
presumed.82 Accordingly, without express consent from the State of registry, space 
debris cannot be disposed of or otherwise interfered with, “by electronic or other 
means.”83 To do otherwise would amount to an “improper assertion of jurisdiction 
over sovereign property.”84 That being said, this “jurisdiction and control” clause 
contains a “two-fold concept”85 and it can be portrayed as a potential double-edged 
sword in practice: while other nations are prohibited from removing registered 
75 Joseph N. Pelton, New Solutions for the Space Debris Problem 74 (2015).
76 Manfred Lachs, The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law-Making 73 
(1972).
77 Responses to the set of Questions, 5 (emphasis added).
78 Id.
79 Baker, supra note 54, 182.
80 Baker, supra note 24, 69–71 (emphasis added).
81 Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc.A/56/10; GAOR, 56th 
Sess., Supp. No.10, art. 20 (2001) [hereinafter ILC articles].
82 Joyeeta Chatterjee, Legal Issues Relating to Unauthorised Space Debris Remediation, 65 Int’L 
Astronautical Cong. 1, 6 (2014).
83 Jenks, supra note 21, 238.
84 Malcolm Russell, Military Activities in Outer Space: Soviet Legal Views, 25 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 153, 
184 (1984). See also Brian Weeden, Overview of the Legal and Policy Challenges of Orbital 
Debris Removal, 27(1) Space Policy 41 (2011).
85 Schmidt-Tedd and Mick, supra note 18, 524.
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space objects of another state, the State of registry—as the appropriate state—is 
liable for any damage caused by the debris of such space objects.
3.4.2  The Practical View: Termination of Jurisdictional Power 
Under Special Circumstances
Yet, particularly in view of the ever-increasing problem of space congestion, excep-
tions to the principle of “permanency of jurisdiction and control” should be devel-
oped and applied sparingly in certain circumstances.86 Today, a more modern or 
realistic interpretation of Article VIII suggests that any grant of jurisdiction under 
this clause is “non-exclusive.”87 Arguments in favour of a more restrictive concept 
of “jurisdiction and control” can be divided primarily into two categories of cases: 
(1) an expressed or implied act of abandonment, and (2) a situation of peril.
3.4.2.1  Scenario 1: An “Expressed” or “Implied” Act of Abandonment
First, a more restrictive view of Article VIII is that legal control and jurisdiction 
over registered space object ceases to exist when there is an “expressed” or “implied” 
act of abandonment,88 arguably due to a loss of animus dominandi (“the desire to 
power”).89 Indeed, in most circumstances, a space object should not be presumed to 
be abandoned unless there is a public statement or declaration by the registering 
state.90 That being said, a space object can still be abandoned impliedly, if the state 
of registry has no longer made any attempt to recover it over a long period of time,91 
which can be evident from the cessation of regular or periodic use of the object or 
the loss of control over the object in the absence of any prompt action to re-establish 
such control.92 Based on the foregoing analysis, inoperative space objects might be 
considered abandoned and thus not subject to national jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances.93
86 Hacket, supra note 70, 209.
87 Mark J. Sundahl, Legal Status of Spacecraft, in Routledge Handbook of Space Law 44 (Ram 
S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2016).
88 Philip De Man, Exclusive Use in an Inclusive Environment: The Meaning of the Non-
Appropriation Principle for Space Resource Exploitation 372 (2016).
89 Cheng, supra note 14, 416.
90 Wayne White, Real Property Rights in Space, 40 Proceedings Colloq. L. Outer Space 370, 380 
(1998).
91 Jenks, supra note 21, 240.
92 See Man, supra note 88, 372; White, supra note 90, 380.
93 See Hamilton DeSaussure, An International Right to Deorbit Earth Threatening Satellites, 3 
Annals Air & Space L. 383 (1978). Art IX of the OST requires a State to carry out its space activi-
ties with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other countries.
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3.4.2.2  Scenario 2: A “State of Peril” Circumstance
The second line of argument is that “jurisdiction and control” over registered space 
objects should terminate when it poses a source of danger for other states.94 
Generally speaking, in order to legitimately remove a space debris, the removing 
state is normally required to (1) notify the registering state of the threat imposed by 
the space debris; (2) consult with the registering state and give it a prior right of 
removal; and (3) independently verify the necessity of space debris removal.95
Even though a State of registry retains “jurisdiction and control” over its space 
objects, some scholars have clarified that “the [apparently] absolute nature of juris-
diction, control and ownership can be circumvented in certain cases.”96 In particular, 
an injured state is entitled to intercept a space object without consent of its register-
ing state, if the hazard presented by the object threatens the safety of other space 
activities,97 or causes potentially harmful interference with the activities of any 
other legal entity98—dubbed the “state of peril” situation. This is especially so when 
the State of registry, after being notified of such harmful interference, does not 
undertake to authorize its removal,99 or remains negligent in deorbiting its debris, 
which causes damage to the legitimate space activities of other countries.100 Further 
support for this proposition can be gleaned from customary international law, under 
which a state may have jurisdiction—the “national security jurisdiction”—to regu-
late a space object that poses a security threat to it.101
3.4.2.3  Competing Interests of States: A System of Priorities in Space 
Law?
It is worth noting that the above-discussed arguments, when read in the context of 
the OST regime, mainly arise from, and can perhaps be justified by, balancing two 
seemingly antagonistic provisions: the jurisdictional power of the registering state102 
and the observance of the “due regard” principle.103 Hence, to understand the exact 
94 Man, supra note 88, 372.
95 See DeSaussure, supra note 93, 394; Viikari, supra note 16, 82.
96 Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law in Post-Colonial Africa 205 (1999); Craig Fishman, Space 
Salvage: A Proposed Treaty Amendment to the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return 
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Space, 26 Virginia J Int’l L 965, 965 (1986).
97 Hamilton DeSaussure, The Application of Maritime Salvage to the Law of Outer Space, 28 Proc. 
Coll on the Law of Outer Space 127, 127 (1985) (emphasis added).
98 Howard A.  Baker, The ESA and US Reports on Space Debris  – Platform for Future Policy 
Initiatives, Space Policy 332, 336 (1990) (emphasis added).
99 Id, 336.
100 Wassenbergh, supra note 53, 74.
101 Sundahl, supra note 87, 44.
102 OST, art. VIII.
103 DeSaussure, supra note 93, 390.
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nature of the “jurisdiction and control” clause, Article IX of the OST—a provision 
requiring a state to carry out its outer space activities with “due regard” to the cor-
responding interests of all other countries104—merits special attention. Specifically, 
it imposes a duty to undertake space activities with a standard of care, taking in 
consideration the rights and legitimate interests of all other nations.105 It also requires 
states sharing a common amenity to adjust their space activities with reasonable 
protective measures.106 More notably, this so-called “due regard” principle is under-
stood as an obligation to take into account the legal rights of other states, “both prior 
to (planned) and during (ongoing) space activities.”107 Accordingly, the accidental 
or intentional creation of dangerous (inoperative) space debris before or during any 
space mission, at the potential expense of the interests of other space-faring nations, 
would indeed run counter to the “due regard” principle. Following this analysis, it 
seems that the jurisdictional power of registering states should somehow be circum-
scribed or, at the very least, operate within the confines of Article IX.
In addition to Article IX, the need to harmonise the competing interests of states 
is further highlighted by the so-called “common interest” principle,108 which man-
dates that space activities shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of 
all countries.109 This “common interest” principle, at a minimum, imposes a nega-
tive duty on states to refrain from disregarding or harming the interests of other 
nations when conducting space activities (“no-detriment requirement”).110 More 
specifically, Article I prevents a state from interfering with or hampering the legiti-
mate activities of other countries.111 It follows that the “no-detriment requirement” 
should be employed to counteract the restrictive effect of Article VIII, particularly 
in light of the potential dangers posed by space debris to the ongoing space activities 
104 OST, art. IX.
105 Sergio Marchisio, Article IX, in I Cologne Commentary on Space Law 175 (Stephan Hobe et al., 
eds. 2009). See also Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v Ice.), Merits, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶72 (July 25) 
(recognizing that “States have an obligation to take full account of each other’s rights”). See also 
Gordon Chung, The Emergence of Environmental Protection Clauses in the Outer Space Treaty: A 
Lesson from the Rio Principles, in A Fresh View on the Outer Space Treaty 2 (Annette Froehlich 
ed. 2018).
106 Hacket, supra note 70, 99.
107 M.C.  Mineiro, Article IX’s Principle of Due Regard and International Consultations:An 
Assessment in Light of the European Draft Space Code-of-Conduct, The 5th Eilene M.Galloway 
Symposium on Critical Issues in Space Law 1, 3 (2010).
108 Stephen Gorove, The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy, 73 Am. J. Int’l L. 444, 448 
(1979).
109 OST, art. I(1) (emphasis added).
110 Ricky Lee, Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space 198 (2012); 
Edwin W. Paxson, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration: Space Law and Economic 
Development, 4 Mich. J.  Int’l L. 487, 494 (1993); H.A. Wassenbergh, Speculations of the Law 
Governing Space Resources, 5 Annals Air & Space L. 611, 614 (1980). See also the discussion in 
Gordon Chung, An Incentivising Regime For Private Enterprises: The Enduring Benefits Derived 
From The Commercialisation Of Outer Space, The Fifth Manfred Lachs International Conference 
on Global Space Governance and the UN 2030 Agenda (MLC17) 1, 5–6 (2017).
111 Paxson, supra note 110, 494; Wassenbergh, supra note 110, 614.
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of other countries. Accordingly, even an application of the “common interest” prin-
ciple would likely point to a conclusion that the jurisdiction and control (i.e. national 
interests) of a registering state should not inevitably prevail.
The above analysis on the competing interests of states, especially in the context 
of space debris removal, draws us to the question of how we can determine which 
interest prevails. While the OST implicitly recognizes the competing interests 
among different states,112 the present space law regimes fail to lay down any rules 
for designating priority among those interests.113 Indeed, as envisaged by commen-
tator Schwetje, it is necessary, and ultimately inevitable, for modern space law to 
develop a hierarchy of needs or a system of priorities,114 which in my view should 
include, from highest to lowest, (a) the prevention of life-threatening dangers, (b) 
the maintenance of international peace and security in outer space, (c) the advance-
ment of a state’s interests (including strategic and economic interests). As far as 
category (a) is concerned, international space law should confer upon a state the 
right to remove the space debris belonging to another in a situation in which human 
life is directly threatened. In other words, the state that is exposed to such threat is 
entitled to take action against the debris, even to the extent of destroying the threat-
ening object.115 With respect to category (b), a widened concept of “peace and secu-
rity” that goes beyond the “traditional inter-state conflict model” has to be adopted,116 
especially in light of the environmental degradation caused by space debris. Notably, 
states are under a general duty to maintain “international peace and security,”117 and 
this duty extends to cover the preservation of collective human interests that tran-
scend any particular state, including the removal of hazardous space debris which is 
capable of inhibiting the sustainable, future use of outer space.118 Following these 
propositions, the possibility of removing space debris should, at the very least, be 
available to categories (a) to (b), where there are imminent dangers or security 
threats deriving from an over-populated space debris environment.
More controversial are, however, cases concerning category (c)—when and how 
may a state remove the registered space object of another for “purely economic 
112 OST, art. IX provides that “States Parties […] shall conduct all their activities in outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all 
other States Parties to the Treaty” (emphasis added).
113 U.S Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental 
Problem-Background Paper, OTA-BP-IS C-72, 30 (1990).
114 F. Kenneth Schwetje, Space Law: Considerations for Space Planners, 12 Rutgers Computer & 
Tech. L.J. 245, 279 (1987).
115 Panel Discussion, in Preservation of Near-Earth Space for Future Generations 240 (John 
A. Simpson ed. 2007).
116 Michael Mineiro, Space Technology Export Controls and International Cooperation in Outer 
Space 174 (2012).
117 OST, art. III states that States “shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies […] in the interest of maintaining international 
peace and security […].” See also Id, 172–173 (emphasis added).
118 See Id, 172–173.
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reasons”?119 In such cases, it appears that a balancing exercise should be carried out, 
on a case-by-case basis, between the potential benefits deriving from the proposed 
space debris removal and the costs of actions, be they monetary120 or non-monetary, 
borne by the registering state in deorbiting its object. In any event, one should rec-
ognize the policy reason behind active space debris removal: the embracement of 
such a system could eventually transform current environmental challenges into 
“business opportunities” for the global space sector, specifically by facilitating the 
development of novel technologies for space debris mitigation and the design of 
non-debris generating missions.121 At the end of the day, even though the State of 
registry may be expected to pay for space debris removal missions, it still has 
recourse to the owner of the space object and its debris.122
3.5  Conclusion
At present, the congestion of space debris is a serious problem that might well para-
lyze the progressive development of space activities. While the mitigation of space 
debris is an almost inevitable solution in light of the ever-increasing debris popula-
tion, the question of legitimacy of such acts (i.e. deorbiting or removing a registered 
space object of another state) remains unanswered. Notably, the “jurisdiction and 
control” clause laid down in Article VIII of the OST is the major barrier under pres-
ent space law regimes. As the expression “jurisdiction and control” is an attribute of 
sovereignty, a state can legally remove a registered space object only if it satisfies 
the requirement of Article VIII or obtains prior consent from the State of registry. 
Therefore, understanding the exact nature of the jurisdictional power conferred 
upon the registering states in relation to their space objects is a paramount priority 
to facilitating the viability of space debris removal.
While the expression “space debris” generally refers to cover all man-made 
objects that are non-functional in outer space, this criterion of “technical functional-
ity” is not a desirable determinant for distinguishing space debris from other objects, 
and it seemingly fails to satisfy the functionalist dimension of “space object.” But in 
practice, a close examination of the language of Article VIII suggests that space 
debris, despite its lack of definitive legal meaning, is still caught by the definition of 
“space object” and thereby subject to the jurisdiction and control of the State of 
registry. The reason behind this is simple: as a matter of policy, present space laws, 
especially the Liability Convention, would be rendered meaningless if “space 
debris”—one of the greatest hazards in space—were excluded from their scope. 
119 F. Kenneth Schwetje, Current U.S. Initiatives to Control Space Debris, 30 Proc. on L. Outer 
Space 163, 165 (1987).
120 In fact, all methods of removing debris inevitably incur certain economic costs. See U.S 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 113, 6.
121 Stella Tkatchova, Emerging Space Markets 99 (2017).
122 Wassenbergh, supra note 53, 74.
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Also, for space debris to fall within the ambit of Article VIII, its origin must be 
capable of being identified—the distinction between “identifiable” and “unidentifi-
able” objects must therefore be made. In practice, the State of registry retains the 
exclusive power to remove only its identifiable space debris. To cope with this issue 
the Registration Convention has created “a dual system of national and international 
registration” in furtherance of the identification process. At the end of the day, in 
order to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over the activities of their space 
objects under Article VIII, states are incentivized to comply with the requirement of 
registration.
It is noteworthy that two dichotomous views emerge as to whether the jurisdic-
tional power granted by Article VIII attaches permanently to the State of registry or 
lapses with the conclusion of effective physical control. According to the traditional 
“principle of the immunity of space objects” or the doctrine of “permanency of 
jurisdiction and control,” Article VIII effectively transforms a registered space 
object into a “state property.” Notably, ownership is considered irrelevant in deter-
mining the appropriate state under the obligation to register a space object. It fol-
lows that space debris is theoretically incapable of becoming a “res derelicta.” 
Without any mechanism to transfer the jurisdiction over and control of a registered 
space object, the jurisdictional power would rest permanently with the State of 
 registry. Yet, according to a more practical interpretation of Article VIII, any grant 
of jurisdiction is “non-exclusive” in nature.
The apparently absolute nature of “jurisdiction and control” may be circum-
vented in two specific scenarios: (1) an expressed or implied act of abandonment 
and (2) a state of peril. More importantly, these two lines of reasoning can be justi-
fied by balancing two seemingly antagonistic provisions in the OST: the jurisdic-
tional power of the registering state and the observance of the “due regard” principle. 
Specifically, Article IX requires states to undertake space activities with a standard 
of care, taking into account the legal rights of other states. The “no-detriment 
requirement” of Article I is also reflective of this principle, by imposing a negative 
duty on states to refrain from disregarding or harming the interests of other nations 
when conducting space activities.
The application of these principles reinforces the view that the jurisdiction and 
control of a State of registry should not inevitably prevail. In the future, it is inevi-
table for modern space law to develop a hierarchy of needs or a system of priorities, 
which includes, from highest to lowest, (a) the prevention of life-threatening dan-
gers, (b) the maintenance of international peace and security in outer space, (c) the 
advancement of a state’s interests (including strategic and economic interests). 
While space debris removal in categories (a) to (b) is normally justifiable, category 
(c) requires more scrutiny. At the end of the day, one should balance the potential 
benefits deriving from the space debris removal missions against the costs of actions 
borne by the registering state in deorbiting its object.
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Chapter 4
Between Active Debris Removal and  
Space- Based Weapons: A Comprehensive 
Legal Approach
Matteo Frigoli
Abstract The growing population of space debris has the potential to seriously 
compromise the exploration of and access to outer space. It is now generally agreed 
that large portions of Earth’s orbits are on the threshold of an irreversible situation 
making the removal of non-functional space objects a necessity. While the technolo-
gies to carry out removal operations are being developed, the outer space legal 
regime has not kept the pace with these challenges. Active debris removal technolo-
gies present both opportunities and risks. The dual use nature of these technologies 
is one of the most challenging questions, as the same technology could be used to 
deorbit debris or damage functional satellites. In the light of these considerations, 
this analysis discusses how the space law regime applies to these issues with the 
purpose of setting out possible legal solutions based on the interrelations between 
active debris removal technologies and space weaponization.
4.1  Introduction
Outer space has proven to be a fundamental environment for scientific and economic 
progress, as well as for military and geopolitical interests. The linkage between 
states and space-based assets has become a key factor for development in a very wide 
range of fields, to the extent that without reliable satellites in orbit standards of living 
would deteriorate.1 Indeed, it could be argued that if 30 or 40 years ago the progress 
of space-assets were an appendix of Earth’s technology, today a major part of Earth’s 
technological progress is basically linked to the goals of space- based assets.
1 Joseph N. Pelton, New Solutions for the Space Debris Problem (Springer, 2015) at 1.
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But whilst, on the one hand, space activities and space assets have flourished, 
becoming key enablers of national and international infrastructures,2 on the other 
hand, since the launch of Sputnik 1, space debris has begun to populate Earth’s 
orbits, as every spaceflight potentially produces space debris.3 These objects come 
from a large variety of sources, including, for example, the intentional destruction 
of satellites, the abandonment of stages of launch vehicles or parts of the spacecraft 
in orbit, and the creation of ‘paint flakes’ or aluminum oxide particles due to motor 
combustion or solar radiation.4
Currently, space debris is one of the most critical issues related to space explora-
tion and use, with an estimated population of 29,000 objects larger than 10  cm, 
750,000 objects from 1 cm to 10 cm, and 166 million objects from 1 mm to 1 cm 
orbiting the Earth.5 This multitude of objects threatens to undermine the continued 
access to outer space. While the removal of space debris has become a necessity, the 
existing legal regime of outer space is silent about the lawfulness of such operations. 
Furthermore, space-assets capable of carrying out removal operations could be used 
for military purposes. Considering the high level of militarization of outer space and 
the competition between the major space powers, eventual unilateral removal opera-
tions could be a ‘game changer’ toward the risk of space weaponization.
4.1.1  Dealing with Growing Space Debris, the Gentle 
Mitigation and the Hard Removal
Basically, there are two main approaches that, so far, have been developed to address 
the issue of space debris. The first one sees the adoption of ‘mitigation guidelines’ 
as the main instrument to arrest the creation of new space debris. In fact, this is the 
only way in which the international community is currently dealing with the issue. 
International efforts to address the problem did not begin until 2002, when the Inter- 
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) published the document 
“IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines”.6 Subsequently, this subject was dis-
cussed in the more general framework of United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
2 NATO Parliamentary Assembly ‘The space domain and allied defense’ (Defense and Security 
Committee, Draft Report - 068 DSCFC 17 E, (20 March 2017) at 1.
3 SpaceSecurity.org, Space Security 2013, at 23; Lotta Viikari, The Environmental Element in 
Space Law, Assessing the Present and Charting the Future (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) at 32.
4 Firooz Allahdadi, Isabelle Rongier, Paul D. Wilde, Safety Design for Space Operations (Elsevier, 
2013) at 17.
5 ESA, ‘Space debris by the numbers’ available at http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/
Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers accessed 3/11/2017.





Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) that, in 2007, adopted Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.7
The UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines are:
 1. Limit debris released during normal operations
 2. Minimize the potential for break-ups during operational phases
 3. Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit
 4. Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities
 5. Minimize the potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy
 6. Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in 
the Low Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission
 7. Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages 
with the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) region after the end of their 
mission
Whilst these non-binding guidelines constitute “the leading international 
arrangement to mitigate space debris”,8 they are often seen as inapt to tackle the 
overall issue of space debris. Unfortunately, the 25 years-rule set out by the “IADC 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” as the lifetime limit of space objects after 
which to undertake a controlled re-entry in the atmosphere is not expressly repeated. 
Environmental protection is not even mentioned, and the intentional destruction of 
space objects is not totally banned.9 The inadequacy of this method is not related to 
these issues or to the voluntary nature of these measures but, especially, to the tech-
nical consideration that, even if the creation of all new space debris were to stop 
now, the problem would not be solved. Indeed, it is generally accepted that portions 
of the region of the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) are already environmentally unstable, as 
the population of space debris is large enough to potentially trigger a cascade of 
collisions leading to the production of new orbital debris (the so-called Kessler 
effect).10
7 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as 
annexed to UN doc. A/62/20 (2007).
8 Towards Long-term Sustainability of Space Activities: Overcoming the Challenges of Space 
Debris, A Report of the International Interdisciplinary Congress on Space Debris, January 2011, 
UN doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2011/CRP.14, at 5.
9 According to Guideline 4 “intentional break-ups” could be “necessary”, in this case “they should 
be conducted at sufficiently low altitudes to limit the orbital lifetime of resulting fragments”. Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines (n.7).
10 Joseph N.  Pelton, Space Debris and Other Threats from Outer Space (Springer, 2013) p.  2; 
Firooz Allahdadi, Isabelle Rongier, Paul D. Wilde (n.4) at 18,576; “The term “Kessler Syndrome” 
is an orbital debris term (…) that grew out of a 1978 JGR paper predicting that fragments from 
random collisions between catalogued objects in low Earth orbit would become an important 
source of small debris beginning in about the year 2000 (…) While popular use of the term may 
have exaggerated and distorted the conclusions of the 1978 paper, the results of all research to date 
confirms that we are now entering a time when the orbital debris environment will increasingly be 
controlled by random collisions.” Donald J. Kessler, Nicholas L. Johnson, J.-C. Liou, Mark Matney 
‘The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space operations’ (33rd annual AAS guidance and 
control conference, Breckenridge, Colorado, February 6–February 10 2010) at 1, available at 
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In the light of the above, the second approach normally advanced to cope with 
the issue of space debris focuses on active debris removal (ADR) and orbital satel-
lite services (OSS). This approach takes its momentum from the growing consensus 
that, in the light of previous considerations, these activities are the only ones that 
may ensure long-term sustainability of outer space exploration and use.11 These 
measures aim to reduce the existing amount of space debris through different 
techniques.
 (1) Active debris removal refers to any action directed to remove a defunct space-
craft, vehicle or space object from Earth orbit. This include a wide range of 
activities, for example: the utilization of thrusters or passive de-orbiting sys-
tems to increase the atmospheric drag at the end of life of a space system as well 
as for the upper stage of a launcher vehicle; the employment of some form of 
directed energy device to change the orbit of a space object; sending a space- 
system to outer space that can directly or indirectly change the orbit of the tar-
geted space object.12
 (2) Orbital satellite services (OSS) are conceived in the broad context of ADR 
measures. In particular, OSS take account of technologies carried out by robotic 
devices to extend the lifetime of functional satellites. The same technology 
could be used to reduce the orbital debris population by modifying, recycling, 
upgrading a defunct space object or attaching it to other space objects, forming 
a useful sub-system or a complete functional satellite.13 In this last regard, 
Project Phoenix of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
aims to develop robotic satellite servicing and assembly technologies capable 
of recycling components of space objects that are still intact, and forming func-
tional satellites.14 Also, the European Space Agency (ESA) is involved in space 
debris remediation technologies, in particular the first European system for 
Active Debris Removal with Nets (ADR1EN) testing net technologies on the 
ground with the aim of commercialising them later on.15
http://webpages.charter.net/dkessler/files/Kessler%20Syndrome-AAS%20Paper.pdf accessed 
21/10/2017.
11 Lotta Viikari, ‘Environmental aspects of space activities’ in Frans vor den Dunk, Fabio Tronchetti 
(eds.), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) p. 757; Active Debris Removal-An Essential 
Mechanism for Ensuring the Safety and Sustainability of Outer Space, A Report of the International 
Interdisciplinary Congress on Space Debris Remediation and On-Orbit Satellite Servicing, 27 
January 2012, U.N.  Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16, pp.  8–15; Firooz Allahdadi, Isabelle 
Rongier, Paul D. Wilde (n.4) p. 18: Pelton (n.1) at 7.
12 Pelton (n.1) at 8.
13 Ibid.
14 C. G. Henshaw, ‘The DARPA Phoenix Spacecraft Servicing Program: Overview and Plans for 
Risk Reduction’, Proceedings of 12th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics 
and Automation in Space (Montreal, Canada, 2014); Active Debris Removal (n.11) at 27.
15 Jason L. Forshaw, Guglielmo S. Aglietti, Thierry Salmon, et al, ‘Final payload test results for the 
Remove Debris active debris removal mission’ (2017) 138 Acta Astronautica 326; See also Hrishik 
Mishra and Phillip Schmid, ‘Motion And Parameter Estimation For The Robotic Capture Of A 
Non-Cooperative Space Target Considering Egomotion Uncertainty’ (Symposium on Advanced 
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For the purpose of this analysis, ADR technologies include the notion of OOS as 
a means of conducting removal operations.
As will be later discussed, even if the technologies to achieve these goals are 
currently in an advanced stage, their use meets significant legal and political obsta-
cles. One of the main concerns could be the interplay between the use of these 
technologies and the weaponization of outer space. Taking this into account, this 
contribution will move from the current legal framework and the main legal issues 
related to space debris removal activities, to eventually focus on the above-men-
tioned interplay.
4.1.2  The Corpus Juris Spatialis and Space Debris, 
an Unforeseen Challenge?
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter 
also Outer Space Treaty)16 constitutes the basic legal framework of international 
space law and has been ratified by 106 states and signed by 25 signatories.17 It is 
considered as a quasi-constitutional treaty. Furthermore, it is also generally agreed 
that the principles of the earlier Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space18 (which were mostly 
incorporated into the Outer Space Treaty) express general customary law, binding 
on all states.19
At the time the Outer Space Treaty was drafted, the space debris issue was not 
seen as a long term threat to space access and space activities, and, as a conse-
Space Technologies in Robotics and Automation ASTRA, 20–22 June 2017, Leiden) asserting 
“The Deutsche Orbitale Servicing Mission (DEOS) from German Aerospace Center (DLR) was 
considered pivotal in steering the narrative in On-Orbit Servicing (OO-Servicing) towards capture 
of a non-cooperative spacecraft as a mission objective to secure and de-orbit uncontrollable 
satellites”.
16 Adopted on 19 December 1966, opened for signature on 27 January 1967, in Washington, 
Moscow and London, entered into force on 10 October 1967, 610 UNTS 205.
17 Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2017, 
U.N. doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7, available at http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/
spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_2017_CRP07E.pdf. Accessed 03/11/2017.
18 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, GA Res. 1962(XVIII) [hereinafter Declaration].
19 “(…) the provisions of the Principles Declaration are virtually identical to their equivalents in the 
Outer Space Treaty, it is probable they can all be considered to have crystallised into customary 
law.” Ricky J.  Lee, Steven R.  Freeland, ‘The Crystallisation of General Assembly Space 
Declarations into Customary International Law’ (54th International Astronautical Congress of the 
International Astronautical Federation, the International Academy of Astronautics, and the 
International Institute of Space Law 29 September–3 October 2003, Bremen, Germany); J.  I. 
Gabrynowicz, ‘The Outer Space Treaty and enhancing space security’, UNIDIR, Building the 
Architecture for Sustainable Space Security: Conference Report 30–31 March 2006, at 113.
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quence, no specific provision was included therein. The same applies to other inter-
national agreements concerning outer space, which were later adopted.20 
International space law was not constructed to directly deal with this issue21; neither 
the Outer Space Treaty nor the other four agreements composing the so-called 
Corpus juris spatialis contain an ad hoc regulatory regime of space debris or a legal 
regime concerning the protection of the outer space environment itself.
That said, even if the text of the relevant provisions does not refer to orbital 
debris, it would be inaccurate to rely solely on a literal interpretation to address the 
problem.
By contrast, the Outer Space Treaty is primarily a treaty of principles, since 
many Articles of the Treaty are articulations or copies of the Declaration provisions. 
As a result, the norms of the Outer Space Treaty cannot embody exclusively in their 
text a clear legal regime for any forthcoming issue affecting the whole outer space 
scenario. Though, bearing in mind the assumption that one of the duties of the inter-
preter is the action of researching and clarifying the rule that in the silence and 
ambiguity of the text should be applied,22 the relevant norms of the Outer Space 
Treaty and the other agreements on outer space seems to fall into an inextricable 
legal impasse in addressing the question of space debris, making the search for a 
possible solution far more complex for the interpreter.
Indeed, as was correctly observed: “remediation of space debris meets its first 
major obstacle in the perplexing legal regime”.23 Even if ADR and OOS operations 
are imperative,24 the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and the other agreements 
on outer space, far from incentivising space debris remediation, pose various legal 
problems, many of which needed to be solved before conducting any removal 
operation.
4.1.3  The Outer Space Treaty and Space Debris: A Protective 
Legal Cradle
There is no provision in the Corpus juris spatialis that addresses the matter of space 
debris; instead the treaties use the term ‘space object’. Thus, only inferential conclu-
sions can be drawn from the legal regime with respect to space debris and space 
20 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space objects, 29 March 1972, 961 
UNTS 187 (hereinafter Liability Convention); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, 29 November 1971, UNGA Res. 3235 (XXIX) (hereinafter the Registration 
Convention); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in Outer 
Space, 22 April 1968, 672 UNTS 119; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 December 1979, 1363 UNTS 3.
21 Active Debris Removal (n.11) at 33.
22 Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary (The Scarecrow Press, 2005) at 328.
23 Joshua Tallis, ‘Remediating Space Debris, Legal and Technical Barriers’ (2015) 9(1) Strategic 
Studies Quarterly 86.
24 Lotta Viikari, ‘Environmental aspects of space activities’ (n.11) at 757.
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debris remediation. A broad interpretation of the term ‘space object’ could arguably 
include ‘space debris’, considering that both space objects at the end of their life-
time and orbital fragments of the same are space debris.
Although the goal of this analysis does not extend to the analysis of this specific 
issue, it is anyhow important to point out that if space debris does not qualify as a 
space object, the entire issue would then fall mostly outside the scope of application 
of the outer space treaties.25
Bearing this in mind, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty is the most relevant 
norm and shall be regarded as the core of the legal framework when it comes to 
space debris removal, as it contains the fundamental legal terms of other norms 
applying to space debris and thus space debris remediation.
The first part of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides:
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried 
shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while 
in outer space or on a celestial body.
The second part of Article VIII points out:
Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on 
a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer 
space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts 
found beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried 
shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior 
to their return.
Outer space is a sovereignty-free area in which registration creates a chain of 
attributions between the space object and the registering State. These attributions 
consist of: jurisdiction and control over the space object; ownership; international 
responsibility for national space activities; liability of all launching States.26 These 
principles represent fundamental elements of international space law, since they 
were firstly stated in the Declaration and then embodied in the Outer Space Treaty.
The jurisdiction and control clause is in the first sentence of Article VIII, indeed 
the registering State “shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over 
any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body”. In this context 
article II(2) of the Registration Convention is particularly relevant: “Where there are 
two or more launching States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly 
determine which one of them shall register the object”. It follows that jurisdiction 
and control over a space object will exclusively be executed by the registering State.
This consists “[of] the power of the state under international law to regulate or 
otherwise impact upon people, property and circumstances and reflects the basic 
25 Lotta Viikari, The Environmental Element in Space Law, Assessing the Present and Charting the 
Future (n.3) at 70–71; Marietta Benko, et al., Space Law: Current Problems and Perspectives for 
Future Regulation (Eleven International Publishing, 2005) at 41–42.
26 Stephan Hobe, et al., Cologne Commentary on Space Law, vol.1 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009) 
at 495.
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principles of state sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in domestic 
affairs.”27
In accordance with this set of provisions, the jurisdiction and control clause 
seems to be an impediment to ADR operations, since it covers space objects in a 
quasi-territorial manner, allowing the State of registry to subject its space assets and 
personnel to any national laws that are not in conflict with international law.28 The 
event of a removal operation unilaterally carried out by a third State would consti-
tute a violation of the Outer Space Treaty.
Indeed, jurisdiction over a space object or parts and fragments of the same does 
not expire for the sole practical reason that the registering State has lost the control 
over such objects. Determinating whether a space object is ‘uncontrolled’ or ‘non- 
functional’ may be more complex than expected. While other states might perceive 
a space object as totally useless, it could in reality still have some value. An inactive 
space object may, for instance, be in reserve for future activities, carry valuable clas-
sified information, or be of some other interest unknown to other states.29
This is even more relevant when considering the ownership of space objects.
Ownership of a space object is a determining factor in identifying which state 
can exercise jurisdiction and control. Since Article VIII does not define the “owner” 
of the space object, it is important to note that the registration of space object serves 
as an element for identification in the sense of national ownership.30 The State of 
registry has been defined in the Registration Convention as a launching state on 
whose registry a space object is carried—it follows that the state owner, therefore, 
has to be a state that launches or procures the launching of a space object or a state 
from whose territory or facility a space object is launched.31
Ownership of space objects is perpetual, indeed it “is not affected by their pres-
ence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth.” This is 
particularly important since even if a state has lost de facto control over the space 
object, or the space object has been reduced to hundreds of space debris, ownership 
continues irrespective of where the object may be, and of the functional or material 
status of the same object.32 A fortiori, non-functional or uncontrolled space objects 
27 Micheal N. Shaw, International Law (8th edn, Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 483.
28 Gbenga Oduntan, Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in Airspace and Outer Space: Legal Criteria for 
Spatial Delimitation (Routledge, 2012) at 180; Fabio Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural 
Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: a proposal for a legal regime (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2009) at 202.
29 Lotta Viikari, The Environmental Element in Space Law, Assessing the Present and Charting the 
Future (n.3) at 33.
30 Ogunsola O. Ogunbanwo, International law and outer space activities (Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) 
at 82.
31 Joyeeta Chatterjee, Legal Issues Relating To Unauthorised Space Debris Remediation (65th 
International Astronautical Congress, Toronto, Canada, 2014) at 7.
32 Active Debris Removal (n.11) at 31; Joshua Tallis (n.23) at 91; Lotta Viikari, The Environmental 
Element in Space Law, Assessing the Present and Charting the Future (n.3) at 82.
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cannot be abandoned at the end of their lifetime.33 This means that regardless of 
whether the registering state has lost the control over an entire space object or small 
fragments of the same, ownership is not affected in any manner, tying the State of 
registry to bearing international responsibility and liability for any damage caused 
by its space object, even though it is no longer controllable.
The Outer Space Treaty establishes the comprehensive liability of all launching 
states. Based on Article VII: “each State Party to the Treaty (…) that launches or 
procure the launch of an object into outer space including the Moon or other celes-
tial bodies” and “each State Party from whose territory of facility the object is 
launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or 
to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, 
in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.” This 
provision is particularly important as extends the liability for damage caused by an 
object or its component part, and applies to damage occurring anywhere: on Earth, 
in the air, or in outer space.34
The Liability Convention complements these provisions by setting out more 
detailed rules for cases of ‘space damage’ involving different states. In fact, the 
Liability Convention establishes two separate regimes of liability: one of absolute 
liability, to be applied in the case of damage caused by a space object “on the sur-
face of the Earth or to aircraft flight”, and another based on fault liability which 
applies when the damage occurs in outer space.35
That said, with respect to ADR operations these regimes are only relevant on the 
occurrence of damage, originating from a removal operation, suffered by states or 
legal or juridical persons due to the space activities of others. The only compensable 
damage is that which results in “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of 
health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, 
or property of international intergovernmental organizations”. Leaving aside the 
complexity of the concept of ‘fault’ when the damage occurs in outer space, the 
Liability Convention excludes any damage to the outer space environment itself, 
and does not take into concern an obligation to carry out a removal operation under 
the circumstance of damage occurring in outer space. Currently, space debris are 
beneficiaries of the provisions of the outer space legal regime drafted to protect 
33 Lyall and Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (Routledge, 2016) at 84; Ram S.  Jakhu, Joseph 
N. Pelton, Global Space Governance: An International Study (Springer, 2017) at 123.
34 Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty provides: “Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or 
procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable 
for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object 
or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies.”
35 Lotta Viikari, The Environmental Element in Space Law, Assessing the Present and Charting the 
Future (n.3) at 65.
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space objects and ensure peaceful outer space activities,36 erecting legal barriers to 
any attempt at removal or changing the orbit of space objects.
As will be later discussed, ADR operations would be more effective if not 
bounded by any ‘fault-based’ legal regime. Indeed, the implications of active debris 
remediation measures shall be firstly addressed with regard to the fundamental legal 
criterion of the protection of the outer space environment and the freedom of access 
to outer space.37
From the above discussion it is apparent that on the one hand, international space 
law is silent about space debris and space debris removal operations. On the other 
hand, the occurrence of a removal operation carried out by a state not owner of the 
removed debris, would constitute an internationally wrongful act, since the register-
ing State retains jurisdiction and control and ownership of the space object even if 
it is blown up into thousands of debris.
At least one legal mechanism could be useful for a removal operation of space 
debris—this is the prior consent of the state owner. Prior consent to the removal 
operation would remove the wrongfulness of the conduct.38 However, this legal 
mechanism could be regarded as a ‘too late and too slow approach’ in dealing with 
space debris. Comprehensive cleaning operations of Earth’s orbit are now a neces-
sity, and prior consent requires a prior identification of the space debris, which is not 
always possible.39 A system based on multiple authorizations for ADR operations 
would not be suitable to face the problem in view of the large-scale removal opera-
tion needed, especially in LEO and in the Geostationary Earth Orbit (GSO). Thus, 
authorization could be a source of international disputes when a removal measure 
exceeds the limits of the consent given,40 or in case of damage to a space object 
caused by the same removal operation, with the possible creation of new space 
debris.41
36 Benko (n.25) at 43.
37 The second sentence of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty provides: “Outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without dis-
crimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there 
shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”
38 International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts” Official records of the General Assembly, 56th Sess., Supp. no. 10 (A/56/10); 
International Law Commission, Yearbook Of The International Law Commission, vol. II pt.2 
(Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, 2001) 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) at 72–74.
39 Firooz Allahdadi, Isabelle Rongier, Paul D. Wilde (n.4) at 583; Lotta Viikari, The Environmental 
Element in Space Law, Assessing the Present and Charting the Future (n.3) at 36.
40 International Law Commission, Yearbook Of The International Law Commission (n.38) at 74.
41 To avoid these issues, some authors even suggest “[that] future regulatory mechanisms for debris 
removal could even require that space debris be declared to be under no one’s “jurisdiction and 
control”; otherwise removal mechanisms not capable of distinguishing between different kinds of 
objects could end up being in violation of the UN space law” Lotta Viikari, The Environmental 
Element in Space Law, Assessing the Present and Charting the Future (n.3) at 83.
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4.1.4  Space Weaponization and Active Debris Removal: 
A Comprehensive Legal Perspective
The legal status of space debris provided by the outer space legal regime is one of 
the major legal obstacles to active debris removal operations. In fact, the main legal 
path with which to deal with space debris removal is centered on Article VIII of the 
Outer Space Treaty. The ownership clause and the jurisdiction and control clause 
seem to exclude any effort regarding lawful ADR in Earth orbits.
Although this legal approach may be considered a cornerstone regarding the sta-
tus of space debris in the current legal framework, it is not be the most appropriate 
when it comes to ADR operations.
An environmental perspective on outer space could underpin the circumstances 
under which rightful removal operations may be conducted. Indeed, ADR technolo-
gies may, first, be linked to one of the fundamental issues that led to the interna-
tional consensus underlying the draft of the Outer Space Treaty: freedom of access 
and exploration of outer space by all states.
This implies that outer space should be a peaceful environment in the sense of a 
broad non-harmful medium for space activities. Second, ADR technologies are 
linked to the protection of the outer space environment, and in the present time, to 
the imperative necessity to remediate space debris, assuring sustainable access and 
use of outer space. As has already been mentioned above, the outer space environ-
ment has little capacity to cleanse itself. Space activities generating space debris 
will produce an immediate and potentially permanent negative impact on the outer 
space environment.42
The issues “outer space should be a peaceful environment in the sense of a broad 
non-harmful medium for space activities” and “protection and remediation of outer 
space environment” in order to achieve “the freedom of access and exploration of 
outer space by all States” are linked to ADR technologies but also to the legal impli-
cations of space weaponization. The will to avoid unrestrained weaponization of 
outer space could be considered another part of that international consensus which 
led to the elaboration of the Declaration and further of the Outer Space Treaty.
In fact, the Outer Space Treaty was an essential tool to avoid that states use 
weapons in outer space (especially in the cold war context), and to ensure freedom 
of access and exploration of outer space by all states, and peaceful space activi-
ties, a crucial objective pursued by the international community that would be 
drastically compromised by the possibility of putting weapons in space. In addi-
tion, space weaponization is a threat to the outer space environment, constituting 
the easiest way to make outer space a battlefield and a consequential source of 
space debris. That said, outer space as a “peaceful environment in the sense of a 
42 SpaceSecurity.org, Space Security 2008, at 25 noting that “debris in orbits above 600 kilometers 
will remain a threat for decades and even centuries.” available at http://spacesecurityindex.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/10/SSI2008.pdf.
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broad non- harmful medium for space activities” would be undermined by space 
weaponization.
From this discussion, it may be argued that ADR technologies and space weap-
onization are linked both legally and factually, both connected to the essential issues 
around which international consensus on the draft of the Outer Space Treaty was 
formed.
This interrelation implies that a unique approach is needed, as conceding some-
thing to one side will inevitably impact on the other side. As was correctly observed: 
“circumventing the provisions of the existing regime that establish jurisdiction and 
control in the State of registry may have negative consequences for space security”.43 
Indeed a spacecraft capable of grabbing space debris could also be used to damage 
or disrupt a functional satellite.
A comprehensive environmental perspective as described above, seems to 
address the problem of space debris at its core: the lawfulness of ADR operations, 
as the starting point from which detailed regulation is elaborated.
In this regard, Article I and Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty are particularly 
relevant, since they relate to the essential premise regarding outer space as a “peace-
ful environment in the sense of a broad non-harmful medium for space activities”.
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes fundamental principles which, in 
one way or another, affect all state activities in outer space, and could be considered 
as part of international customary law.44 This last assumption is particularly relevant 
as regards Article 1, since the vagueness of its terms make its practical application 
a problematic issue. Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty provides:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall 
be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree 
of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use 
by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance 
with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. There 
shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such 
investigation.
Article I (2) grant three basic rights to all spacefaring states: the right of free 
access, the right of free exploration, and the right of free use. In addition, it estab-
lishes a parameter regarding the exercise of these three rights, indeed access to outer 
space and exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out “without discrimi-
nation of any kind” and “on a basis of equality”. No state can be prevented from 
exercising these rights and in case another state party does so, it will commit a viola-
tion of the Treaty.45
43 Active Debris Removal (n.11).




In this context, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty is relevant since it points out 
an invaluable regulation regarding outer space activities and the outer space 
environment.
In fact, Article IX (1) sets out the general principle, according to which, in the 
exploration and use of outer space “States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by 
the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance (…) with due regard to the cor-
responding interests of all other States”. Article IX (2) significantly adds “States 
Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful 
contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth” and adopt 
measures for this purpose. Article IX (3) contains a mandatory international consul-
tation clause in that if a “State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activ-
ity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space (…) would cause 
potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties” or “a State 
Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned 
by another State Party in outer space (…) would cause potentially harmful interfer-
ence with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space”, then a state 
“may request consultations concerning the activity or experiment.”
The legal framework provided by Article I and Article IX lays down what could 
be considered as the cardinal points of the legal relation between ADR operations 
and the assumption of outer space as a “peaceful environment in the sense of a broad 
non-harmful medium”. The following principles are relevant:
 (1) Freedom of access, use and exploration of outer space by all states without any 
discrimination and on a base of equality;
 (2) Prohibition of harmful contamination of outer space and harmful interference 
of outer space activities;
 (3) Adoption of appropriate measures to avoid environmental contamination of 
outer space and interference between space activities;
 (4) Mandatory international consultation in case of a potentially harmful interfer-
ence with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space;
It could be argued that ADR technology acts as a fundamental tool in order to 
make these principles work in practice. These technologies could be considered as 
the standard response in the remediation of an environmental danger to outer space 
itself, and to outer space activities capable of jeopardizing the above principles.
In the high-crowded orbit regions, these principles assume great value within the 
legal framework of the Outer Space Treaty and could constitute the legal basis for 
ADR operations. Indeed, the progressive congestion of outer space due to the 
increasing debris population is moving the outer space environment towards the 
threshold of an irreversible situation.46 That said, an environmental approach to 
46 “the current environment [of LEO] is already above a critical density, even 100% compliance 
with these [Space Debris Mitigation] guidelines would not prevent the debris environment from 
increasing.” Donald J. Kessler, Nicholas L. Johnson, J.-C. Liou, Mark Matney (n.10) at 12–13.
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space debris and ADR operations should be considered as the main method to 
address the problem.
However, with this scenario in mind, the essential question cannot be avoided: 
what can be done with the existing legal regime?
Before assessing workable legal solutions, space weaponization should be briefly 
taken into account, since it might constitute the other side of the coin within the 
ADR context. Tested ADR technologies are based on the creation of the capability 
to locate, intercept and capture space debris, such as robotic arms, net technologies, 
and electrodynamic tethers.47 Those same capabilities apply to space weapons, 
assessing the dual-use nature of ADR technologies. Any spacecraft capable of car-
rying out a removal operation could also be used for military purposes, such as the 
capture or the manipulation of satellites in an attempt to deny linkage to outer space 
to a potential adversary.
Outer space is indeed a highly militarized environment. Due to its unique fea-
tures, outer space offers crucial advantages to those waging war. For example, space 
offers persistency of coverage—space objects move at extremely high speed because 
of orbital mechanics and there is no point on the earth’s surface or in the airspace 
that cannot be observed from outer space. Space-based systems enable precision 
navigation and positioning, provide real-time weather data, make possible instanta-
neous global communications, and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance mis-
sions.48 Militaries with developed space-capabilities are strongly dependent on 
space assets, to the point that without reliable satellites in orbit, most of their capaci-
ties would be deteriorated.
Moreover, most space assets, such as communications, weather forecasting and 
observation satellites, may be exploited for both military and non-military purposes. 
Accordingly, civilian and military satellites have become deeply intertwined.
As has been observed: “Space today from a military perspective is fundamental 
to every single military operation that occurs on the planet today […] Every opera-
tion from humanitarian operations to major combat operations is critically depen-
dent on space capabilities”.49
States largely exploit outer space for passive military uses, such as satellite posi-
tioning, communication, and reconnaissance. These activities are part of the so- 
47 Active Debris Removal (n.11) at 24–28.
48 M.  N. Schmitt, ‘International Law and Military Operations in Space’ in A. von Bogdandy, 
R. Wolfrum (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (vol. 10, 2006, Brill Academic 
Publishers) at 90–94.
49 Air Force Gen. John E.  Hyten, commander of the United States Strategic Command, 
‘U.S.  Strategic Command Perspectives on Deterrence and Assurance’ (Speech at the Stanford 
University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, California, 24 January 2017) avail-
able at http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/transcript_stratcom_-_hyten_160125_no_
qa.pdf; see also Michael Krepon & Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The 
Case Against Weaponizing Space (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003) at 10–27 (asserting that “Today, 
space assets play a much larger role in the real-time enhancement of military operations” and 




called militarization of space, which encompasses every use of space in which 
space-systems are not part of a direct engagement in warfare but are confined to the 
support of combatants. Due to the perceived non-aggressive nature of these activi-
ties, the militarization of outer space has been broadly accepted by the international 
community as not being contrary to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.50 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether every passive military utilization of outer 
space is also non-aggressive, such as the use of satellites to direct bombing raids.
On the other side, the weaponization of space, or active military use of outer 
space, has been described as “the deployment of weapons of an offensive nature in 
outer space or on the ground with their intended target located in space”.51 During 
the cold war both the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) developed the capacity to destroy satellites through 
anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). Today, with the current pace of diffusion of technol-
ogy, many more countries have demonstrated ASAT capabilities.52 The utilization 
and risk of proliferation of these weapons are major critical issues regarding outer 
space activities. Although outer space is currently not weaponized,53 the idea of 
conducting defensive and offensive operations in outer space has been embraced by 
the military doctrines of the major space-powers.54 The growing threat of the weap-
onization of space is strictly linked with space debris and the deterioration of the 
outer space environment.
Indeed, ASAT weapons are essentially divided into kinetic energy weapons and 
directed energy weapons. Kinetic energy weapons achieve their destructive effect 
through direct collision or near-explosion with the target. The large majority of 
ASATs are kinetic weapons, such as standard missiles, small projectiles propelled 
by electromagnetic canons, and ‘killer satellites’ that co-orbit and destroy the tar-
50 Art.2 (4) of the United Nations Charter provides as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.” United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
51 Fabio Tronchetti ‘A Soft Law Approach to Prevent the Weaponisation of Outer Space’ in Irmgard 
Marboe (ed) Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function of Non-binding Norms in International Space 
Law (Böhlau Verlag 2012) 361–386.
52 “China, Russia and the United States all possess these capabilities. India’s recent development of 
a layered missile defence system indicates it is likely to have the capability (at least in the near-
term) of direct-ascent ASAT capabilities. Japan, Israel, and France can also be considered turn-key 
ASAT players in today’s international space defence environment, as they are currently only barred 
from entry by the political will to do so, rather than by technological capabilities” NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly (n.2) at 6.
53 Unidir, Outer Space and Global Security (Unidir/2003/26) at 15; John Kierulf, Disarmament 
under International Law (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017) at 154; Adam G. Quinn, ‘The 
New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty and the Weaponization of Space’ (2008) 17 Minn. 
J. Int’l L. 475, 494.
54 Steven Freeland, Jackson Maogoto, ‘Space Weaponization and the United Nations Charter 
Regime on Force: a Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist?’ (2007) 41(4) The International Lawyer 
1091.
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get.55 Alternatively, ASAT weapons may be directed energy weapons, which dam-
age or destroy the target through a direct emission of energy.56 These technologies 
include, for example, high-energy lasers, particle beam cannons, and electromag-
netic pulses created by a nuclear explosion in space or by a non-nuclear electromag-
netic bomb (E-BOMB).57 These weapons could temporarily degrade a satellite 
sub-system or permanently damage a spacecraft, without relying on physical 
projectiles.
One major feature that distinguishes ASAT weapons is the creation of space 
debris. As mentioned above, only kinetic ASATs destroy the target physically by 
colliding with it, thus generating thousands of space debris.
Even if no hostile use of ASATs has been recorded,58 states have rarely raised any 
objection under international law to the development and testing of these technolo-
gies. For example, when China tested an ASAT weapon in January 2007, producing 
approximately 20% of the entire currently catalogued debris,59 a spokesperson for 
the United Kingdom was reported to have said: “We are concerned about the impact 
of debris in space and we expressed that concern […] We don’t believe that this does 
contravene international law.”60
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty directly addresses the matter of space mili-
tarization and weaponization, establishing only a partial demilitarization of outer 
space, as follows:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects car-
rying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. 
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifica-
tions, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial 
bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for 
any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility 
necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be 
prohibited.
States parties to the OST are forbidden to place, install or station nuclear weap-
ons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space in any manner. The placement or 
the utilization of anti-satellite weapons is not forbidden.61 In addition, in the debate 
55 Detlew Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law (UNIDIR 2005) 
[emphasis added] at 34–37.
56 Bahman Zohuri, Directed Energy Weapons: Physics of High Energy Lasers (HEL) (Springer, 
2016) at 81 [emphasis added].
57 Detlew Wolter (n.55); CARLO KOPP, ‘The E-Bomb: A Weapon Of Electrical Mass Destruction’ 
Proceedings Of Infowarcon V, Washington, DC, September 1996.
58 SpaceSecurity.org, Space Security 2014, at 7. Available at http://spacesecurityindex.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Space-Security-Index-2014.pdf.
59 Ibid.
60 Pavle Kilibarda, ‘The Militarization of Outer Space and Liability Convention’ (2015) 40(3) Air 
and Space Law 271.
61 Fabio Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy (Springer, 2013) at 9; Johannes 
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over the significance of the ‘peaceful purposes’ clause as meaning either “non- 
military” or “non-aggressive”, the “non-aggressive” use of outer space has prevailed 
and been endorsed by state practice.
The ambiguity of the legal framework of Article IV can be explained by the fact 
that both the United States and the Soviet Union had already launched satellites into 
outer space for military purposes at the time of the drafting of the Outer Space 
Treaty. During the cold war, space powers were extremely careful in ensuring that 
no provision of the treaty could infringe on their plans for the limited military uses 
of outer space.62
As a result, the legal gaps in Article IV have been filled by the advancement of 
military space technology towards the threshold of space weaponization. Nowadays, 
space assets are an integral part of the military hardware of the major powers, and 
willingness to refrain from the utilization of anti-satellite weapons in a potential 
conflict could be based on a thin legal and political balance.
The lack of legal clarity and good faith of space powers is increasingly putting 
outer space into a delicate situation. Dialogues over a binding treaty that might spe-
cifically address the problem are currently stalled.63
In this context, how does space weaponization relate to the set of four principles 
mentioned above?
The Freedom of access, use and exploration of outer space by all States without 
any discrimination and on a base of equality established by Article I of the Outer 
Space Treaty would be undermined by the deployment or use of space weapons, and 
the consequential growth of space debris could constitute a temporary or permanent 
impairment to access and exploitation of outer space for the whole international 
community. Indeed, a problem with a large-scale use of kinetic ASATs, is that even 
a sole impact can create a considerable amount of debris that can indiscriminately 
harm one’s own satellites as well as those of others.64
In this context, the prohibition of harmful contamination of outer space and 
harmful interference of outer space activities is particularly relevant, since “harmful 
M. Wolff “Peaceful uses’ of outer space has permitted its militarization: does it also mean its wea-
ponization?’ (2003) Disarmament Forum at 7.
62 Paul G.  Dembling, Daniel M.  Arons ‘The Evolution Of The Outer Space Treaty’ (1967) 33 
Journal Of Air Law And Commerce 419,433; Detlew Wolter (n.55) at 17.
63 “The most recent attempt to achieve [a treaty concerning space weaponization] is the Russia/
China Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament 
in 2008 and 2014 […] Although the Draft Treaty may be regarded as a point of departure in the 
formulation of a treaty prohibiting the weaponisation of outer space, the criticism that has been 
raised by governments against the draft document makes it unlikely that it would be easily accepted 
by the majority of states […] In addition, there also seems to be still some concern regarding 
Russia and China’s motives with the Draft Treaty, which are considered by some observers as an 
attempt to limit their adversaries’ military capabilities”. Anél Ferreira-Snyman ‘Selected Legal 
Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, with Specific Reference to Article IV of 
the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18(3) Potchefstroom Elec. L.J. 488.
64 Ram S. Jakhu, Joseph N. Pelton, Global Space Governance: An International Study (n.33) at 
274.
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contamination of outer space” and “harmful interference with outer space activities 
of other state-parties” are supposed to be avoided in pursuing studies and explora-
tion of outer space. The increasing congestion of Earth’s orbits has led the two 
obligations, namely, to cause “no harmful contamination of outer space” and “no 
harmful interference with outer space activities of other state-parties”, to assume a 
growing value in the legal framework of the Outer Space Treaty.
Article IX of the OST provides for the adoption of appropriate measures to 
avoid environmental contamination of outer space and interference between space 
activities, and mandatory international consultation in case of a potentially harmful 
interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. There 
is a lack of practical application of these provisions, mostly due to the space com-
petition between the major space powers and the renewed attention to ASAT devel-
opment.65 In addition, states have not been willing to reveal too much about space 
activities, mainly because of the high geopolitical value of this kind of 
information.
That said, Article IX could be considered as the core of the future regulation of 
space activities since it is applicable to military and non-military space activities. As 
an inalienable condition of outer space exploitation itself, outer space activities 
must firstly take place in accordance with the obligations of “no harmful contamina-
tion of outer space” and “no harmful interference with outer space activities of other 
state-parties”.
This approach does not exclude military uses of outer space, or an evolution of 
the same, if aligned with the legal parameters of Article IX, which should be 
regarded as a fundamental threshold of the lawfulness of each space activity.
Indeed, spacefaring nations have perceived the need to protect space assets given 
their nature as vulnerable and critical infrastructure. It could be argued that if space 
weaponization is in breach of international law and could be a definitive threat to 
space activities, by corollary, transparency and confidence-building measures in 
outer space activities could establish a different concept of ‘space security’. These 
measures are being debated at international level and are an important opportunity 
to eliminate all miscommunications, misperceptions and apprehensions about 
potentially harmful activities in outer space.66
4.1.5  Selective Cleaning Operations: A Possible Temporary 
Solution?
A workable legal solution that would address ADR operations cannot avoid or mini-
mize the issue of space weaponization. This must be considered as a crucial aspect 
of ADR technologies.
65 NATO Parliamentary Assembly (n.2) at 1.
66 Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, Report of the Secretary-
General, 16 February 2017, U.N. Doc. A/72/65.
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The dual-use nature of ADR technologies bears different practical and legal con-
sequences with respect to those posed by the current dual-use capacity of space 
assets.
For example, the utilization of civilian space assets, such as communication or 
observation satellites for military purposes, remains in the area of the passive mili-
tary uses of outer space, which are generally accepted by the international commu-
nity as permitted by Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which basically 
prohibits “the threat or use of force”.67
On the other hand, the deployment for military purposes of a satellite dedicated 
to removal operations would be an active military use of outer space, in the form of 
a space-based weapon, thus constituting that “threat or use of force” in outer space 
that the international community has been striving to avoid.
In September 2013, China carried out experiments in outer space regarding on- 
orbit servicing and satellite capture, involving a satellite fitted with a mechanical 
arm. These maneuvers raised international concerns that “the tests go beyond the 
stated objectives and are actually cover for testing on-orbit ASAT technology.”68 
There is a thin line that separates ADR technologies from space-based weapons, and 
it could be argued that ignoring this feature in a possible future regulatory frame-
work could lead to some sort of “masked weaponization” of outer space.
Bearing this in mind, what can be done with the existing legal regime? How can 
the set of four principles enshrined in Article I and Article IX of the Outer Space 
Treaty regulate ADR operations and ensure outer space as a “peaceful environment 
in the sense of a broad non-harmful medium”?
To answer these questions, a key-role should be played by the mandatory inter-
national consultation in case of a potentially harmful interference with activities in 
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, which could deny access to outer 
space.
In effect, the increased accessibility of space technology has led to a deep diver-
sification of space actors and space assets. As a result, outer space is increasingly 
becoming fundamental part of states infrastructures. Furthermore, the fundamental 
role of space-based assets in the essential fields of security, global communication 
and navigation, weather forecasting, and data transfer, weave the globe’s highly 
complex $78 trillion economy together.69 In the near future, access to and use of 
outer space could become increasingly exploitable by individuals. This prediction is 
substantiated by the development of commercial space flights and sub-orbital or 
orbital space tourism activities.70
67 Wolff (n.61) at 8.
68 Space Security 2014 (n.58) at 78; Kevin Pollpeter ‘China’s Space Robotic Arm Programs’ (2013) 
SITC Bulletin Analysis.
69 NATO Parliamentary Assembly (n.2) at 1.
70 OECD, The Space Economy at a Glance 2014 (2014, OECD publishing) at 64.
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It could be argued that the principles laid down by Article I and Article IX have 
progressively assumed greater value as access to outer space has become essential 
to states, and even to individuals.
The mandatory international consultation clause in the event of ‘harmful con-
tamination of outer space’ or ‘harmful interference of outer space activities’ could 
be the instrument to deal with space debris in the present time. This is even more 
important considering that collisional cascading, known as the Kessler Syndrome, 
could render some orbits unusable for centuries,71 denying access, use, and explora-
tion of outer space.
A discussion at international level would also minimize the threat of space wea-
ponization, which would emerge eventual unilateral removal operations carried out 
by different states.
However, this matter will show all its complexity on the occurrence of broad 
international consultations concerning active debris removal. Which criteria for 
removal could be relevant?
In this respect, large-scale and small-scale removal operations bear different con-
sequences and conclusions.
Large-scale removal operations will meet hard legal hurdles, requiring multiple 
authorizations by the states owners of the space objects, or at least multiple transfers 
of jurisdiction and control over the same objects to the entity or state that will con-
duct the removal. In addition, this approach may not be effective. In fact, not all 
debris are trackable, for each tracked debris there are 30–50 untracked objects in the 
centimeter range presenting a real danger to space assets.72
In pursuing this approach, attention would be concentrated on the removal of 
tracked and catalogued objects instead of addressing the uncatalogued “lethal popu-
lation” of debris. Thus, in the discussion of large-scale removal, security issues need 
to be addressed, making harder the conclusion of an agreement.
On the other hand, small-scale removal and improved compliance with the IADC 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, especially with the rule establishing a maxi-
mum of 25 years lifetime limit after which the space object should be re-entered in 
the atmosphere, could be effective and may constitute a first step toward a more 
general approach.
As has been demonstrated, complete compliance with the debris mitigation rules 
plus removal of five objects per year would prevent the number of catalogued frag-
ments from increasing.73 Broad international consultation in the event of ‘harmful 
contamination of outer space’ or ‘harmful interference of outer space activities’ 
posed by space debris could be the context in which states agree on this selective 
approach by removing a few objects per year.
71 C. M. Scaparotti, “Joint Publication 3–14, Space Operations,” US Department of Defense, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 2013, at 9. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/
jp3_14.pdf.
72 Firooz Allahdadi, Isabelle Rongier, Paul D. Wilde (n.4) at 583.
73 Donald J. Kessler, Nicholas L. Johnson, J.-C. Liou, Mark Matney (n.10) at 13.
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In the terms of Article IX, international consultations should be requested when 
a state “has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its 
nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause 
potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space” or when a state “has reason to believe that an 
activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with 
activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies”.
Article IX is guided by principles of “cooperation and mutual assistance” with 
“due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty”. 
Even if Article IX has a lack of specificity and does not describe what constitutes 
“harmful interference” and does not designate an agency to which States should 
turn for this evaluation, the international consultation clause should be interpreted, 
ad minimum, as requiring contact with other States Parties to the Treaty whose 
peaceful explorations and use of outer space would experience potentially harmful 
interference.
This could be a ‘step by step’ method to reach agreement on the removal of a few 
objects per year and to construct a consensus for future agreement on comprehen-
sive cleaning operations, targeting catalogued and uncatalogued objects, since the 
technology to achieve this objective could be soon available.74
4.2  Final Conclusions
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty assigns the jurisdiction, control and owner-
ship of a space object to the state of registration for an indeterminate period of time, 
which militates against the unilateral removal of such an object by another entity. 
Some authors suggest exempting space debris from such ‘protection’ by space 
law.75 This approach could raise serious security issues concerning space weapon-
ization. A series of unilateral removal operations could transform the threat of wea-
ponization of outer space into a reality.
The Outer Space Treaty and the other four agreements on outer space establish 
the essential rules regarding the access, use and exploration of outer space applica-
ble to all space activities, independent of their military or non-military nature. It can 
be inferred from Article I and Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty that the 
74 Eugene Levin, Jerome Pearson, Joseph Carroll, ‘Wholesale Debris Removal From Leo’ (2012) 
73 Acta Astronautica 100.
75 “it has been suggested already several decades ago that the principles concerning jurisdiction and 
control of Article VIII of the OST balanced with those of Article IX regarding states’ obligation to 
conduct their activities in outer space with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states 
would result in a qualified right to de-orbit inactive satellites” Lotta Viikari, The Environmental 
Element in Space Law, Assessing the Present and Charting the Future (n.3) at 82.
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 assumption that “outer space as a peaceful environment in the sense of a broad non- 
harmful medium for space activities” is a fundamental underlying issue in interna-
tional space law. The legality of small-scale removal operations may be based on a 
broad interpretation of Article IX, and space actors should engage in international 
consultations in which a few space objects per year are targeted for de-orbit.
Nonetheless, a detailed future regulatory framework is needed especially for 
large-scale removal operations, since the Outer Space Treaty establishes only gen-
eral rules that could be considered only as an initial step towards an instrument that 
directly addresses the removal of space debris. As has been correctly observed “[the 
Outer Space Treaty] is a quasi constitution, not only culmination, but also an 
initiation”.76
In this last regard, the role of space weaponization should be specifically consid-
ered, since it is deeply intertwined with ADR technologies. In fact, the legal gaps of 
today could become the black holes of tomorrow—further legal uncertainty about 
space militarization and weaponization could make outer space a definitive arena of 
warfare.
However, it seems that a common understanding regarding the value of environ-
mental protection of outer space and the need to assure long-term sustainability of 
outer space activities is currently growing. It has been estimated that “it appears that 
we are at the threshold of a new epoch in which environmental preservation of outer 
space has taken on a new meaning and sense of urgency not only for purposes of 
protecting valuable space assets in the short-term, but also to ensure the continued 
sustainability of space activities in the long-term”.77 The next step is for the interna-
tional community, particularly space technologists, policy makers, and law makers, 
to make a concerted effort to find a workable legal framework, since ADR technolo-
gies have matured to the point of being able to provide low-cost solutions for whole-
sale LEO debris removal.78
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76 George S. Robinson, Harold M. White, Envoys of Mankind: A Declaration of First Principles for 
the Governance of Space Societies (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986) at 181.
77 Active Debris Removal (n.11) at 8.
78 Eugene Levin, Jerome Pearson, Joseph Carroll (n.74) at 16.
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Chapter 5
The Right to (Anticipatory) Self-Defence 
in Outer Space to Reduce Space Debris
Annette Froehlich
Abstract Active debris removal is currently being widely discussed, because the 
simple mitigation of the creation of new space debris is no longer sufficient to guar-
antee the sustainable use of outer space. However, these discussions have encoun-
tered various difficulties due to the fact that the authors of the specialized UN space 
treaties, at the time of their drafting, did not take into consideration the many poten-
tial consequences of increased space activities, such as the problem of space debris, 
among others. The lack of clarity on how to handle this problem concerns not only 
the definition of space debris, but also the ways and means to address it, including 
the rights and obligations of involved operators.
In this setting, the EU initiative for an International Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities is to be highlighted as an attempt at clarity in this domain, espe-
cially as it envisages the possibility of using the right of self-defence to avoid the 
creation of space debris. This right must be assessed in the context of existing inter-
national norms, such as the provisions of the UN Charter on the notion of self- 
defence. Its application in the frame of active space debris removal is being 
questioned by some Member States, and Russia is currently advocating holding a 
debate on self-defence in UNCOPUOS. Discussions and initiatives in the UN First 
Committee must also be taken into account as these are also seeking security and 
safety in outer space by examining the aspect of self-defence.
Analysis of the legal implications of active space debris removal requires under-
standing of the nature of the space debris problem. Since the launch of the first 
artificial satellite, SPUTNIK-I in October 1957 by the Soviet Union (USSR), more 
than 5250 launches have been undertaken. This has led to more than 42,000 tracked 
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objects in orbit.1 23,000 of them remain in space and are regularly tracked by the US 
Space Surveillance Network,2 the main source of information on space debris. This 
number dwarfs the approximately 1200 operational satellites that are currently in 
orbit.3,4
One example of an inoperable space object is the former Envisat (“Environmental 
Satellite”) satellite of the European Space Agency (ESA), the world’s largest civil-
ian Earth observation satellite that is still in orbit (launch mass 8.211  kg). ESA 
formally announced the end of this Envisat mission on 9 May 2012 after an unex-
pected loss of contact with the satellite on 8 April 2012.5 It has been calculated that 
it may need around 150 years to gradually decay through orbits to reach the Earth’s 
atmosphere. While there are various projects and analyses to de-orbit this non- 
functional satellite, it nonetheless presents a collision risk.
Indeed, due to the cascade effect (Kessler syndrome), there is a high risk that 
space debris could generate an infinitely cascading number of further space debris. 
Various incidents in the past already underline the seriousness of the situation. The 
Chinese FengYun-1C engagement in January 2007 is one of these unfortunate oper-
ations that, alone, increased the trackable space object population by 25%.6 
Moreover, the first-ever in-orbit collision between two satellites on 10 February 
2009 (the privately owned American communication satellite Iridium-33 and the 
Russian military satellite Kosmos 2251) must be noted. Their collision at 11.7 km/s 
led to their full destruction, which generated more than 2300 trackable fragments.7 
Due to the enormous speed of space debris, the International Space Station (ISS) 
and other satellite providers have frequently had to undertake avoidance manoeu-
vres to obviate any damage to the ISS and the humans aboard. In fact, functional 
space infrastructure has already been harmed by space debris, and space shuttle 
windows have had to be replaced because of damage from paint flecks.8
1 ESA, Space debris, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Debris/ 
FAQ_Frequently_asked_questions.
2 Their catalogue registers objects larger than 5–10 cm in low-Earth orbit (LEO) and 30 cm to 1 m 
at geostationary (GEO) altitude.
3 ESA, About space debris, https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Debris/About_
space_debri; See also: Orbital Debris Quarterly News, https://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/
quarterly-news/newsletter.html.
4 Total mass of all space objects in Earth orbit: About 7500 tonnes, figures provided by ESA’s 
Space Debris Office at ESOC, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Debris/
Space_debris_by_the_numbers.
5 ESA, Earth Online, https://earth.esa.int/web/guest/missions/esa-operational-eo-missions/envisat.
6 ESA, About space debris, https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Debris/About_ 
space_debris.
7 ESA, About space debris, https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Debris/About_ 
space_debris.




Consequently, the question that arises is whether the doctrine of self-defence can 
be utilised to remove space debris in order to avoid or to reduce the risk for potential 
further incidents, especially as the protection of operating space objects and infra-
structure is nowadays vital for the functioning of critical key-services of states.
Thus, in its draft for a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, the European 
Union (EU) has explicitly employed the right to self-defence. Several other cur-
rent initiatives along the same lines will also be analysed in the following. Also 
significant is that in several fora, such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), the Russian delegation has foreshadowed discussion 
on the use of the right to self-defence in outer space in the context of active space 
debris.
Due to the amount of already existing space debris, the simple avoidance of the 
creation of new debris during the launching or operational phases is no longer suf-
ficient to guarantee the sustainable use of space. Therefore, several issues need to be 
examined in the frame of active space debris removal. First, it is important to anal-
yse the legal definition of space debris (Sect. 5.1). This will be followed by an in 
depth investigation of whether there is a right, or even an obligation, to remove 
space debris (Sect. 5.2) in the context of existing international legal norms to ensure 
peaceful behaviour in space (Sect. 5.3), but also in view of ongoing initiatives based 
on the right of self-defence to mitigate space debris (Sect. 5.4).
5.1  Legal Definition of Space Debris
Prevailing opinion considers any further human made objects in space to be space 
objects. However, the level of risk (for example of collision) emanating from space 
objects may be different, as functional space objects are manoeuvrable, which is 
mostly no longer the case for non-functional space objects and even less possible for 
space debris, especially non-trackable debris. Therefore, space debris has high risk 
potential as they seriously endanger all space activities. Consequently, regulation is 
needed, beginning with a legal definition of space debris.
5.1.1  Lack of Legal Clarity: Absence of Space Debris 
Definition
The legality of the removal of space debris is deeply affected by the lack of a legal 
definition of the term ‘space debris’. International space law (mostly based on the 
five United Nations space treaties and declarations) does not contain a definition of 
space debris. This gap leads to several ambiguities especially concerning the dis-
tinction between space debris and non-functional objects (the latter may be inten-
tionally kept in space to serve as spares, or to be repaired when repair satellites can 
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be launched in orbit). In addition, the aspect of what is ‘useful’ is difficult to define 
as various actors may have different ‘uses’ in mind.9
Nevertheless reference can be made to Art. VII Outer Space Treaty (OST) which 
clearly stipulates that the launching state10 “is internationally liable for damage to 
another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object 
or its component parts (…)”. In addition, the Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space (REG) also lays down under Art. 1b REG that “the term 
‘space object’ includes component parts of a space object as well as its launch 
vehicle and parts thereof”.11
While the UN space treaties make clear that space objects include also their com-
ponent parts, none of them see functionality as relevant in defining a space object. This 
is important because Art. VIII OST states that “a State Party to the Treaty on whose 
registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and con-
trol over such object”. If the criterion of functionally were relevant for the classifica-
tion of a space object, the state of registry would lose its right to exercise jurisdiction 
and control over a space object as soon as it became inoperable. This would contradict 
Art. VII OST that stipulates state liability for damages caused by its own space objects. 
If a state is liable for damages caused by its space objects, the state should have also 
the right to control and exercise jurisdiction over all operations affecting the space 
object, otherwise the link between the right to control the space operation and to 
assume responsibility and liability in case of damage would be interrupted.
5.1.2  Initiatives to Define Space Debris
Due to the lack of legal definition of space debris in the UN space treaties, various 
initiatives have been undertaken to define space debris.
In 2007, based on the definition elaborated and adopted by the Inter-Agency 
Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)12 in the frame of its ‘IADC Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines’, the UNCOPUOS Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee elaborated a draft that was later endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly in the same year.13 In these UNCOPUOS Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines ‘space debris’ are defined as follows:
9 Reconsidering Space Debris: Can Space Junk Be Useful? In: Futurism, https://futurism.com/
reconsidering-space-debris-space-junk-useful/.
10 The launching state is defined in this Art. VII OST as the state “that launches or procures the 
launching of an object into outer space, (…), and each State Party from whose territory or facility 
an object is launched”.
11 Art. 1b REG.
12 IADC is an international governmental forum for the worldwide coordination of activities related 
to the issues of man-made and natural debris in space, https://www.iadc-online.org/.




For the purpose of this document, space debris is defined as all man-made objects, includ-
ing fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are 
non-functional.14
It should be emphasized that this definition of ‘space debris’ was elaborated and 
adopted “for the purpose of this document” and does not constitute any further bind-
ing international legal definition. Nevertheless, this definition has been taken up by 
several member states and organisations. Thus, the European Space Agency (ESA) 
explains space debris as follows: “Space debris is defined as all non-functional, 
human-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or 
re-entering into Earth’s atmosphere”.15 Also NASA has declared that “space debris 
encompasses both natural (meteoroid) and artificial (man-made) particles. 
Meteoroids are in orbit about the sun, while most artificial debris is in orbit about 
the Earth. Hence, the latter is more commonly referred to as orbital debris. Orbital 
debris is any man-made object in orbit about the Earth that no longer serves a useful 
function. Such debris includes non-functional spacecraft, abandoned launch vehicle 
stages, mission-related debris and fragmentation debris”.16 Moreover, in the IAA 
Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management, it is underlined that “there is no legal 
distinction made between valuable active spacecraft and valueless space debris.”17 
However, these statements and initiatives do not constitute legally binding rules.
5.2  Removal of Space Debris: Right, Obligation or Voluntary 
Option?
Since there is no legally binding definition of space debris, and a wide range of 
operations is possible to secure its removal, the question becomes: “Is there an obli-
gation to remove space debris, and if so, is this a right or just a voluntary option?”
With regards to international space law, Art. I OST underlines the free use of 
outer space: “The exploration and use of outer space (…) shall be carried out for the 
benefit and in the interests of all countries (…), shall be free for exploration and use 
by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accor-
dance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial 
bodies”. This article clearly stipulates that the use of outer space should be free for 
all and there should be free access. Consequently, all space actors should have the 
right to use outer space freely. Thus, if a space object of a nation hinders the free use 
14 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, p. 1, 
pt. 1, http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf.
15 ESA, Space debris, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Debris/ 
FAQ_Frequently_asked_questions.
16 NASA, Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/
news/orbital_debris.html.
17 Corinne Contant-Jorgenson, Petr Lála, Kai-Uwe Schrogl (eds.), IAA Cosmic Study on Space 
Traffic Management, 2006, p. 40, https://iaaweb.org/iaa/Studies/spacetraffic.pdf.
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of space by others, this may be considered as a violation of Art. I OST. In addition, 
Art. IX OST clearly indicates the limits of free use of outer space by emphasizing 
that space actors have to conduct their operations in outer space “with due regard to 
the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty”.18 Moreover, 
“harmful contamination”19 should be avoided.
Even though there is no legally binding definition of harmful contamination, 
space debris that may constitute a risk for space activities can be considered as 
harmful contamination as this would constitute pollution of the Earth’s environment 
and its orbits. In this regard, reference can be made to other international regulations 
and especially the ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment’ which in 1972 formulated Principle 21 that “States have, in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law 
(…) the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction”.20 This obligation was echoed in Principle 2 of the ‘Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development’ of 1992.21
Consequently, it can be deduced that there is clear obligation on states to ensure 
that space activities emanating from their area of jurisdiction do not damage the 
celestial environment. However, it can be argued that most space debris were cre-
ated before these UN declarations were elaborated. But we can rely on the jurispru-
dence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which, in its Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
case, clearly stated that if a new international regulation were adopted to protect the 
environment, this new standard would apply not only to upcoming, but also to 
already ongoing operations: “Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and 
other reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done 
without consideration of the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific 
insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind - for present and future 
generations - of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, 
new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instru-
ments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consider-
ation, and such new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate 
new activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past.”22 Indeed, 
18 Art. IX OST.
19 Art. IX OST.
20 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972, http://
www.un-documents.net/unchedec.htm.
21 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 
1992, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.
22 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) judgment of 25 




for the ICJ this approach is the only way to preserve the environment in view of a 
sustainable development.”23,24
5.2.1  Who May Remove Space Debris: Is There a Compulsory 
Link Between Space Debris and Ownership?
Even if an obligation to remove space debris can be deduced from the international 
regulations and the jurisprudence of the ICJ discussed above, the question of who 
has the obligation or the right to remove space debris must be addressed. Moreover, 
a distinction must be made between removal of own, and removal of foreign, space 
debris.
As stated above, Art. VIII OST provides that the state of registry exercises juris-
diction and control: “A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched 
into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and 
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.”25 In addi-
tion, the “ownership of objects launched into outer space, include[s] (…) their com-
ponent parts”.26 The right to exercise jurisdiction and control is important when 
considering any act of space debris removal.
The Registration Convention was adopted to clarify registration obligations by 
providing more detail. It states in Art. II para. 1 REG that “the launching State shall 
register the space object”27 and, in para. 2 clarifies that “where there are two or more 
launching States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly determine 
which one of them shall register the object”.28
It can be concluded that the state of registry is entitled to remove its space debris, 
but is also obliged to do so to avoid any harm to the environment.29 Clearly, the state 
of registry is also entitled to ask or to give permission to another state to carry out 
debris removal operations. But what happens if a state does not comply with its 
23 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) judgment of 25 
September 1997, para. 140.
24 In the domain of soft law, Guideline 6 of the UNCOPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 
which enjoins parties to “Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital 
stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission” recommends that 
“Spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages that have terminated their operational phases in orbits 
that pass through the LEO region should be removed from orbit in a controlled fashion”, http://
www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/COPUOS-GuidelinesE.pdf. This UNCOPUOS 
guideline is non-legally binding and it is questionable if all space debris are covered by Guideline 
6 as spacecrafts and launch vehicle orbital stages are only expressis verbis mentioned. Nevertheless 
it can be concluding that this embrace also its components.
25 Art. VIII OST.
26 Art. VIII OST.
27 Art. II para. 1 REG.
28 Art. II para. 2 REG.
29 See above.
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international obligations? Is another state then entitled to implement those obliga-
tions? There are no binding rules in this regard, although several attempts have been 
undertaken, such as the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
5.2.2  The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities (ICoC)
To ensure the sustainable use of the common outer space, the European Union (EU) 
has proposed the European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, which has 
since been renamed “The International Code of Conduct (ICoC)”.30 The code was 
proposed by the EU to strengthen and enhance security, safety and sustainability in 
outer space, especially as one of the main EU aspirations in its space policy is “to 
encourage responsible behaviour in outer space”.31 Moreover, the proposed code 
“was made in response to a call for ‘transparency & confidence-building measures’ 
among all space actors in two UN General Assembly Resolutions”.32 Both resolu-
tions are entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space 
activities”, the first adopted in 2006,33 the second in 2007,34 and seek the more 
secure use of outer space.
However, the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities initiative 
has encountered difficulties especially due to its Art. 4.2. This stipulates that states 
engage not to undertake any actions in space that directly or indirectly cause dam-
age or destruction to space objects, unless these actions are justified. Such justifica-
tion is based on three possible scenarios: prevention of a possible hazard to human 
life or health, the prevention or reduction of the emergence of new space debris, and 
measures provided by the UN Charter including the right to self-defence.35
Art. 4.1. The Subscribing States resolve to establish and implement policies and procedures 
to minimise the risk of accidents in space, collisions between space objects, or any form of 
harmful interference with another State’s peaceful exploration, and use, of outer space.
30 European External Action Service (EEAS) (2014): Draft International Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space Activities, Version 31 March 2014, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/
space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf.
31 EU External Action, Security and Sustainability in Outer Space, 14.01.2015, https://eeas.europa.
eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8466/security-and-sustainability-outer-space_en.
32 EU External Action, Security and Sustainability in Outer Space, 14.01.2015, https://eeas.europa.
eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8466/security-and-sustainability-outer-space_en.
33 Resolution 61/75 on Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, 
2006, A/RES/61/75.
34 Resolution 62/43 on Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, 
2007, A/RES/62/43.
35 “Refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of 
space objects unless such action is justified”, European External Action Service (EEAS) (2014): 




Art. 4.2. The Subscribing States resolve, in conducting outer space activities, to:
 • refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruc-
tion, of space objects unless such action is justified:
 ○ by imperative safety considerations, in particular if human life or health is at risk; 
or
 ○ in order to reduce the creation of space debris; or
 ○ by the Charter of the United Nations, including the inherent right or individual or 
collective self-defence.
and where such exceptional action is necessary, that it be undertaken in a manner so as to 
minimise, to the greatest extent practicable, the creation of space debris;
 • take appropriate measures to minimize the risk of collision; (…)
In consequence, the ICoC envisages the possibility of ‘anticipatory intervention’ 
that uses the right of self-defence to avoid the creation of space debris before they 
damage other space assets. However, the use of self-defence in this case is contro-
versial. In fact, the right to self-defence, or the possibility of avoiding debris by 
destroying a space object, has been questioned especially by Russia, which sees it 
as a pretext to destroy the space objects of other states. In this context it should be 
underlined again that an intact space infrastructure is not only vital for the survival 
of industrialized countries, but for a steadily increasing community of states. 
Therefore, Russia has introduced several proposals at the UNCOPUOS level to ini-
tiate a debate on the use of self-defence in space.36 Moreover, some Latin American 
countries consider that the foreseen reference to Art. 51 of the UN Charter, and the 
right to self-defence therein, constitutes more of a source of conflict and further 
militarisation than a way to secure space activities. Against this background, it is 
necessary to analyse in depth the relevant international legal norms in this regard.
5.3  International Legal Norms to Ensure Peaceful Behaviour 
in Space
The specialized space UN treaties, especially the Outer Space Treaty, were adopted 
to regulate activities in outer space to ensure security and peace in space. Other 
general international regulations, such as in the UN Charter, may also be relevant.
5.3.1  Relevant Specialized UN Space Treaties
The Magna Carta for space activities, the Outer Space Treaty stipulates in its Art. III
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, 
36 See: IV.1. Russian approach for a uniform interpretation of the right of self-defence in outer 
space in conformity with the UN Charter. p. XX.
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 including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international 
peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.37
This article specifies clearly that space activities have to be carried out in “accor-
dance with international peace, including the Charter of the United Nations” for the 
purpose of “maintaining international peace and security”. In addition, Art. IV OST 
addresses possible future military intervention in outer space.
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects car-
rying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty 
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and 
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on 
celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or 
for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility 
necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be 
prohibited.38
Although Art. IV OST deals with the important aspect of the peaceful use of 
space, many aspects remain unclear as the community of states during the drafting 
process of the OST did not envisage a general prohibition of military interventions, 
unrealistic at the time of the Cold War.
However, in the context of possible space missions for the purposes of active 
debris removal (for example ESA’s e.Deorbit mission39), the use of military equip-
ment may be considered as well. Unfortunately due to some unclear definitions in 
Art. IV OST, this may raise further questions and incertitude. In consequence, Art. 
IV OST should be analysed in detail.
5.3.1.1  Moving Weapons into Space (Art. VI, para. 1 OST)
Art. VI, para. 1 OST has already led to various controversial interpretations due to 
the unclear stipulation “not to place”, since weapons do not have to be placed into 
orbit in order to activate them. A simple flight through would be sufficient. 
Accordingly, outer space may be used for the transport or fly through of nuclear 
weapons or weapons of mass destruction.40 Also, the OST does not specify how to 
proceed with weapons that are not explicitly listed, since only “nuclear weapons or 
37 Art. III OST.
38 Art. IV OST.
39 ESA, Clean space, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering_Technology/Clean_
Space/e.Deorbit.
40 A ballistic flight would therefore not be a violation of the treaty, but it is controversial whether 
weapons systems, which cover only part of their flight path in space, are really allowed. Therefore, 
in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missiles) treaties 
to limit missile defence systems, as it was unclear whether these space-based systems were cov-
ered by the prohibition of Art. IV OST.
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any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” are mentioned in Art. VI, para. 1 
OST. This could mean that weapon systems other than nuclear weapons/weapons of 
mass destruction are not subject to this restriction and could be placed into space.
In this context, reference should be made to the ‘Treaty on Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer 
Space Objects’ (PPWT), a proposal submitted by Russia and China to the Geneva 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February 2008. According to the proposed 
Treaty, no objects that carry any kind of weapon should be sent into Earth orbit and 
no weapons should be placed on celestial bodies. This text was presented again in a 
modified version in June 2014, but met with criticism. The United States for exam-
ple raised security concerns and missing verification mechanisms.41
5.3.1.2  Definition of Peaceful Use (Art. IV, Para 2 and Para. 4 OST)
Furthermore, Art. IV, para. 2 OST states that the use of the Moon and other celestial 
bodies should be undertaken exclusively for “peaceful purposes”. However, the 
term “peaceful use” is not further determined and is controversially interpreted. 
Does “peaceful use” mean no military use or only no aggressive military activities? 
If “peaceful” were to be considered non-military, then all military activities would 
be prohibited. If “peaceful” were to be considered non-aggressive, only aggressive 
activities in space would be prohibited, but not the use of military personnel and 
facilities (including space activities carried out by military personnel). In general, it 
is assumed that “peaceful” should be interpreted as “non-aggressive”, unless the 
OST speaks of “exclusively for peaceful purposes” (Art. VI, para. 2 OST). In this 
case, no activities or facilities in a military context are possible.
However, it can be argued that the OST itself envisages certain military activi-
ties. While the testing of weapons of all kinds is prohibited (Art. IV, para. 3 OST), 
the use of “military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful pur-
poses” (Art. IV, para 4 OST) is allowed, which may also be applicable in the context 
of space debris removal. In this context, questions arise about ‘dual-use’ activities 
in space, which is also of high relevance for the European Space Agency (ESA) as, 
according to Art. II of its statutes, the purpose of this organization “shall be to pro-
vide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among 
European States in space research and technology and their space applications”. 
Here it must be underlined that a multiplicity of applications and missions can have 
both a civilian and military character. Therefore, in regard to the peaceful use of 
outer space, it can be concluded that the OST guarantees the right to use outer space, 
however it is limited by Art. IV requiring that this use is peaceful. This will mostly 
be the case for active space debris removal. But it might also be contested by those 
who claim that active debris removal is only a pretext for destroying the space 
41 Jeff Foust, U.S.  Dismisses Space Weapons Treaty Proposal As “Fundamentally Flawed”, in: 
Spacenews.com, 11.09.2014, http://spacenews.com/41842us-dismisses-space-weapons-treaty- 
proposal-as-fundamentally-flawed/.
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 infrastructure of other states. In consequence, it is important to analyse the general 
regulations, especially those of the UN Charter, in this regard.
5.3.2  The UN Charter and the Use of Force
Art. III OST explicitly provides that the States Parties should carry out their space 
activities “in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United 
Nations”.42 The UN Charter was elaborated after the Second World War and con-
tains provisions related to the use of force. First, however, it is necessary to clarify 
preliminary questions around the general applicability of the UN Charter to extra- 
terrestrial spheres as, at the time of their drafting and adoption, the UN rules were 
primarily intended to ensure peace on Earth. Nevertheless, it is nowadays accepted 
that international law extends also to the first two levels around the Earth, i.e. 
terrestrial- lunar and interplanetary space (our solar system). Therefore, it is instruc-
tive to analyse the relevant articles on peace and security, especially Art. 2 (4) and 
Art. 51.
5.3.2.1  Art. 2 (4) The UN Charter and the Prohibition on the Use of Force
Art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter promulgates a general prohibition on the use of threat 
or force: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.43 The 
meaning of this article was reinforced by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
its Nicaragua case,44 which gave the status of international customary law to this 
article and its principle.
Art. 2 (4) UN Charter not only mentions the use of force “against the territorial 
integrity”, but also “any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations”, which extensively enlarges the scope of application of the right of self- 
defence. In addition, it must be highlighted that Art. 2 (4) not only encompasses 
territorial integrity, but also the “political independence of any state”, which does 
not limit this right to territorial criteria. This was also endorsed by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case by underlining that this embraces a multitude of various rights of a 
State expressing its sovereignty. As noted above, states have to register their space 
objects. As registration is the constituting act for the right of the Registry state to 
exercise jurisdiction and control, this means it can exercise its right of suzerainty.
42 Art. III OST.
43 Art. 2 (4) UN Charter.
44 Nicaragua Case, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), I.C.J. Report 1986, para. 190.
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5.3.2.2  Art. 51 UN Charter and the Concept of Anticipatory Self-Defence
Chapter VII UN Charter is entitled “Action with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” Art. 51 UN Charter addresses the 
concept of “self-defence” by stipulating the inherent right of a state to act in self- 
defence in case of an armed attack:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and secu-
rity. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be imme-
diately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.45
First, it must be noted that Art. 51 UN Charter applies only if an “armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations” without giving any further details 
concerning the location of such attack. The only qualification is that it must be 
against a UN Member State. In regard to the three-element doctrine, a state is based 
on state territory, state people and state power. As there is no territory in outer space, 
and especially as Art. II OST forbids any national appropriation in outer space, it 
may be deduced that the right of self-defence can only be carried out on Earth, 
against the territory of another Member State. However, due to the above-mentioned 
link created by the act of registration, a space object is part of and falls under the 
suzerainty of the Registry state that has the right to defend persons and objects 
belonging to its dominion.46
Furthermore, an act of self-defence must correspond to certain criteria—other-
wise it may be considered as unlawful. In the Nicaragua case the ICJ stated: “with 
regard to the characteristics governing the right of self-defence, since the Parties 
consider the existence of this right to be established as a matter of customary inter-
national law, they have concentrated on the conditions governing its use. (…) The 
Parties also agree in holding that whether the response to the attack is lawful depends 
on observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures 
taken in self-defence.”47 To concretise these elements, reference can be made to the 
draft articles on ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, which 
give more detail on the aspects of “necessity”.
45 Art. 51 UN Charter.
46 It is therefore an advantage to register space objects as this is the sole way to exercise suzerainty 
rights over them and to defend them in case of peril.
47 Nicaragua Case, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), I.C.J.  Report 1986, para. 194. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
5 The Right to (Anticipatory) Self-Defence in Outer Space to Reduce Space Debris
84
Precluding the Wrongfulness of Removing Space Debris
The draft articles on ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ 
elaborated by the International Law Commission (ILC)48 cover various special cir-
cumstances that can vitiate the wrongfulness of an act. First, Art. 20 mentions 
“Consent” (“Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another 
State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the 
extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent”49). Indeed, in the con-
text of active debris removal, the consent of the state of registry to the removal of its 
space debris can vitiate the wrongfulness of another state in removing the space 
debris of the state of registry. Art. 21 refers to “Self-defence” (“The wrongfulness 
of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self- 
defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations”50). The possi-
bility of invoking self-defence in the context of the removal of space debris to avoid 
harm to other space operations has already been analysed above.
Another important circumstance is “Necessity”51 as mentioned in Art. 25. 
‘Necessity’ may be “invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness 
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation”.52 Nevertheless in order 
to invoke necessity, various criteria must be met. The action must be “the only way 
for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril”53 
and must “not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”54 In the 
field of space debris, the international community’s interest is that no further threats 
are posed by space debris and it is hardly conceivable to see how the removal of 
space debris may impair the essential interest of its State owner (except if this state 
does not consider this object in space as space debris but as an non-operable space 
object necessary for further operations). In addition, a peril can be qualified as a 
“grave and imminent peril” even if its realisation will occur in the medium or 
 long- time future. Indeed, the ICJ stated in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case “that a 
‘peril’ appearing in the long term might be held to be ‘imminent’ as soon as it is 
established, at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril, however 
far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable”.55
48 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft articles on ‘Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts’, text adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 
and submitted to the UN General Assembly, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_
articles/9_6_2001.pdf.
49 ILC, Draft articles on ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, Art. 20.
50 ILC, Draft articles on ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, Art. 21.
51 ILC, Draft on ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, 2001, http://legal.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf.
52 Art. 25, para. 1.
53 Art. 25, para. 1a.
54 Art. 25, para. 1b.
55 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) judgment of 25 
September 1997, para. 54.
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The Concept of Anticipatory Self-Defence and Preventive Actions
Art. 51 states “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations”. On a strict reading, the article only applies “if an armed attack 
occurs”. But what happens if an imminent attack is obvious which may lead to sig-
nificant damage for the victim state. Should the state wait and first endure the attack? 
Can the state victim act legally in advance and claim self-defence to avoid damage 
to its country, its population or goods? (Especially taking into account that it will 
take a certain time for the UN Security Council to take the measures indicated in 
Art. 51 UN Charter). At a time where one strike with a weapon of mass-destruction 
can have an enormous destructive, even extinguishing, effect for the affected state, 
it is legitimate to advocate an anticipatory right of self-defence as the affected state 
may otherwise no longer exist or be able to exercise its right of self-defence.
The question of the right to anticipatory self-defence was already widely debated 
before the drafting of the UN Charter, especially in the frame of the Caroline56 
case.57 Even in the nineteenth century, International customary law accepted a pre- 
emptive lawful use of force as self-defence. During the Caroline case the criteria for 
this right were elaborated, namely “necessity” (“necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”58), 
meaning that the attack is imminent (“conditionality of an attack denotes both the 
occurrence and expectation of an armed attack”59), and the condition of “propor-
tionality” (that the considered measures to take in self-defence are the only way to 
avoid the threat/attack).
In the wake of the 11 September 2011 tragedies, the US administration under 
President G.W. Bush decided that the right of (anticipatory) self-defence had to be 
reconsidered and adapted to meet the threat from high-tech weapons. A new strat-
egy was presented which included the concept of pre-emption. Therefore, the US 
National Security Strategy (NSS) announced that despite the traditional criterion of 
imminence for anticipatory self-defence, the US “must adapt the concept of 
 imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”60 It under-
lined that “[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”61 As this 
56 The destruction of the small vessel Caroline occurred on 20 December 1837.
57 The Caroline Case, British-American Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-
1842d.asp.
58 Daniel Webster, Letter from Daniel Webster, US Secretary of State to Henry Fox, British Minister 
in Washington, 24 April 1841, p. 1138.
59 Kinga Tibori Szabó, Anticipatory Action in Self-Defence, 2011, p. 292.
60 The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss.html.
61 The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss.html.
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 anticipatory self-defence may be used also in the case of “uncertainty“, it turns pre-
emptive actions into a purely political decision.62
5.4  Further Initiatives on the Use of Self-Defence to Mitigate 
Space Debris
The right of self-defence was also discussed in other fora, e.g. the delegation of the 
Russian Federation advocated initiating a debate during the UNCOPUOS sessions. 
Furthermore, discussions within the first UN Committee were initiated in the con-
text of a possible treaty and resolutions in this regard. In addition to the ICoC, the 
EU has proposed multilateral non-legally binding instruments on space security to 
foster the safe and sustainable use of outer space, as elaborated below.
5.4.1  Russian Approach for a Uniform Interpretation 
of the Right of Self-Defence in Outer Space 
in Conformity with the UN Charter
For some years now, the Russian delegation to UNCOPUOS has raised the question 
of the right of self-defence in outer space and its conformity with the UN Charter. 
Russia has advocated a uniform interpretation of this right and in 2015 submitted a 
working paper entitled “Achievement of a uniform interpretation of the right of self- 
defence in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations as applied to outer 
space as a factor in maintaining outer space as a safe and conflict-free environment 
and promoting the long-term sustainability of outer space activities”.63 In its state-
ment of 12 June 2017, Russia said that this aspect “has great significance for the 
entire space safety and security discipline”. Furthermore, it stated:
the unfortunate thing is that some States prefer not to discuss this issue. The reasons for this 
are different. There are those who hold the position that it would be intolerable and cynical 
even to raise the question of self-defence in outer space. The moral aspect of such a position 
is understood, but, to be frank, it is not exactly in correlation with realities. And, of course, 
there are those who might not be enthusiastic about dwelling into the problem here in the 
Committee simply because in conceptualizing self-defence in space they have by far sur-
passed the concept characterizing the UN Charter’s Article 51 by providing for preventive, 
preemptive and even anticipatory self-defence in outer space. The Charter of the United 
Nations certainly does not provide for such types of self-defence in its radicalized form, 
either in Earth or anywhere. Some national policy instruments refer to self-defence in outer 
space as being a customary norm. And this is something to be discussed for sure since 
62 Edward G. Ferguson/John J. Klein, It’s Time for the U.S. Air Force to Prepare for Preemption in 
Space -Without a preemption strategy, the United States is vulnerable-, 22 April 2017, https://
warisboring.com/its-time-for-the-u-s-air-force-to-prepare-for-preemption-in-space/.
63 UNCOPUOS, 58th session, Vienna, A/AC.105/L.294, 29 April 2015.
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 customs comprise habitual practices of States which are regarded as binding on all States. 
This is a classical description of what customary law is all about. We find it difficult to 
recollect any events that could be interpreted as forming a sustained practice of self-defence 
particularly in outer space.64
In the ensuing discourse, it claimed that the “absolute majority of States would 
hardly respond to an assertion that such customary law norm actually exists.” 
Moreover, the delegation of the Russian Federation clearly declared that “Russia 
upholds the position that it would be very important for the international commu-
nity to reach a common understanding of how to interpret the relevant provisions of 
the UN charter as they may hypothetically apply to outer space. In case such an 
understanding is reached, it would have to be approved by the General Assembly 
and the Security Council”.65 For these reasons, Russia advocated a detailed analysis 
of this aspect. (“The examination of the problem of self-defence in outer space may 
lead to quite interesting outcomes.”66)
Furthermore, the delegation of the Russian Federation again expressed its reser-
vations concerning the draft ICoC:
The well-known draft Code of conduct in outer space activities featured salient paragraph 
4.2 that claimed reason and validity for a rather strange concept providing for suprajurisdic-
tional coercive measures with respect to foreign space objects on rather preposterous 
grounds such as space debris mitigation or superior safety considerations. We tried to figure 
out the intention behind it. The pursuit of explanation here was in vain, since the attempts 
to explain such a new paradigm have been poor. We can say absolutely for sure that it would 
not be conceivable for either State that has advanced this idea to have its own space object 
destroyed by any other State. To be frank, this concept seemed to be based on the presump-
tion of somebody possessing a monopoly of coercive force in outer space.67
Therefore, the Russian delegation urged the UNCOPUOS to have further discus-
sions on this topic. “We sincerely believe that the Committee should set itself a very 
practical task of analysing different behavioural situations and behavioural 
responses. Achieving understandings here would serve practical needs in mitigating 
conflict eruption. Such positive thinking process could well naturally lead to agree-
ing on self-defence in its far more reserved (restrained) expression”.68
64 Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 60th session of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on agenda item 5: Ways and means of maintaining outer space 
for peaceful purposes, 12 June 2017, pp. 1–2.
65 Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 60th session of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on agenda item 5: Ways and means of maintaining outer space 
for peaceful purposes, 12 June 2017, p. 2.
66 Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 60th session of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on agenda item 5: Ways and means of maintaining outer space 
for peaceful purposes, 12 June 2017, p. 2.
67 Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 60th session of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on agenda item 5: Ways and means of maintaining outer space 
for peaceful purposes, 12 June 2017, pp. 2–3.
68 Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 60th session of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on agenda item 5: Ways and means of maintaining outer space 
for peaceful purposes, 12 June 2017, p. 3.
5 The Right to (Anticipatory) Self-Defence in Outer Space to Reduce Space Debris
88
Moreover, the Russian delegation stated in its “General exchange of views”69 
that
different States treat the issue of self-defence in outer space differently. (…) They need to 
be discussed. (…) Why do some colleagues think that this issue is beyond the call of duty 
of this Committee? Why do some colleagues tend to resist a sound proposal to have legal 
grounds for self-defence in space examined. The basic concern of the Russian working 
paper A/AC.105/L.294 is to explain problems associated with self-defence in outer space 
rather than to propagate the principle as such.70
Several topics related to self-defence in outer space are analysed in the working 
paper presented by the Russian delegation in 2015: “Achievement of a uniform inter-
pretation of the right of self-defence in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations as applied to outer space as a factor in maintaining outer space as a safe and 
conflict-free environment and promoting the long-term sustainability of outer space 
activities”. The paper underlines that various aspects of safety and security of space 
activities are closely interrelated with numerous ongoing initiatives and projects, 
including in the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-
Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, and the Working group for the develop-
ment of guidelines for ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.71
Further, the Russian paper emphasises that even if Russia advocates a discussion 
on the legal basis for exercising the right of self-defence in outer space, “t(T)his initia-
tive does not in any way contradict the fundamental value of preserving outer space as 
a conflict-free environment: on the contrary, it is aimed at streamlining the logic of 
studying the interrelationships among all security factors in outer space and designing 
a joint systemic approach to ensuring such security.”72 Therefore, the aim of the paper 
is rather to engage in a discussion to reach a common understanding and way of inter-
pretation of ‘self-defence’ because the Russian delegation considers ‘self-defence’ 
more a political concept than an international legal notion. Therefore, there may be a 
risk that not all states have the willingness to bring their concept of self-defence in 
outer space in conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter, which may lead to a 
situation of conflict, especially as different geopolitical interests may be involved.73
In summarizing, this Russian initiative has so far not triggered any further con-
sequences such as debates or the establishment of a specialised working group in 
the frame of UNCOPUOS. This may be because other member states know that this 
is more a topic for only a few countries e.g. China, the US and Russia, which hold 
the highest percentage of dysfunctional space objects in orbit. Nevertheless, at 
UNCOPUOS Russia always opposes any ideas of removal of space debris by other 
states that consider active debris removal as a means to ensure the sustainable devel-
opment of outer space.
69 Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 60th session of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on agenda item 4: General exchange of views, 7 June 2017.
70 Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 60th session of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on agenda item 4: General exchange of views, 7 June 2017, pp. 3–4.
71 UNCOPUOS, 58th session, Vienna, A/AC.105/L.294, 29 April 2015, p. 1, pt. 1.
72 UNCOPUOS, 58th session, Vienna, A/AC.105/L.294, 29 April 2015, p. 2, pt. 2.
73 UNCOPUOS, 58th session, Vienna, A/AC.105/L.294, 29 April 2015, pp. 2–3, pt. 3.
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5.4.2  Proposals for Multilateral Non-legally Binding 
Instruments on Space Security by the EU
In its Statement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space of 16 June 201774 
at the Conference on Disarmament Working Group on the “Way Ahead”, the EU 
underlined that its member states would “continue promoting the preservation of a 
safe and secure space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equi-
table and mutually acceptable basis.” Due to the increased number of actors and 
activities, it stated that it is “both more complicated and more necessary to develop 
new norms and rules governing human activity in space”. With reference to its pro-
posed Code of Conduct, the EU underlined that it “demonstrated leadership and 
willingness to work with the international community on space issues”. Therefore, 
the EU insisted that further global principles were needed to ensure safe and secure 
space environment. Those new principles should complement existing rules and 
initiatives and “should address the full range of space activities and related chal-
lenges such as space debris, space traffic management, collision avoidance and pre-
vention of an arms race in outer space and should hence serve long term goals: to 
increase international cooperation in space, to commit mutually to debris mitigation 
and to non-interference in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, to facili-
tate an equitable access to outer space and increase transparency in the conduct of 
space activities.”75 For the EU, this new non-legally binding instrument is a tool to 
achieve greater security and safety, and space debris is specifically mentioned.
5.4.3  Further Initiatives to Strengthen Space Security 
by Taking into Account Space Debris and the Right 
of Self-Defence
In the context of active space debris removal, reference should first be made to the 
draft76 submitted by China and Russia jointly at the UN First Committee in February 
2008 entitled ‘Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 
74 European Union/External Action, Statements on behalf of the EU, Geneva, 16 June 2017, https://
eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28329/conference-disarmament- 
working-group-way-ahead-eu-statement-prevention-arms-race-outer-space_en.
75 European Union/External Action, Statements on behalf of the EU, Geneva, 16 June 2017, https://
eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28329/conference-disarmament- 
working-group-way-ahead-eu-statement-prevention-arms-race-outer-space_en.
76 Draft ‘Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use 
of Force against Outer Space Objects’ (PPWT), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(htt-
pAssets)/C4CD83AD4A8B4797C1257CF3003AC425/%24file/1319+Russian+Federation+Draft
+Updated+PPWT+.pdf.
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Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)’.77 The draft 
elaborates several definitions. Art. 1b defines ‘weapons in outer space’ as “any 
outer space object or its component produced or converted to eliminate, damage or 
disrupt normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth’s surface or in the 
air, as well as to eliminate population, components of biosphere important to human 
existence, or to inflict damage to them by using any principles of physics”.78 
Moreover, Art. 1c concretises what should be understood by ‘placed in outer space’ 
(“A device is considered as ‘placed in outer space’ when it orbits the Earth at least 
once, or follows a section of such an orbit before leaving this orbit, or is placed at 
any location in outer space or on any celestial bodies other than the Earth”79). In 
addition, Art. IV draft PPWT states that “this Treaty shall by no means affect the 
States Parties’ inherent right to individual or collective self-defense, as recognized 
by Article 51 of the UN Charter”80 without providing more detail in regard to this 
right. Even though the draft treaty explicitly affirmed the inherent right of self- 
defence, it was not adopted. Among other aspects, it was opposed by the U.S. due 
to security concerns in regard to their space assets.
Second, despite the failure of the draft treaty, a resolution entitled ‘No First 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space’ (NFP)81 was adopted with 126 votes in 
favour, 4 against (Georgia, Israel, Ukraine, US82) and 46 abstentions.83 This encour-
aged states to a political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in space. 
The EU abstained. By way of explanation of its abstention, it emphasized that the 
EU and its Member States had always advocated safe space travel and the peaceful 
use of space and considered the sustainable use of space as a common priority. 
Consequently, the EU had developed the ICoC where space debris and self-defence 
were covered. However, with regard to the submitted resolution, the EU was of the 
view that “this particular initiative does not adequately respond to the objective of 
strengthening trust and confidence between States, but could rather increase the 
risk of conflict in space”.84 In addition, this resolution lacked a definition of what is 
to be regarded as a “weapon in space”. This could lead to misunderstandings (“The 
NFP initiative does not address the difficult issue of defining what a weapon in outer 
space is, which could lead a State to mistakenly assess that another State has placed 
77 United Nations General Assembly Session 61 Verbatim Report 67, A/61/PV.67, p. 6, 6 December 
2006.
78 Art. 1b draft PPWT.
79 Art. 1c draft PPWT.
80 Art. IV draft PPWT.
81 Resolution A/RES/69/32, 12 December 2014, initially co-sponsored by Brazil, China and Russia.
82 United States Mission to the United Nations, Explanation of Vote in the First Committee on 
Resolution L.54, Agenda Item 97(b): No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, New York, 
30 October 2017, https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8084.
83 Staff Writers, UN passes resolution banning arms race in outer space, SpaceDaily, 05.12.2014, 
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/UN_Passes_Russian_Proposed_Resolution_Banning_Arms_
Race_in_Outer_Space_999.html.
84 Explanation of Vote delivered by Estonia on behalf of European Union Member States, pt. 8.
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weapons in outer space. Without a common understanding of what constitutes a 
weapon in space, a State could inadvertently put an object in space that another 
State considers to be a weapon”85).
Furthermore, the EU member states were concerned about the further develop-
ment of anti-satellite weapons. Therefore, the EU considered it as urgent to include 
them in international efforts to avoid an arms race in space. Instead of an NRP 
pledge, it would thus make more sense to place the behaviour of the space actors as 
the focus of efforts for the peaceful use of space (“to address the behaviour in, and 
use of, outer space in order to advance meaningful discussions and initiatives on 
how to prevent space from becoming an arena for conflict and to ensure the long- 
term sustainability of the space environment”86).
5.5  Conclusion: Already Struggles by Concretising ‘Peaceful 
Use of Space’ for Discussion Fora
The discussion during the opening of the UNCOPUOS session in June 2017 reveals 
how difficult it is to evaluate the peaceful use of outer space, as the committee also 
had to deliberate on the request of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to 
attend its sixtieth session as observer. Indeed, “some delegations expressed their 
strong concern (…). Those delegations were of the view that the status of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as an observer of the Committee was incon-
sistent with repetitive violations by that State of Security Council Resolutions 1718 
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 
(2017). Those delegations were of the view that such participation in the Committee’s 
session misrepresented that country’s space programme as peaceful, while in fact, 
that was manifestly not the case, as any space launch by the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea using ballistic missile technology directly violated the Security 
Council resolutions and brought that country closer to its stated objective of creat-
ing a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile”.87 However, other member 
states of this Committee opined that “the Committee was a platform for discussion 
among all Member States and that it should be inclusive for all States, irrespective 
of their level of social and economic development, and thus all Member States had 
equal right to familiarize themselves with topical matters relating to the peaceful 
uses of outer space”.88 This argument opened the path for North Korea to attend as 
an observer the discussion around the peaceful use of outer space within UNCOPUOS 
85 Explanation of Vote delivered by Estonia on behalf of European Union Member States, pt. 9.
86 Explanation of Vote delivered by Estonia on behalf of European Union Member States, pt. 10.
87 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixtieth session, 7–16 June 2017, 
A/72/20, pt. 8.
88 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixtieth session, 7–16 June 2017, 
A/72/20, pt. 9.
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and reveals how much effort it needs already to define this notion of “peaceful use 
of outer space”, an effort which will be even more difficult for activities related to 
active space debris removal.
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Chapter 6
The Degree of the Lack of Regulation  
of Space Debris Within the Current Space 
Law Regime and Suggestions for a Prospective 
Legal Framework and Technological 
Interventions
Anton de Waal Alberts
Abstract The purpose of this research is to analyse the current international legal 
regime (referred to as “First-Generation Space Law”) with regard to the issue of 
space debris management, specifically mitigation and eradication. Against this anal-
ysis a technological framework is introduced in order to monitor current and pro-
spective space debris removal technologies that enables the design of a framework 
law regime to address the growing problem of space debris. Both the analysis of the 
current international legal regime and the design of the framework law regime pro-
vide insight into the uncertain nature of the current international law on space debris 
management that is not conducive to a solution to the space debris problem. The 
argument is thus advanced that the time has come for the Second-Generation Space 
Law to be developed in this regard.
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Moon Agreement (MA) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Outer Space Treaty (OST) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Registration Convention (CR) Convention on Registration of Space Objects 
Launched into Outer Space
Rescue Agreement (RA) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the 
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space
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SGSL Second Generation Space Law
UN United Nations
6.1  Introduction
Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, space activities have resulted in many scientific 
discoveries, positive technological advances and numerous space-based services in 
communication and remote sensing, amongst others. Unfortunately, it has also 
resulted in a multitude of space debris orbiting earth at dangerous velocities expos-
ing existing space assets and human operations to huge probabilities of damage and 
danger.
Given the New Space paradigm currently unfolding in the space industry in the 
form of increasing private enterprise investment in space development and activi-
ties, it is not surprising that a growing body of research focuses on the mitigation 
and removal of space debris. While altruistic reasons also serve as motivation in 
developing this technological base, it is actually economic opportunities that are 
driving many technological developments in this regard.
However, while there is no shortage of technological research aimed at finding 
mechanisms to mitigate and/or eradicate space debris, many legal questions are 
raised. These include: does an effective international legal regime exist in this 
regard; if not, does one need to be established, and, if so; what form should it take? 
These questions cannot be answered without having regard to the unfolding techno-
logical environment to ensure the adoption of a forward-looking paradigm that will 
be able to deal with future developments in whatever form they may come.
This study investigates the current international legal regime and the unfolding 
technological environment in order to establish the form of regulation needed, and 
to design a possible framework legal regime that will be enabling in addressing the 
growing problem of space debris.
In this process of investigation two novel ideas are introduced: a system of space 
law to facilitate the understanding of current law and the development of new law; 
and, a taxonomical tool for technological assets that can assist in the design of a 




6.2  A New Perspective on Space Law
Space law, as public international law that is tangentially and transversally con-
nected to various other fields of law, is a developing field of law within an increas-
ingly complex environment, and with an increasing array of space activities from a 
variety of old and new role players. It is useful, therefore, to reflect upon the system-
atic positioning of space law within history so as to ensure that a logically consistent 
paradigm of law, framing reality as it flows from the past into the present and ulti-
mately the future, is presented for ease of use and systematic development.
Having regard to the historical development of space law, its current status, and 
possible and probable future trends, space law can be divided into the following 
categories:
 i) ‘Macro’ law: This consists of both ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’. “Hard law’ com-
prises the five outer space treaties, related treaties dealing with space activities 
tangentially, and international customary law—all of which is binding on states 
based on consent or conduct. ‘Soft law’—that is non-binding and guiding in 
nature—includes the United Nations (UN) principles, declarations, and resolu-
tions, as well as guidelines issued by various international and regional bodies 
(whether UN affiliated or not), such as codes of conduct, model laws etc.;
 ii) ‘Micro’ law: consisting of inter-state cooperation agreements that come into 
existence by way of mutual consent in bilateral or multilateral form, deals with 
matters or projects specific to the states involved, and is usually guided and 
informed by ‘macro’ law.
Importantly, ‘macro’ law consists mostly of broad philosophical orientations, 
general principles, various obligations, and specific prohibitions. ‘Macro’ law gen-
erally does not deal with the minutiae of specific space activities, initiatives or proj-
ects, but provides broad overarching or universal rules. As for specific regulation of 
individual space activities, initiatives or projects, it is incumbent upon the legal 
tools arising from the field of ‘micro’ law, such as contracts, to ensure consensus 
and binding obligations. Therefore, ‘macro’ law serves as the skeletal structure of 
space law whereas ‘micro’ law serves as the muscles and sinews of this body of law.
Further to the above exposition, it is important to note on a temporal scale that 
while this systematic framework is applicable to the current framework of space law 
that mostly originated in the cold war era, it might not necessarily be so in future. 
The current trend is to create and apply ‘soft law’, and there seems to be broad con-
sensus that the five treaties are for now settled. Obviously, international custom can 
still develop as new activities become customary and accepted as such. This body of 
law to date can be regarded as First Generation Space Law (FGSL).
However, with the advent of the New Space era, new space activities are chal-
lenging the FGSL and interpretations given to core provisions of the space law trea-
ties, such as the non-appropriation rule that permeates them all via Article II of the 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty 
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(OST)). On the one hand there is growing pressure to make amendments to ensure 
private ownership in space and on celestial bodies, but also a counter-push to revive 
the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (Moon Agreement) with its emphasis on the prohibition of appropriation and 
its focus on benefit-sharing.
The need for greater legal certainty and an enabling legal regime for the burgeon-
ing private enterprise in space is of the utmost importance. While the FGSL was 
designed with nation states as the main role players in mind, and focused mostly on 
international security and scientific exploration, it could stifle the New Space era or, 
even worse, become ineffective as nation states enact local laws enabling private 
space development and activities while ignoring the FGSL. The time is thus ripe to 
reflect on the establishment of legal certainty that enables new developments and 
regulates these activities for the greater public good of the planet. It is thus time to 
develop Second Generation Space Law (SGSL).
As will be shown infra, regulation of the mitigation and eradication of space 
debris will form part of the developing SGSL.
6.3  Space Debris Regulation
Space debris mitigation and eradication—referred to herein as the Space Debris 
Regulation Regime (SDRR)—is addressed in the body of the FGSL. A brief outline 
of the various references follows:
6.3.1  The Five Space Treaties (Hard Law)1
The point of departure is the Magna Carta of space law, namely the Outer Space 
Treaty.
6.3.1.1  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies
The OST establishes the codified foundations of the international space law regime 
and emerged from the United Nations’ Declaration of Legal Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration of and Use of Outer Space (Outer Space 
1 United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, related General Assembly resolutions 
and other documents, UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2013, http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosa-




Declaration (OSD)). Due to its unanimous adoption, the OSD is considered to con-
stitute international customary law.2 The OST is the codification thereof and forms 
the foundation of the four subsequent space law treaties.
As far as the SDRR is concerned, while the OST does not refer to it specifically, 
it does create certain principles and obligations that affect it, set out as follows:
• Article I: Importantly, the right to free access to space for exploration and use by 
states is hereby established. However, the increasing swarm of orbiting space 
debris will in future inhibit this fundamental right. The question that arises is 
whether this part of the global commons, referred to as the ‘province of man-
kind’, should not be protected by all parties to the OST by virtue of a space 
launch and orbital tax on launching states that will result in a ‘clean-up fund’ that 
can finance new technologies able to eradicate space debris?
• Article VI: The obligation is hereby established that states party to the OST shall 
bear “international responsibility for national activities in space”. This obligation 
was later fully developed in the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention (LC)). Whether this establishes 
any liability with regard to space debris shall be discussed infra.
• Article VII: The obligation with regard to liability for damage caused in space 
is hereby established and is further elaborated in the LC, to be discussed infra. 
Of importance for the SDRR is that component parts of an object launched into 
outer space are also considered as a possible cause of damage and can result in 
liability.
• Article VIII: Establishes the link between jurisdiction, control and ownership of 
a space object and its component parts through implementation of a registry. This 
provision gave rise to the adoption of the Convention on Registration of Space 
Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention (CR)), to be dis-
cussed infra.
• Article IX: Establishes the important obligation that states and those under their 
jurisdiction shall pursue studies of outer space and conduct exploration in a man-
ner so as to avoid harmful contamination. Given the extent of the space debris 
problem, it is quite clear that this obligation has not been adhered to by states 
party to the OST. The question now turns to the further mitigation of the increase 
of space debris on the one hand, and the rehabilitation of orbital space to ensure 
compliance with this obligation, on the other.
The next space law treaty that is applicable to the SDRR is the second space law 
treaty adopted, namely the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement 
(RA)).
2 Dugard, J. 2012. International Law. A South African Perspective. Cape Town: Juta.
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6.3.1.2  Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts 
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
The RA is drafted to ensure the rescue of astronauts and the return of space objects 
and their component parts from jurisdictions other than that of the “launching 
authority”, which in this case refers to the state responsible for launching. Article 
5.3, however, does make mention of the return of space objects or their component 
parts to the “launching authority” recovered beyond the territorial limits of the 
“launching authority”.3
This raises the question whether this provision is also applicable to orbital space 
debris recovered by a state, or any organization or company under its jurisdiction. 
There is no certainty in this regard as yet, however, a case can be made that the RA 
is focused on the return of space objects and their component parts found in territo-
ries on Earth and thus is not intended to deal with debris recovered in outer space.
6.3.1.3  Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 
by Space Objects
The LC deals with damage caused by space objects and the establishment of liabil-
ity by the “launching State”, which is defined as either a state that launches or pro-
cures the launch of a space object or means a state from whose territory or facility a 
space object is launched. Of further importance for the SDRR is the definition of 
“space object” that includes “component parts of a space object as well as its launch 
vehicle and parts thereof”. The question arises whether the definition of “space 
object” is wide enough to include space debris. It also elicits the further question: 
what is actually regarded as space debris? Can space debris also be regarded as 
entire component parts—whether damaged or not—abandoned in space by the 
“launching State”? Conversely, can derelict and broken-off pieces of a space object, 
irrespective of size, be regarded as a “space object” for the purposes of the LC?
The answers are important as they affect the applicability of the LC’s liability 
provisions on space debris. In the event that space debris is found to be encom-
passed, then this treaty will have a far-reaching effect on the liability of “launching 
States”, given the extensive regulation of liability by this treaty. In this case, a 
“launching State” will be liable for damage caused by its space object in the form of 
space debris if it is at fault. This means that negligence or intention must be proven 
before liability is vested and thus serves as a shield against liability in cases where 
events beyond the “launching State’s”, control results in debris creation and 
damage.
It is thus of the utmost importance that certainty is created regarding the defini-
tion of “space object”. The answer to this question might be found in the Convention 
3 See note 2.
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on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention 
(RC)) that links registration of space objects to liability in terms of the LC.
6.3.1.4  Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space
The RC connects the identification of space objects with their ‘owners’ i.e. the State 
of registry and any liability that might result from damage created by space objects. 
An obligation is placed on a “launching State”, that is defined similar to the defini-
tion in the LC, to register in an “appropriate registry” any space object “launched 
into Earth orbit or beyond…”.4 The information in the registry must be communi-
cated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The definition of a “space object” is the same as in the LC, and thus unfortu-
nately raises the same problems of interpretation as that found in the LC.  Once 
again, the question arises if the term “component parts” includes space debris. 
Normally space debris would be parts and pieces of space objects that have been 
abandoned by any launching State, whether intentionally or by necessity due to the 
impossibility of recovering the parts or pieces. However, should the definition of 
“space object” be construed to include space debris, then abandonment shall never 
be a shield to liability as the space object is identifiable by virtue of a registry that 
establishes ownership and jurisdiction even long after the launching State has lost 
interest in the lost space object.
Given the right to free access to space by virtue of Article I of the OST, and the 
obligation against the contamination of space by virtue of Article IX of the OST, an 
argument can be construed that space debris must form part of the definition of 
“space object” in the LC and RC and that a launching State will be held liable for 
damage caused by its identifiable space debris in cases where it was at fault. 
Negligence will then arise when the launching State has not taken care to mitigate 
space debris. Liability based on intent can also arise, such as in the case of the 
Chinese destruction of one of its own satellites with a missile in 2007, resulting in 
damage to a Russian satellite due to a collision with space debris from the Chinese 
satellite.5
However, since a soft law instrument has been created to deal with the SDRR—
to be discussed infra—questions are raised as to whether the international space 
community intends to treat space debris as part of the definition of “space object”.
The last of the five space law treaties, namely the Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement 
(MA)), deals with space activities removed from the orbital space around Earth and 
is thus not currently relevant to this enquiry.
4 See note 2.
5 Russian Satellite hit by debris from Chinese anti-satellite test, Space.com, 8 March 2013, https://
www.space.com/20138-russian-satellite-chinese-space-junk.html (accessed on 20 December 
2017).
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6.3.2  Related Treaties (Hard Law)
There is no evidence that related treaties can impose imperative legal rules on 
SDRR. One study, however, does provide insight into the effect that the application 
of the rules of Environmental Protection Agreements might have on space debris 
mitigation from an economic perspective. Singer and Mussachio argue that the cre-
ation of coalitions of states to deal with post-mission deorbiting of space craft, 
where equitable transfers take place to alleviate asymmetries of costs and benefits 
among the members, is workable. This means that ‘micro’ law tools of international 
agreement must be applied in the absence of ‘micro’ law certainty to achieve the 
establishment of the mooted coalitions.6
The search for legal certainty within the FGSL will thus have to be continued by 
having regard to customary international law and soft law.
6.3.3  Customary International Law (Hard Law)
Currently, customary international law does not create any known rules with refer-
ence to the SDRR except for the obligation not to contaminate space as established 
in the OSD and codified in the later OST. Through state practice and intention to be 
bound, the soft law, alluded to infra, could eventually become customary interna-
tional law. However, these rules are mitigating in nature only.
As for the rules that would be used in any space debris eradication process, no 
state practice of actual eradication exists except for the practice on space object life 
spans and re-entry burn-up procedures, which also forms part of the mitigation soft 
law guidelines discussed below. It can be argued that these rules constitute custom-
ary international law due to their wide practice with the intention to mitigate and 
eradicate additional space debris, but as they are included in the soft law discussed 
infra, they do not seem to have yet obtained the status of law.
As for the eradication of the great swathes of existing space debris—in contrast 
with mere mitigation measures—there is still an open question as to what rules may 
develop, and this depends on the technology and practices undertaken to eradicate 
space debris.
6.3.4  Soft Law
The UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS) introduced 
non-binding technical measures in 2007 known as the Space Debris Mitigation 
6 Singer, M.J, & Mussachio, J.T. 2009. Model of an International Environment Agreement among 




Guidelines that were adopted by the UN General Assembly.7 However, these are not 
yet legally binding rules, although an argument exists that through continuous use 
by spacefaring states they can become international customary law. While these 
guidelines mitigate the increase of space debris, they do not assist in reducing the 
existing corpus of space debris in orbit. Eradication of space debris is thus still 
caught in a legal lacuna.
Seven guidelines, which are applicable during the “mission planning, design, 
manufacture and operational (launch, mission and disposal) phases of spacecraft 
and launch vehicle orbital stages”, have been formulated as follows:
• Limit debris released during normal operations;
• Minimize the potential for break-ups during operational phases;
• Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit;
• Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities;
• Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy;
• Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in 
the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission;
• Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages 
with the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their 
mission.
These guidelines are designed to mitigate the further growth of space debris only.
6.4  Shortcomings of the Current Space Debris Regulation 
Regime
6.4.1  Effectiveness of the Current Space Debris Regulation 
Regime
The effectiveness of the current SDRR is negatively affected by the fact that the 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines are not binding upon participants in the space 
industry. This is aggravated by the fact that no global space traffic management 
system currently exists. At most, the management of the launch of space objects and 
the orbital management thereof is performed informally by each country and entity 
by utilising space debris tracking information.
As it stands, it is probable that a significant impact between large space assets 
may take place releasing even more debris and increasing the chances of a cascad-
ing cycle of debris growth and harm. The importance of ensuring, through new 
rules, that this does not happen is therefore of the utmost importance.
7 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2010, http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_
space_49E.pdf (accessed on 19 December 2017).
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The SDRR’s current shortcomings can be summarised in that it forms part of the 
FGSL tainted by the uncertainty of interpretation of the hard law, and the non- compulsory 
nature of the soft law. Against the background of the growing probability of damage due 
to space debris, the emergence of a new set of binding laws that forms part of the SGSL 
is growing in urgency.
6.4.2  New Technology, Opportunities and Business Models
New technological developments are resulting in a burgeoning of ideas, research, 
plans, and business models to build, launch, and use space debris eradication tech-
nologies and vehicles in space to start decreasing the volume of orbital spaced 
debris. However, the launch and use of any of these technologies will be performed 
against the background of the uncertainty of the FGSL, as set out supra.
It is not the purpose of this paper to enumerate all the projects currently in prog-
ress, but rather to provide a systematic framework within which to understand the 
technology to provide guidance for the establishment of legal certainty and new law. 
In this regard, reference can be made to the work of Van Wyk to establish a unifying 
code for technology.8 Van Wyk has taken the emergence of key concepts that 
describe the three fundamental aspects of physical reality, namely matter (M), 
energy (E) and information (I), and used it to “connect all technologies, and to pres-
ent them in a coherent matrix”.
In this regard Van Wyk has devised the very useful nine-cell functional classifica-
tion matrix as a tool to classify technology along a vertical and a horizontal axis. 
The vertical axis represents the key aspects of physical reality, and the horizontal 
axis represents the three modes of technological activity, namely Process, Transport 
and Store. These three modes of technological activity can be described as 
follows:
• “Process” entails “inputs of one kind and transforming them into outputs of 
another kind”.
• “Transport” entails “receiving inputs and moving them a certain distance before 
releasing them”.
• Lastly, “Store” entails “receiving inputs and holding them for a period before 
releasing them”.
The technology classification matrix is presented in Table 6.1.
A sample analysis using the technology classification matrix of space transport 
technology is presented in Table 6.2. Note that the subsystems of space transport 
technology can each be subjected to this analysis and that the analysis can also be 
scaled up to larger units or scaled down to smaller sub-units, if applicable.
8 Van Wyk, R. 2004. Technology – A Unifying Code. Cape Town: Stage Media Group.
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For the purposes of this investigation, the technology classification matrix was 
adapted to include application of related legal fields, as presented in Table 6.3. This 
analysis is performed by making use of the Deutsche Orbitale Servicing Mission 
(DEOS) project—Germany’s on-orbit servicing satellite concept. The concept con-
sists of a service satellite used to find unused or decommissioned satellites that 
could not deorbit and then to rendezvous with the satellite, capture and deorbit it 
manually. The service satellite will capture the unused satellite by way of a light-
weight manipulator or robotic arm and then steer itself and the captured satellite 
into a predefined re-entry corridor for atmospheric burnup.9
Table 6.3 provides a legal-technological analysis of the DEOS service satellite.
Table 6.3 presents a first attempt to design a legal-technological framework that 
not only sets out the applicable space law in relation to the purpose of the project, 
but also assists in identifying the applicable legal fields that will become relevant in 
relation to the various components identified under the three activities of process, 
transport and store.
This framework also assists in coming to a conclusion on the status of the SDRR 
and applicable law for the project in that the ‘micro’ law of contracts provides more 
certainty than the ‘macro’ law.
While this framework was developed for the enquiry with regard to the SDRR, it 
can be applied to any space activity.
9 Deutsche Orbitale Servicing Mission, Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., (Undated), 
http://robotics.estec.esa.int/ASTRA/Astra2011/Presentations/Plenary%202/04_wolf.pdf 
(accessed on 19 December 2017).
Table 6.1 Technology classification matrix
3 modes of technological activity
Process Transport Store
3 key aspects of physical reality Matter (M)
Energy (E)
Information (I)
Table 6.2 Technology classification matrix of space transport technology






Matter (M) Single- or multi-stage 
rockets with stages 
discarded during launch
Rockets (by way of 




Energy (E) Internal process in rocket 
engines and electronic 
circuitry
Fuel transport by way of 
fuel tanks and rocket 







Electronic circuitry and 
communication systems
ICT systems and software ICT 
systems and 
software
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Table 6.3 Technology and legal classification matrix for a Space Debris Eradication project
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6.4.3  New Law and New Ideas?
This enquiry has established that the certainty needed for the future development of 
space opportunities and the expansion of the space economy has not quite been 
established. While there seems to be an unwillingness to amend or create new trea-
ties at this stage, there is willingness to establish soft law, as evidenced by the Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines.
As indicated supra, the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines are limited to the 
mitigation of the further growth of space debris only. What is needed, therefore, is 
the development of a new set of guidelines to manage space debris removal so that 
projects such as DEOS are not financed, developed, and launched in a legal vacuum. 
As may be the case with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, they may also 
develop into customary international law, and with the increase of space activity, 
might do so in a short space of time. Thereafter, codification should not lie too far 
ahead in the future. This new law will form part of the developing SGSL that will 
need to cater for the New Space era in a fair and equitable manner without inhibiting 
private enterprise.
For now, in the absence of ‘macro’ law certainty, the ‘micro’ law tools of con-
tract will play an increasingly important role to bring, at the very least, legal cer-
tainty, inter se, between parties that are engaged in space debris mitigation and/or 
eradication. It is not ideal, but the fast-moving commercial space industry will not 
let a legal lacuna hold back its activities as witnessed by the growing New Space 
environment.
It is treaty law that all states have the right to access and use of space. If space 
debris remains an obstacle to exercising this right without proactive legal interven-
tion, it may well happen that self-help and contractual relationships will become the 
new de facto space law. When this occurs, it may too late to play catch up with new 
treaties as new settled practice will have crystalised into customary international 
law.
New and innovative ideas must also be sought to deal with the growing and dan-
gerous problem of space debris. One idea that might find traction over time is to 
build an international launch and orbital tax into the system to ensure joint interna-
tional action can be funded to eradicate space debris from orbit, akin to the rehabili-
tation fund that every mine in South Africa must establish to ensure that rehabilitation 
takes place.
6.5  Conclusion
The new perspective of space law with its ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ law delineation, on 
the one hand brings to the fore the importance of the necessary legal certainty that 
will be provided by ‘micro’ law tools if the ‘macro’ law is not developing fast 
enough. On the other hand, the delineation between the First Generation space law 
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and the Second Generation space law underscores the fact that new space law needs 
to be developed to provide certainty and an adequate framework to deal fairly and 
in an enabling manner with the burgeoning New Space world.
The analysis of the Space Debris Regulatory Regime underscores the conclusion 
that new law needs to be developed faster. Given the complexities of law enactment 
in international law, it is sensible to start off with soft law development that might 
turn into customary international law fairly quickly due to its fast adoption rate in 
practice, hopefully followed by codification per treaty.
The technological nature of space law requires it to have not only legal under-
standing, but also insight into the technologies that enable space activities. In this 
regard, the technology classification matrix, as adapted into the legal-technological 
framework, may be useful in establishing the applicable law for space projects. It 
can be further refined as situations require, but is at the very least a starting point for 
a legal-technological analysis. The analysis in casu making use of the framework 
has also indicated the lack of certainty in hard law and the fall back on soft law.
In essence, this enquiry has raised more questions than answers. The questions 
deserve a quick response in the absence of which the space industry will cut its own 
path that could in the long run lead to inequitable outcomes and new dangers to the 
global commons.
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Chapter 7
Proposal for an International Agreement 
on Active Debris Removal
Zhuang Tian
Abstract Along with the benefits derived from space applications, the burgeoning 
of space activities has also shown a side effect, namely numerous pieces of space 
debris orbiting the Earth. Awareness of the problem of space debris has been raised 
and spread with the increasing severity of this issue, and many initiatives have been 
taken. This note deals with several legal questions concerning the implementation 
of Active Debris Removal (ADR). The first question is what should be removed, 
i.e., the definition of the term “space debris”, and the correlation between this term 
and the term “space object” which is frequently referred to in the United Nations 
(UN) space treaties.
The UN space treaties are commonly referred to as the “five United Nations treaties on 
outer space” which are:
 (i) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies 18 UST 2410 (1967) 
(Outer Space Treaty);
 (ii) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement);
 (iii) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 672 
United Nations Treaty Series 119 (1968) 24 UST 2389 (1972) (Liability Convention);
 (iv) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 28 UST 695 (1975) 
(Registration Convention); and
 (v) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
1363 Nations Treaty Series 3 (1979) (Moon Agreement).
Texts of all of these treaties can be found at <http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/
spacelaw/treaties.html>
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The following question is who can remove space debris, and subsequently the 
potential liabilities involved in such implementation. Finally, this note discusses the 
establishment of an Orbital Maintenance Fund for the promotion of technological 
development in ADR.
7.1  Introduction
Space science and space applications improve our fundamental knowledge of 
the-universe and the daily lives of people worldwide through environmental moni-
toring, management of natural resources, early warning systems to help mitigate 
disasters and support disaster management, meteorological forecasting, climate 
modeling, and satellite navigation and communications.1 Therefore, space science 
and technology make a major contribution to the well-being of humanity, support-
ing the goals of major UN conferences and summits and playing a vital role in vari-
ous aspects of economic, social and cultural development on Earth.2 Along with the 
benefits derived from space applications, the burgeoning of space activities also 
brings about a hazardous side effect, i.e., numerous pieces of space debris orbiting 
the Earth, which pose threats not only to space objects and astronauts therein but 
also to persons and property on the ground.
The condition of the space environment is worsened by the self-generating 
effects of space debris. In 1978, NASA scientist Donald J. Kessler proposed a the-
ory which was now known as the “Kessler Syndrome”. According to Kessler, as the 
number of artificial satellites in earth orbit increases, the probability of collision 
between satellites also increases.3 Satellite collisions would produce orbiting frag-
ments, each of which would increase the probability of further collisions, over time 
resulting in an exponential increase in the number of objects, and thus leading to the 
growth of a belt of debris around the Earth.4 Recent studies on the instability of the 
debris population in the LEO indicate that the environment has reached a point 
where collisions among existing objects will cause the LEO population to increase, 
at least in the next 200 years, even without any new launches.5 In reality, the situa-
tion will be worse than this “no future launches” scenario, since satellite launches 
1 UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.308, Guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities 
(15 February 2017), at 11. See http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/oosadoc/data/documents/2017/
aac.105l/aac.105l.308_0.html.
2 Id.
3 Donald J. Kessler and Cour-Palais B. G. “Collision frequency of artificial satellites: The creation 
of a debris belt.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Space Physics 83, No. A6 (1978): 2637.
4 Id.
5 J.C. Liou, “An Active Debris Removal Parametric Study for LEO Environment Remediation.” 
Advances in Space Research 47, No. 11 (2011): 1865.
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will continue and unexpected major breakups may continue to occur.6 This conclu-
sion has also been confirmed in the UN Report on ADR and OOS, which states that,
While a population of about 2,500 intact objects in LEO may be considered the threshold 
of stability beyond which the amount of debris in LEO will continue to increase by itself, 
estimates show that this threshold of stability has already been surpassed with the current 
number of intact objects in LEO reaching 2,683.7
According to Gunnar Leinberg, with the present rate of growth of orbital space 
debris, it is only a matter of time before the debris becomes a serious impediment to 
space operations.8 Without proper international controls, the continuing  accumulation of 
orbital space debris will eventually prevent man from being able to utilize outer space.9
Awareness of the problem of space debris has been raised and spread with the 
increasing gravity of this issue, and many initiatives have been taken. The European 
Space Agency (ESA) is now planning an active debris removal mission, eDeorbit, 
whose goal is to capture a heavy, ESA-owned item of debris and remove it from an 
altitude of 800–1000  km in a near-polar orbit.10 Likewise, China has launched 
Aolong-1 (the Roaming Dragon, in English), a space debris clean-up satellite, on 
the inaugural Long March 7 flight in June 2016.11 This space “garbageman” is 
equipped with a small robotic arm to grab debris pieces and launch them towards 
the atmosphere for de-orbiting.12
However, although several IADC member agencies are now actively working on 
various orbital debris removal concepts, routine operations to remove orbital debris 
will likely not occur for several years to come.13 Moreover, it is generally agreed that 
in addition to the technical challenges of debris removal, many economic and legal 
hurdles also exist.14 The economic hurdle concerns mainly the question of who should 
pay for the cost of the operation of ADR missions. The legal hurdles include but are 
not limited to: (1) lack of a legally binding definition of space debris; (2) possible 
6 Id.
7 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16, “Active Debris Removal — An Essential Mechanism for 
Ensuring the Safety and Sustainability of Outer Space, A Report of the International Interdisciplinary 
Congress on Space Debris Remediation and On-Orbit Satellite Servicing.” (27 January 2012) 
(referred to in this note as the Report on ADR and OOS) at 20. See http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/
limited/c1/AC105_C1_2012_CRP16E.pdf.
8 Gunnar Leinberg, “Orbital Space Debris.” 4 J.L. & Tech. (1989): 93.
9 Id.
10 ESA, “E.Deorbit: It is Time to Make Active Debris Removal a Reality for The European Space 
Sector.” (2017) See http://blogs.esa.int/cleanspace/2017/01/30/e-deorbit-it-is-time-to-make-active- 
debris-removal-a-reality-for-the-european-space-sector.
11 Ajey Lele, “China’s 2016 Space White Paper: An Appraisal.” (2017) See http://www.eurasiare-
view.com/09012017-chinas-2016-space-white-paper-an-appraisal.
12 Id.
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infringement upon other states’ sovereign jurisdiction or ownership as inactive or 
dead space objects are generally believed to remain space objects; (3) possible liabil-
ity for damage caused in ADR operations; and (4) concern for the inherent Anti-
Satellite (ASAT) potential due to the dual-use nature of some types of ADR systems.15 
As noted by Brian Weeden, further technical research and development on ADR 
t echniques and technologies is required and is underway by scientists and engineers 
around the world.16 Meanwhile, the legal and policy issues are no less important, and 
policymakers and lawyers should thus begin tackling the non- technical challenges.17
When the UN space treaties were drafted, the hazard of space debris had not yet 
been envisaged. As a consequence, these treaties contain only vague and general 
provisions concerning space environment protection, among which many articles 
are subject to divergent interpretations.18 Hence, these treaties are not the most prac-
tical tools to confront the challenges posed by space debris. Meanwhile, interna-
tional soft laws contain more specific rules on space debris. However, these rules 
have their limitations. First, they are non-legally binding and thus cannot impose 
any compulsory obligation on states. Second, the soft laws most relevant to space 
debris, including the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines (IADC Guidelines) and the Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines 
(COPUOS Guidelines), apply mainly to debris mitigation; debris remediation is not 
a focus of these guidelines.19 Therefore, specific legally binding rules in this regard 
15 Jinyuan Su, “Active Debris Removal: Potential Legal Barriers and Possible Ways Forward.” 
Journal of East Asia and International Law 9, no. 2 (2016): Chapter II.
16 Brian Weeden, “Overview of the Legal and Policy Challenges of Orbital Debris Removal.” 
Space Policy 27, no. 1 (2011): 42.
17 Id. at 43.
18 For instance, there are different interpretations of the term “harmful contamination” as pre-
scribed in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. See Roberts, Lawrence D, “Addressing the Problem 
of Orbital Space Debris: Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes.” Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review 15, No. 1 (1992): 61. Howard A. Baker has 
asserted that “harmful contamination” must be interpreted from a reading of Article IX as a whole, 
and it was never intended that the protection offered by this article would apply to the environ-
ments of outer space, the Moon and celestial bodies per se. See Howard A. Baker, “The Sci-Lab 
Perception: Its Impact on Protection of the Outer Space Environment.” Proceedings of the Thirtieth 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1987): 127. On the contrary, M. Miklody maintains that 
this term was intended to protect the sanctity of the space environment itself irrespective of any 
human activity therein. See M. Miklody, “Some Remarks to the Legal Status of Celestial Bodies 
and Protection of Environment.” Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Colloquium on the Law of Outer 
Space (1982): 13.
19 However, it should be noted that debris remediation is one of the major concerns of the proposed 
second set of Guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, which are still 
under discussion. See UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.362 (21 June 2017). Work continues on this sec-
ond set of guidelines, which will be brought together with the first set to form a full compendium 





are required. As such, the main purpose of this note is to discuss the establishment 
of an international treaty on ADR.
This note is divided into seven sections. Section 7.1 gives a general overview of 
the problem of space debris from a technical and legal perspective. Section 7.2 pres-
ents the overall background for the establishment of an international regime regulat-
ing space debris. The main body of this note lies from Sects. 7.3 to 7.6, which 
discusses the elements to be considered for the establishment of such an agreement. 
These include the definition of the term “space debris”, the potential resolution of 
the hurdle arising from the jurisdiction and control provision of the Outer Space 
Treaty, the establishment of an international Orbital Maintenance Fund for relevant 
technological developments, and the potential liability issues involved in the imple-
mentation of ADR. Section 7.7 concludes this note.
7.2  Overall Background for the Establishment 
of an International Agreement on ADR
Before discussing the content of a potential international agreement on ADR, a 
general analysis of the overall background will be made to lay a foundation for the 
following discussions. This analysis includes an examination of the obstacles to the 
implementation of ADR, an analysis of the remediation of space debris from a game 
theory perspective, and a discussion on the most appropriate forum for the interna-
tional negotiation of such an agreement.
7.2.1  Obstacles to the Conduct of ADR
With regard to an analogous problem, the one of global climate change, scholars 
have argued that,
The greatest obstacles to resolving the threat of long-term climate change remain social and 
political, rather than financial or technical. These problems have, in the past, proven to be 
intractable because the gains from environmental exploitation are immediate and certain 
and they accrue to the exploiters, while the benefits of environmental amelioration are in the 
more distant future, are less certain, and are diffuse, that is, shared with the entire popula-
tion rather than being retained by those who make the effort to reduce their environmental 
impacts. Adding to the complexity is the need to coordinate activities among numerous 
companies, numerous national governments, numerous trading blocs, and numerous 
populations.20
20 Eric K. Clemons and Heinz Schimmelbusch. “The Environmental Prisoners’ Dilemma Or We’re 
All in This Together: Can I Trust You to Figure it Out?” (2007) at 1. See http://opim.wharton.
upenn.edu/~clemons/blogs/prisonersblog.pdf.
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The resolution of the space debris problem encounters similar obstacles. 
Moreover, whereas the solution to the problems of global warming and long-term 
climate change is both economically and technologically feasible,21 which is not the 
case for ADR, as ADR implementation is expensive and the technology is not yet 
mature. Furthermore, two obstacles stand in the way of an international agreement 
on ADR: the externalization of the costs and benefits, and the absence of short-term 
cost-effective returns.
7.2.1.1  Externalization of Costs and Benefits
The externalization of costs and benefits may trigger the “tragedy of the commons” 
phenomenon. A classic model of the tragedy of the commons, the “herdsman in the 
pasture” model, as presented by Garrett Hardin, can be referred to as an 
illustration.
Picture a pasture open to all. […] As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his 
gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ‘What is the utility to me of 
adding one more animal to my herd?’ This utility has one negative and one positive 
component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herds-
man receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is 
nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more 
animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the nega-
tive utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the 
only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and 
another… But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit — in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
[…]
In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of pollution. Here it is 
not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting something in —sew-
age, or chemical, radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes into 
the air, and distracting and unpleasant advertising signs into the line of sight. The calcula-
tions of utility are much the same as before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost 
of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes 
before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘foul-
ing our own nest,’ so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.22
21 Id.




In the herdsman scenario, the cost of pollution has been externalized, namely 
every herdsman is only affected by a fraction of his overuse of the pasture. The situ-
ation of space debris is similar to the problem of pollution mentioned above, while 
this time the population does not consist of people but space objects, and the pollu-
tion does not concern air or water pollution but space debris.
7.2.1.2  Lack of Short-Term Cost-Effective Returns
Another difficulty for the establishment of an international agreement on ADR is 
the lack of short-term cost-effective returns of ADR. In the short term (i.e., over the 
next 20–30 years), ADR will have minimal apparent benefit to operating satellites, 
because the principal effect of debris is degradation of satellite lifetime due to small 
debris impacts on solar panels—effects that can be fairly easily minimized through 
improvements in solar panel design.23 Also, as collision avoidance services mature, 
there have only been a few collisions involving operating satellites and large debris.24 
The primary benefit of active debris removal will be realized only in the long term, 
as it will reduce the possibility of uncontrolled debris growth and future limitations 
on space operations.25
Meanwhile, it has been argued that politicians’ incentives are far more short- 
sighted, and there is a cornucopia of examples of government short-termism at the 
expense of the future.26 This argument is based on the analysis that “an election 
loser will be out of office, and capture no appreciable benefit from efforts invested. 
So when an upcoming election is in doubt, everything goes on the auction block to 
buy short-term political advantage.”27 Such government short-termism can be fur-
ther explained by the presidential term limits as enshrined in the constitutions of 
many states, as non-consecutive terms in office would drive the short-term behavior 
of governments. That is a reason why in 2016 the then South Korean President Park 
Geun-hye proposed amending South Korea’s constitution to end the single term 
limit, as “through the single-term presidency, it is difficult to maintain policy con-
tinuance, see results of policy and engage in unified foreign policy.”28 The govern-
ment short-termism is incompatible with the long-term benefits of debris remediation 
and thus constitutes an obstacle to the development of ADR.
23 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 28.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Gary Galles, “Politicians Seek Short-Term Advantages by Lecturing Capitalists about the Long 
Term.” (2015) See https://mises.org/library/politicians-seek-short-term-advantages-lecturing- 
capitalists-about-long-term.
27 Id.
28 Kim Gamel, “S. Korean president proposes amendment to end single-term limit.” (2016) See https://
www.stripes.com/news/s-korean-president-proposes-amendment-to-end-single-term-limit-1.435542.
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7.2.2  Analysis from a Game Theory Perspective
Simply put, the current debris pollution situation can be summarized in one sen-
tence, “the cost of ‘environmental bad behavior’ and continued pollution is borne by 
everyone in the long run, while the benefits are enjoyed by the polluter immediately.”29 
It can be argued that all spacefaring states are aware of the importance of ensuring 
the sustainability of outer space environment, as well as the necessity to mitigate 
and remediate space debris, but what hinders them from actively taking actions is 
that all these states are in a setting “in which unilateral good behaviour is actually 
expensive, and bilateral good behaviour is not certain to occur”.30
This setting is similar to the“prisoner’s dilemma” setting, with two major differ-
ences. First, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma setting, where prisoners cannot talk 
before making their decisions, states do not have to make their decisions without 
discussions.31 Hence, a first step towards the conclusion of an international 
 agreement on debris remediation is to carry out international conversations, espe-
cially among spacefaring nations who are both the major contributors to space 
debris and the most technically capable subjects to implement ADR, in which states 
can  thoroughly exchange their concerns and declare their commitments. Second, 
states can play the game repeatedly, year after year.32 The repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma may be solved with a very simple “tit-for-tat” strategy: play nice after your 
playing partner has been nice, and play nasty after your partner has been nasty.33 
What needs to be considered is how to ensure that such a “tit-for-tat” strategy will 
not deteriorate into a “race to the bottom”, which would render outer space inacces-
sible, with the whole international community being the ultimate victim. To main-
tain a gentleman’s club, an “assisted tit-for-tat” or “tit-for-tat with a referee” strategy 
appears to be a plausible option, where sufficient pressure is put on major polluting 
nations to alter their behavior.34 Hence, an international agreement has to be estab-
lished to settle potential disputes and to punish players who unreasonably benefit 
themselves at the cost of the whole international community.
7.2.3  Forum for Negotiation
It has been argued by Lotta Viikari that the creation of a treaty promulgated through 
the UN to address the problem of space debris would prove to be ineffective because 
a consensus between all of the spacefaring nations would be very time-consuming 
29 Clemons, supra note 22, at 9.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 6.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 11.
34 Id. at 12.
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and would most likely result in a watered-down resolution.35 Time-consuming as it 
might seem, a systematic regulatory regime is indispensable for solving the intricate 
legal challenges that may emerge in the process of ADR implementation. These 
challenges include jurisdiction and control, funding, and liability, which will be 
analyzed in the following discussions. Bearing in mind the necessity of a legally 
binding agreement in this regard, the longer it takes to reach such an agreement, the 
earlier the efforts in this direction should be made to nip in the bud the emerging 
Kessler effect of space debris.
Christopher D. Williams argues that it would be advantageous to pursue multilat-
eral negotiations and discussions among active space nations rather than seek action 
through an existing organization.36 Emphasis should be put on spacefaring nations 
because participation by all, or even a large number of states, could result in need-
less waste and delay, as “only those states which are involved in space activities can 
take an action to contain the production of space debris, and only those states can 
suffer from damage to space objects caused by debris.”37 Gathering a group of 
stakeholders focusing solely on the issue of space debris would increase the 
 efficiency of discussion, and efforts at negotiation should be continued with the goal 
of an international agreement firmly in mind.38
In brief, the legal challenges in the way of ADR implementation justify the 
necessity of reaching an international agreement in this regard. Without such an 
agreement, states would have less incentive to implement ADR, as the benefits 
thereof are mostly externalized and in the long term. The necessity can also be 
argued from a game theory perspective with the analysis of the classical prisoner’s 
dilemma model. The following sections will discuss the key elements for an inter-
national agreement on ADR, including the definition of space debris, the effect of 
the jurisdiction and control provision, the establishment of an international fund, 
and the liability issues. It should be noted that this note is not intended to be exhaus-
tive in this regard, and there are other elements which may also require the attention 
of the international community when discussing and negotiating an international 
agreement on ADR.
35 Lotta Viikari, “The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting 
the Future.” Brill, 2008: 100. See also Plantz, Meghan R. “Orbital Debris: Out of Space.” Ga.j.intl 
& Comp.l 2(2013): 608.
36 Christopher D. Williams. “Space: The Cluttered Frontier.” J.air L. & Com (1994): 1182.
37 Jürgen Reifarth, “An Appropriate Legal Format for the Discussion of the Problem of Space 
Debris.” Environmental Aspects of Activities in Outer Space (Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel ed., 1990): 
308. Williams, id. at 1181–1182.
38 William, id. at 1183.
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7.3  Definition of Space Debris
7.3.1  Function-Based Approach and Control-Based Approach
There is no binding definition of the term “space debris” or “orbital debris” in the 
UN space treaties. In addressing the question of when can a space object be regarded 
as space debris, I. Ph. Diederisks Verschoor stated that “current opinion in interna-
tional organizations tends to assume that an object is debris when all the fuel has 
been used up and the object can no longer be controlled.”39
Consequently, there seems to be a relevant connection between control of a space 
object and its nature as debris.40 Such criterion might encounter problems when 
CubeSats come on the scene, as a large proportion of these satellites do not have 
propellants on board and therefore lack maneuverability. Following the control- 
based criterion, these CubeSats would be categorized as space debris, which is an 
inappropriate classification as they also serve important functions. Hence, if the 
term “control” equates with the maneuverability of a space object, then it should not 
be referred to as a criterion for the determination of space debris.
Reference can be made to the Decree of 19 January 2015 expanding the scope of 
the Space Activities Act to include the control of unguided satellites (Unguided 
Satellites Decree) of the Netherlands.41 Article 1 of the Unguided Satellites Decree 
provides that the Space Activities Act also applies to the control from the Netherlands 
of an unguided space object in outer space by means of a communications link. It 
appears that the term “control” is interpreted as including the “communication con-
nection”. Following this interpretation, most CubeSats are controllable and would 
thus fall outside the scope of the term “space debris”. However, such communica-
tion connection criterion has its limits as this rule may be circumvented. States may 
intentionally install on space objects some long-lasting communication units which 
will remain operational even after such objects become otherwise non-functional, 
and thus these objects would never be categorized as space debris unless their com-
munication units are damaged.
In 1999, the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee of the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) adopted a “Technical 
Report on Space Debris”.42 The report proposed a definition of the term “space 
debris” that “space debris are all manmade objects, including their fragments and 
39 I.  H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, “An introduction to space law.” 2nd ed. The Hague: Kluwer, 
1999. p.  131. Olavo de O.  Bittencourt Neto, “Chasing Ghost Spaceships: Law of Salvage as 
Applied to Space Debris.” Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) 2014: 
154.
40 Bittencourt Neto, id.
41 See http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/national/Netherlands_BZ116174A.pdf. 
See also Neta Palkovitz and Tanja Masson-Zwaan. “Orbiting under the Radar: Nano-Satellites, 
International Obligations and National Space Laws.” Proceedings of the IISL 2012.
42 UN Document A/AC.105/720 (1999).
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parts, whether their owners can be identified or not, in Earth orbit or re-entering the 
dense layers of the atmosphere that are non-functional with no reasonable expecta-
tion of their being able to assume or resume their intended functions or any other 
functions for which they are or can be authorized.”43 It was recognized in the report 
that there was still no consensus agreement on the definition.44
Space debris is defined in the IADC Guidelines as “all man-made objects includ-
ing fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, 
that are non functional.” The same definition can be found in the COPUOS 
Guidelines. The technical definition of space debris, endorsed by these guidelines, 
focuses on the functionality or otherwise of space objects as the relevant criteria for 
distinguishing between space objects and space debris.45 Thus, according to the 
technical definition, if a space object is functional, it is not space debris and vice 
versa.46
Compared to the control-based criterion, the function-based one better reflects 
the characteristics of space debris, as not all non-controllable space objects are 
space debris, especially those functional but non-maneuverable. Moreover, when 
non-functional space objects are to be categorized as space debris, states would be 
less likely to conceal the functions of their space objects. Furthermore, states would 
be stimulated to use multi-functional space objects, for by this means the comple-
tion of one function would not directly render a space object to be regarded as non- 
functional, which would then improve the use-efficiency of outer space.47
However, to be categorized as space debris from a technical perspective does not 
equate with to be regarded as derelict from a legal perspective as space objects that 
are outwardly non-functional may still have a legal value.48 In other words, space 
debris does not always qualify as “space waste”.49
Attention should also be paid to the wording “in Earth orbit or re-entering the 
atmosphere”, according to which space debris seems to be better understood as 
“orbital debris”. Indeed, space is immense. From the human perspective, space 
might be infinite, but not all space is created equal.50 Limitless outer space will 
never be as valuable to humans for communications, research, and defense as the 
Earth’s own orbit.51 Earth orbit is a limited, precious resource and has no conceiv-
able substitute.52 Hence, when using the term “space debris”, it should be borne in 
43 Id. para.6.
44 Id.
45 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 30.
46 Id. at 30–31.
47 The use of multitask satellites is likely to minimize the number of man-made objects orbiting the 
Earth as fewer satellites are needed to undertake tasks.
48 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 31.
49 Id.
50 Natalie Pusey. “The Case for Preserving Nothing: The Need for a Global Response to the Space 
Debris Problem.” Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 21 (2010): 449.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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mind that at the current stage this term refers mainly to debris orbiting Earth or re- 
entering the atmosphere. With the extension of human activities into deep space, a 
geographically broader understanding of the term “space debris” would then be 
considered.
7.3.2  Correlation Between Space Debris and Space Object
None of the UN space treaties deal directly with the problem of orbital debris, and 
the term “debris” is not even mentioned in these treaties. Rather, The UN space trea-
ties use the term “space object” to regulate space activities. However, this term is 
not clearly defined in the treaties. According to the Liability Convention and the 
Registration Convention, a space object includes component parts of a space object 
as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.53 The fact that the definition of space 
object includes the term “space object” reveals how circular the analysis in this area 
can become.54
The manner in which debris is defined will have an impact not only on any future 
agreement but also on the current UN space treaties.55 If debris is not within the 
scope of the term “space object”, then the provisions of the Registration Convention 
and the Liability Convention will not apply.56 On the contrary, if space debris is a 
constituent category of space objects, then certain liability implications will arise 
for certain states if the damage is caused by the removal of debris from space.57 
Also, many complex questions relating to state jurisdiction and control over space 
objects will have to be resolved before the commencement of any removal.58 Hence, 
the correlation between the terms “space debris” and “space object” is beyond the 
scope of academic discussion and is of important practical relevance.
Christopher D.  Williams advocates the exclusion of the term “orbital debris” 
from the term “space object”. According to Williams,
Clearly, removing debris from the scope of the Outer Space Treaty and Registration and 
Liability Conventions could have several positive effects if done in conjunction with the 
development of an intelligible set of guidelines concerning debris. First, such removal 
would do away with the contradictory and confusing arguments put forth by commentators. 
(…) Second, the existing international outer space agreements were clearly not intended to 
address the problem of space debris. (…)59
53 Art. I (d), the Liability Convention. Art. I(b), the Registration Convention.
54 Williams, supra note 38, at 1147–1148.
55 Id. at 1184.
56 Id.
57 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 30.
58 Id.
59 Williams, supra note 38, at 1184–1185.
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If space debris is excluded from the definition of the term “space object”, it will 
not be subject to the continuing jurisdiction and control of the state of registry as 
contemplated by the Outer Space Treaty and Registration Convention. Williams 
further stated that,
Although satellite owners might fear the loss of the satellite after the end of its useful life, 
this definition would provide an incentive to arrange for the proper disposal of the satellite. 
If the owner had not done so, then it could not complain about the later removal of the 
debris.60
It is true that under this arrangement, the legal hurdle contained in Article VIII of 
the Outer Space Treaty can be overcome. However, the fear of loss of satellite after 
the end of its useful life could constitute a high barrier to cross for an international 
consensus on such an arrangement, in that many spacefaring states may not be will-
ing to surrender their jurisdiction and control over their space assets even after such 
assets become space debris. As noted by some scholars, “those wandering vessels 
cannot be properly considered res derelict since, more often than not, their jurisdic-
tion is legally and continuously safeguarded against third parties, due to their stra-
tegic importance.”61
Moreover, it has become a common understanding that at least some debris falls 
within the scope of the term “space object”. Tanja Masson-Zwaan is of the opinion 
that logically, an inactive satellite or even a lost screwdriver should still be regarded 
as (a component part of) a “space object” for which responsibility and liability 
remain with the launching state should damage occur.62
Though at least some space debris such as inactive satellites shall be categorized 
as space objects, the legal status of the rest of space debris is less clear. It is the 
opinion of this writer that the term “space debris” should be completely covered by 
the scope of the term “space object”, for the following three reasons: (1) In such 
circumstance, the lex specialis derogat generali doctrine will apply, and the rules 
governing space debris agreed upon in the future will override the previous law that 
generally governs space objects. For matters not regulated under the former, refer-
ence can be made to the UN space treaties to fill the legal loopholes; (2) Assuming 
that some debris is space object while the rest not, a line shall be drawn there 
between. However, although space debris can be technically classed into four cate-
gories—inactive payloads, operational debris, fragmentation debris, and micro- 
particulate matters—such lines are difficult to draw from a legal perspective. For 
instance, if an inactive payload disintegrates into two halves, should these two 
pieces be categorized as inactive payload or fragmentation debris? In a more com-
plex situation, e.g., one piece of debris contains the majority mass of the original 
payload while the mass of the other is almost negligible, or the active payload dis-
60 Id. at 1185.
61 Francis Lyall and Paul Larsen. “Space Law: a Treatise.” Farnham: Ashgate, 2009: 310. 
Bittencourt Neto, supra note 41, at 154.
62 Tanja Masson-Zwaan, “Legal Aspects of Space Debris.” IAA Space Debris Situation Report 
2016, published in June 2017: 142.
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integrates into countless pieces rather than just two, what is the legal status of these 
debris; and (3) Even if a line can be arbitrarily drawn, why the legal status of space 
debris should differ, e.g., why damage caused by some debris may trigger the liabil-
ity of the launching states under the UN space treaties, while damage caused by the 
rest may not. In brief, space debris shall not be treated differentially from a legal 
perspective and shall be defined as a proper subset of the term “space object”.
7.4  Jurisdiction and Control
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty is not pertinent to the creation of debris, but 
it does have implications for the removal of debris.63 The first sentence of Article 
VIII reads,
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried 
shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while 
in outer space or on a celestial body.
In accordance with this article, the state of registry shall retain jurisdiction and 
control over such object, irrespective of its locus as well as the continuance of its 
maneuverability or command, and such jurisdictional link is not affected if and 
when such space object eventually becomes space debris.64 Article VIII constitutes 
a serious legal obstacle that needs to be addressed for ADR to become a reality 
because it can give rise to an eventual denial, by the state with jurisdiction, of any 
effort to remove from orbit, space debris registered on its behalf, irrespective of its 
factual condition or situation.65
In view of the general rule that a state (or its private entities) cannot remove 
another state’s space object without permission, the fundamental question arises: 
should states be allowed to remove a space object without obtaining permission 
from the state on whose registry the space object is carried?66 If the answer is affir-
mative, on what basis shall such allowance be made?67 It appears that the provisions 
on jurisdiction and control hinder the implementation of ADR. To tackle this chal-
lenge, Olavo de O. Bittencourt Neto refers to the prohibition of abuse of rights doc-
trine. According to Bittencourt Neto, the unjustified denial of other parties’ active 
removal initiatives of dangerous space debris may represent an abuse of rights by 
the appropriate State.68 If this doctrine is to be applied, two terms need to be clari-
fied. First, what constitutes an “unjustified denial”? Can the fact that the target space 
debris contains classified technology, which is the case for most space objects, be 
63 Williams, supra note 38, at 1154.
64 Bittencourt Neto, supra note 41, at 158–160.
65 Id. at 158.
66 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 33.
67 Id.
68 Bittencourt Neto, supra note 41, at 162.
Z. Tian
121
regarded as a reasoned argument? Second, how the term “dangerous” is to be 
defined? It can be said that all space debris is to some extent dangerous due to its 
high velocity while orbiting the Earth or reentering the atmosphere. Hence, the risk 
involved in space debris is a matter of degree. In this context, can a state argue that 
its debris is not the most threatening one, and priority of removal should thus be 
given to other debris?
Bittencourt Neto further argues that “active removal of dangerous, non- functional 
space objects, remaining in the orbit around the Earth without possibility of manoeu-
vre or command, would a priori be allowed, irrespective of express authorization by 
the State who enjoys jurisdiction over the referred space object, in order to answer 
a relevant environmental concern.”69 A similar view can be found in the draft of the 
second set of LTS guidelines. According to these guidelines, adjustments to the 
status of space objects under the jurisdiction and control of states and international 
organizations may, in particular, be validated as an operational necessity with regard 
to space debris fragments if it is convincingly established that such fragments have 
irretrievably lost the ability to function or sustain functionality, and that lifting con-
straints on their removal could be the best solution.70
However, it is important to note that the space security nexus to jurisdiction and 
control over space objects continues ad infinitum.71 Hence, if the above proposals 
are to be adopted, an intricate system has to be established taking into account the 
following questions: what is the criterion72 to determine whether a space debris 
should be removed; through what procedure; what are the defences that may be 
raised by the state of registry; who has the final say when a disagreement arises; and 
what if a wrong space object is taken? These questions have to be carefully dealt 
with, as hastily circumventing the provisions of the existing regime that establish 
jurisdiction and control in the state of registry may have negative consequences for 
space security.73
Meanwhile, national legal and regulatory provisions in some states might inhibit 
the conduct of ADR.74 The United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITARs) serves as an example. ITARs basically govern the export of defense arti-
cles, services, and technical data for items on the U.S. Munitions List, in which 
spacecraft and associated systems are included in Category XV.75 Performing ADR 
of a U.S. satellite or a satellite of another country that has U.S. components or tech-
nology on board falls squarely within the definition of “export” under the ITARs, 
69 Id.
70 UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.308, supra note 3, at 31.
71 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 33.
72 It should be noted that the functionality-based criterion as proposed by Bittencourt Neto and in 
the second set of LTS guidelines embraces a large majority of space debris. Due to the strategic 
importance of classified technology contained in space debris, it is unlikely that states will agree 
to renounce their jurisdiction and control over these objects.
73 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 33.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 33–34.
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which will be either absolutely prohibited or costly.76 As a result, obstacles for ADR 
implementation may be derived from both international law and national law.
Under the trend of commercialization and privatization of outer space, a solution 
is proposed in the Report on ADR and OOS, which is worthy of consideration and 
adoption for a regulatory framework for space debris. According to this proposal,
Subscription of governments to concurrently sign an agreement to procure on a commercial 
basis the removal of space debris created by their own national space activities (e.g., 1 
percent per year). Each subscribing country would then be allowed to impose a national 
space “garbage” collection tax on final users of space-based commercial services available 
in the country.77
National laws such as the U.S. export control regulations as mentioned above 
may impose restrictions on such procurement. The solution would be either to 
amend these national regulations or to subscribe to removal services provided by 
space companies of the same nationality. Other than on a commercial basis, a varia-
tion could be a commitment declared by all spacefaring states to remove a certain 
percentage of space debris created by their previous space activities.
With regard to the percentage of removal, the example given above is “1 percent 
per year”. Several questions ensue: what is the denominator for such percentage—the 
total amount of debris or the cataloged debris; and what is the basis—the mass, the 
size, or the number of space debris? Although calculation based on the total amount 
of debris appears to be the fairest, it is impractical for such calculation to be made as 
the majority of debris is non-cataloged and some is even untracked due to their tiny 
physical size. Hence, a proportion based on cataloged debris would be a more feasi-
ble option. Meanwhile, the calculation based on the mass and size of space debris 
would be a more effective option which would motivate states to remove larger 
debris. It has been argued that if five large objects are removed each year, the cascad-
ing effect predicted by Kessler can be halted.78 In addition, the destructive effect of 
larger debris is normally greater than that of the smaller debris. It should also be noted 
that “per year” as a period may not be long enough, for the preparatory arrangement 
and practical implementation of ADR normally require more than a year. Hence, it is 
more realistic to set a longer period such as “per five years” or “per decade”.
7.5  Orbital Maintenance Fund
Agatha Akers proposes an amendment to the 1975 Registration Convention to 
establish an Orbital Maintenance Fund endowed by a space access fee in order to 
create general resources to finance the development of new technology needed to 
76 Id.
77 Id. at 39–40.
78 See “Stability of the Future LEO Environment”, an IADC study presented to UNCOPUOS, 
February 2013, available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2013/tech-12E.pdf. See also 
Masson-Zwaan, supra note 64, at 144.
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clean up orbital space.79 An analogy can be made to the yearly fees paid by United 
States drivers when cars are registered to maintain highways.80
This note shares the opinion of Agatha Akers that an Orbital Maintenance Fund 
shall be established. To avoid reinventing the wheel, resources should be pooled to 
promote technological development to ensure the cost-effectiveness and safety of 
the implementation of ADR. Another benefit of pooling resources and enhancing 
cooperation for technological development is that when technologies are shared, the 
concerns of states over the dual-use nature of ADR technology can be alleviated.
However, such a Fund should not be established by amendment to the Registration 
Convention—a new treaty is needed to deal with this issue, for two reasons. First, 
the primary concern of the Registration Convention is the registry of space objects 
rather than dealing with the problem of space debris. Second, there are many ques-
tions that need to be approached including who is the payer, on what basis shall the 
funds be collected, the use of the funds and its management, the dispute resolution 
measures, etc. It is more advisable for these issues to be addressed in a systematic 
framework.
The mechanism of fund collections is the first issue to be addressed. As a general 
rule, the state or entity (i.e., principal space system procurers, developers and opera-
tors) responsible for creating space debris should bear primary responsibility for its 
proper disposal.81 However, to require a lump sum payment of the major spacefaring 
nations for the existing debris is neither a fair nor a plausible option. First, spacefar-
ing nations are not the sole beneficiaries of the use and exploration of outer space. 
Satellite constellations such as the US Global Positioning System (GPS), weather 
satellites and other spacecraft, constitute significant global “social infrastructure” 
that provides immense benefits to the world at large, not only to the spacefaring 
nations that are responsible for their launching.82 Hence, it is only fair and equitable 
that all who are involved in space development—either directly by way of utiliza-
tion or indirectly by way of deriving benefits therefrom cooperate internationally in 
an effort to find an appropriate mechanism for the conduct of ADR.83
In addition, under current circumstances, cleaning up the useful Earth orbits is a 
technologically challenging and costly activity.84 In a setting where there are numer-
ous competing priorities in a constrained fiscal environment,85 the probability that 
states could pay such a high one-time fee is low, and some states might refuse.86 
Moreover, if the funds are to be collected from spacefaring nations, on what basis 
79 Agatha Akers. “To Infinity and beyond: Orbital Space Debris and How to Clean It Up.” U. La 
Verne L. Rev. 33 (2011): 286.
80 Id. at 312.
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should their shares be apportioned? The most impartial formula seems to be in 
direct proportion to the mass of space debris created by them. Then the next ques-
tion is whether the space debris that will decay naturally in the future shall be taken 
into consideration? If so, how is the term “self-decay” to be defined? It should be 
noted that most of the near-Earth space debris will decay naturally, which is a matter 
of the lifetime of space debris. Again, it should also be recalled that there is numer-
ous debris that is untraceable, and thus it is difficult to figure out the exact propor-
tion of space debris each state has created.
Next, how should the access fee be calculated? Agatha Akers proposes a starting 
space access fee of $5 million per unmanned object launched and a $1 million fee 
per manned launch.87 The space access fee should be lower for manned launches 
because these types of excursions into space are less likely than satellite launches to 
produce orbital space debris.88 The number of launches may not be the best criterion 
for the calculation of a space access fee. Instead, the criterion shall be the mass of 
objects launched including that of the launching vehicles if such vehicles cannot 
conduct adequate post-mission disposal, and the altitude at which the space objects 
will remain. The mass is taken into consideration because larger objects are more 
likely to cause serious damage and disintegrate into numerous pieces than smaller 
objects. The altitude is relevant because the higher the altitude is, the longer the 
object will remain in orbit.89
Meanwhile, a $1 million fee per manned launch seems to be too high for a fledg-
ling space tourism industry. Although in 2013 Virgin Galactic announced that it was 
increasing the ticket price from $200,000 to $250,000,90 most concepts for space 
tourism developed today envisage a maximum of 4–6 seats for ‘tourists’.91 Hence, a 
$1 million fee per manned launch is too costly for suborbital flight. A more practical 
option would be to calculate the access fee on the basis of a certain proportion of the 
ticket price per passenger, e.g., 10–20%. Such an arrangement could protect the 
infant industry at its beginnings, and collect more funds when larger suborbital 
flight vehicles are developed. Moreover, the space access fee for suborbital flight 
shall be lower than that for the orbital flight. Suborbital spaceflight, which is what 
most current projects offer, covers flights in which orbital velocities are not achieved, 
and therefore they usually attain an altitude of around 100 km.92 Hence, the possibil-
ity for a suborbital flight to create space debris is small. Even if some debris is cre-
ated, it will re-enter into the atmosphere rapidly.
It is advised in this note that the space access fee to be paid by a state shall be 
proportional to its degree of adherence to the space debris mitigation guidelines and 
87 Id. at 315.
88 Id. at 316.
89 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 18.
90 Jeff Foust. “XCOR To Raise Ticket Prices for Suborbital Flights.” (2015) See http://spacenews.
com/xcor-to-raise-ticket-prices-for-suborbital-flights.
91 Tanja Masson-Zwaan and Steven Freeland, “Between heaven and earth: The legal challenges of 




potential space debris remediation guidelines. One of the drawbacks of these guide-
lines is that they are not legally binding. Hence, one can only expect other states to 
behave nicely without anticipating to what extent these guidelines will be adhered 
to. If the space access fee to be charged depends on the degree of adherence to these 
guidelines (e.g., full compliance—80% fee, basic but not full compliance—100% 
fee, and non-compliance—120% fee), a bridge between debris mitigation and 
debris remediation can be built, and this mechanism will stimulate states to abide by 
the above guidelines, as the increase in space access fees means not only a higher 
cost but a subsequent loss of market advantage and customers.
The primary use of the Orbital Maintenance Fund should be to fund the develop-
ment of technology necessary to effectuate orbital debris removal.93 Currently, 
spacefaring nations such as the U.S. and China and regional organizations such as 
ESA are developing their own ADR technologies respectively. Technological prog-
ress would be greatly accelerated if resources can be pooled and cooperation be 
promoted. Another use of the Orbital Maintenance Fund would be to subsidize the 
expenses of states in clearing outer space from the existing space debris created in 
their previous space activities, whether such clearance is done by procurement on a 
commercial basis, or by the state itself. The underlying logic for this subsidy is that 
it is unfair to require spacefaring nations to assume the sole responsibility to remove 
space debris as the whole international community benefits from the exploration 
and use of outer space. Moreover, such a mechanism would stimulate states to 
actively conduct ADR as their expenses could be partly compensated and 
externalized.
Such a system of rewards and penalties would go a long way towards solving the 
problem of the tragedy of the commons, as under this system the most sensible 
option for a contracting party, even from the perspective of its own interest, would 
be to stick to its ADR commitments and adhere to debris mitigation guidelines 
rather than to disregard them, so as to obtain a subsidy for its ADR expenses and a 
reduction in the space access fee.
7.6  Liability Issues
The process of debris remediation is more likely to trigger damage and subsequent 
liability issues than that of debris mitigation, for debris remediation involves 
unavoidably the movement of space objects, which increases the risk of collision, 
and accidents could occur during the rendezvous process between the removal 
mechanism and the target object. These processes might result in the creation of 
new debris as well as damage to functioning space objects. By comparison, debris 
93 Akers, supra note 81, at 311.
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mitigation is much less risky. Only Guideline 694 and Guideline 795 involve the 
movement of space objects. For other guidelines, the implementation of debris miti-
gation, such as the minimization of the potential for breakup as contained in 
Guideline 2 and Guideline 5, is hardly likely to create new debris or to cause 
damage.
According to the Liability Convention, a launching state shall be absolutely lia-
ble to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the 
Earth or to aircraft in flight.96 By contrast, in the event of damage being caused 
elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth to a space object of a launching state, or 
to persons or property on board such a space object, by a space object of another 
launching state, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the 
fault of persons for whom it is responsible.97
This fault-based criterion has greatly diminished the effect of the Liability 
Convention on the problem of space debris, for when damage occurs in outer space, 
the provisions of the Liability Convention cannot provide a clear answer. In addi-
tion, the ambiguity of the term “space object” and its relation to space debris as well 
as the problem of proof when damage is caused by space debris of which the source 
remains unknown also constitute obstacles to the application of the Liability 
Convention. There is a great deal of uncertainty about the meaning of “fault” in the 
Liability Convention, as the term “fault” is not even defined in the convention and it 
carries many different possible interpretations.98 If two objects collide, one a piece 
of debris and another an active space object, it is not automatically the “fault” of the 
debris.99 In reality, it could be the fault of neither party.100
Article IV of the Liability Convention is the relevant provision when it comes to 
removal of space objects.101 If a removal operation causes damage to a third party, 
the launching states of both space objects (i.e., the removal mechanism and the tar-
get object) that cause damage will be jointly and severally liable under the Liability 
Convention.102 Again, the location where the damage occurs determines whether 
absolute liability or fault liability is to be applied.103
For amendment of fault liability as contained in Article III and Article IV of the 
Liability Convention, the Report on ADR and OOS proposes the following:
94 Guideline 6: Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission.
95 Guideline 7: Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with 
the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission.
96 Art. II, the Liability Convention.
97 Art. III, the Liability Convention.
98 Williams, supra note 38, at 1159.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 32.
102 Id.
103 Art. IV, the Liability Convention.
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In removing a satellite, there might be the need to cross orbits on the way up or down. This 
might increase the risk of the entity conducting the removal operation in terms of liability 
which, in turn, creates an incentive to leave satellites in their orbits even after they are no 
longer functional. It may be useful to make the point perhaps in a protocol to the Liability 
Convention that, if someone does the right thing (e.g., by removing a non-functional object 
from orbit), then fault could be mitigated in some way. In other words, active debris removal 
and on-orbit satellite servicing will likely occur if the global spacefaring community could 
come to an agreement not to apply the fault standard to such operations.104
However, although a relaxation of the fault standard might relieve the concern of 
states about legal risks in ADR implementation, a situation shall be avoided where 
states act less prudently due to such relaxation. Hence, the challenge is to clarify 
how fault is to be determined. A clear standard, e.g., a code of conduct for the imple-
mentation of ADR needs to be established as a criterion to determine whether the 
state conducting ADR is acting with due diligence. If so, neither the state conduct-
ing ADR nor the launching state of the space debris should be held liable. In addi-
tion, the guidelines for debris mitigation and debris remediation may also be referred 
to as a supplementary standard to determine “fault”. When fault is determined in 
accordance with these guidelines, states would better adhere to such guidelines in 
order to minimize their legal risks.
7.7  Conclusion
As noted by Benjamin Jacobs, all spacefaring states have likely contributed on some 
scale to the space debris problem, and every state’s space debris threatens the entire 
space ecosystem.105 The international nature of the space debris problem demands 
an international solution.106 There are generally two methods to resolve the problem 
of space debris, namely debris mitigation and debris remediation. For debris mitiga-
tion, international soft laws are already in place which include international guide-
lines and codes of conduct, the most notable and pertinent of which are the IADC 
Guidelines and the COPUOS Guidelines. However, in addition to their non-legally 
binding nature, these guidelines, as their names indicate, only address debris mitiga-
tion but not debris remediation. At the current stage, studies on debris remediation 
are mostly theoretical.
It should be noted that debris mitigation alone is not sufficient. According to all 
available findings at international level, the Kessler syndrome, the increase in the 
number of space debris in Low Earth Orbits due to mutual collisions, appears now 
to be a fact, and the time may have come to study how to clean this fundamentally 
104 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 32.
105 Benjamin Jacobs. “Debris Mitigation Certification and the Commercial Space Industry: A New 
Weapon in the Fight against Space Pollution.” Media L. & Pol’y 20 (2011): 117.
106 Id.
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useful orbital region in an active way.107 While the international soft laws would be 
a way to solve the problem of debris mitigation, an international agreement is 
needed for debris remediation, for the latter poses many legal challenges that can 
only be dealt with through legally-binding rules. A fundamental question is what 
should be removed, namely, the definition of space debris. The function-based cri-
terion to distinguish space debris from active space objects is advocated in this note, 
for the control-based criterion is incompatible with non-maneuverable but func-
tional satellites such as CubeSats. Another question is the correlation between the 
terms “space debris” and “space object”. The latter term is widely used but not 
clearly defined in the UN space treaties. It is advised in this note that “space debris” 
shall be defined as a constituent category of the term “space object” so that provi-
sions of the UN space treaties regulating “space objects” can apply to space debris. 
Meanwhile, specific rules should be made taking into account the special character-
istics of space debris, e.g., non-functional, mostly non-controllable, and necessary 
to be removed. Where there are discrepancies between the specific rules on space 
debris and the general rules as contained in the UN space treaties, the former shall 
prevail in accordance with the lex specialis derogat legi generali doctrine.
After defining space debris, the next question is in what order shall space debris 
be removed, i.e., what kind of space debris should be given a priority of removal? It 
is generally agreed that five large objects must be actively de-orbited from densely 
populated orbital regions in order to keep the orbital environment stable.108 Large 
debris is mostly tracked by the United States Space Surveillance Network (SSN) 
and cataloged, meaning that this debris can be attributed to a particular state. 
According to the Outer Space Treaty, the state of registry shall retain jurisdiction 
and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space 
or on a celestial body.109 Such jurisdiction and control over space objects constitute 
an obstacle for the implementation of ADR, as prior consent is required for the 
removal of space objects carried on the registry of another state. Due to strategic 
considerations and national export restrictions, such obstacles are difficult to over-
come. At the current stage, the most feasible solution would be the subscription of 
governments to concurrently sign an agreement to remove on a periodic basis a 
certain percentage of space debris created by their own national space activities.110
After answering the above questions, the following question is how these activi-
ties should be funded. ADR technologies are not yet mature, and further scientific 
and technological endeavors are required. To avoid reinventing the wheel, resources 
should be pooled to promote technological development to ensure the cost- 
effectiveness and safety of the implementation of ADR.  To this end, an Orbital 
Maintenance Fund should be established. A space access fee should be charged per 
107 Christophe Bonnal, J. M. Ruault, and M. C. Desjean, “Active debris removal: Recent progress 
and current trends.” Acta Astronautica 85 (2013): 51.
108 Id. at 53.
109 Art. VIII, the Outer Space Treaty.
110 Report on ADR and OOS, supra note 9, at 40.
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launch depending on the mass of objects launched into outer space. The fee rate 
should be differentiated between unmanned space mission and human spaceflight, 
as well as between orbital flight and suborbital flight. The access fee should be var-
ied according to the compliance of states with the guidelines on space debris. The 
two major uses of the Orbital Maintenance Fund would be to promote technological 
development and to subsidize the expenses of states for the removal of their existing 
space debris. Also, the potential liability issues in the process of ADR need to be 
addressed. A clear definition of “fault” should be provided and a code of conduct for 
ADR should be established as a criterion for the determination of fault.
In fact, in addition to the elements that have been discussed above, there are other 
issues that also require consideration for the establishment of an international 
regime on ADR, including the enforcement of the transparency and confidence- 
building measures, the establishment of an international organization for the super-
vision and administration of debris remediation, etc.
In brief, the clearance of space debris is an intricate challenge for the whole 
international community involving considerations from technical, legal, economic, 
political and military perspectives, in which the interests of different states need to 
be carefully balanced. Continuous efforts should be made to confront these chal-
lenges and to maintain the sustainability of outer space for the needs and interests 
of future generations.
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Chapter 8
Active Debris Removal, International 
Environmental Law, and the Collective 
Management of Risk: Foundations 
of an International System for Space Traffic 
Management
Ward Munters
Abstract The analysis in the current chapter advances the discussion on the inter-
relationship between space debris, active debris removal and space traffic manage-
ment, and on how they must necessarily be conceptualised and implemented should 
the international community prefer to safeguard the sustainability of mankind’s 
space activities. The first section juxtaposes the state of a number of regulatory 
developments on the above issues with a cursory look at the inescapable physical 
circumstances and processes surrounding space activities and space debris, in order 
to derive a number of fundamental implications for the creation of an effective 
future regulatory system. What emerges, above all, is the need for suitably tailored, 
adaptive and largely unprecedented international legal ‘machinery’ based on a com-
mon construction of the risk attending space activities. De lege lata and de lege 
ferenda, the chapter then briefly situates and qualifies the issues under general inter-
national law and the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
context of international obligations to prevent transboundary harm—an area of 
international environmental law notably concerned with risk and its collective man-
agement—before finally concluding.
W. Munters (*) 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and the Institute for International Law, 
University of Leuven (KU Leuven), Leuven, Belgium 




“Legal imagination is needed to develop law to respond to a world of multiple inter-
connected parties, scientific uncertainty, and socio-political conflict”, argues Fisher 
when recently demonstrating how the dynamic character of environmental law and 
the diverse matters it seeks to regulate “force imaginative reflection on the part of 
environmental lawyers” and policymakers.1 Interestingly, nearly six decades earlier, 
Jessup and Taubenfeld rather more negatively noted that “[s]ome of the current 
spate of writing about outer space is so highly imaginative as to discourage serious 
students of international organization and law from pursuing detailed studies of 
very real problems which now confront the UN.”2
For the large part, international environmental law and international space law as 
discrete areas of international law substantially developed only after3 Jessup and 
Taubenfeld’s observation. Today, however, legal scholars can scarcely ignore the 
importance of environmental regulation of human activity and so, too, ‘serious stu-
dents’ of space law have increasingly turned to environmental law for answers that 
at a glance would appear absent from the corpus iuris spatialis.
Indeed, on the basis of the foregoing, we might conclude that international space 
law and international environmental law are both entwined around a common strand 
of the imaginative. If outer space and its regulation have long captured our imagina-
tion, whether for good or for bad, then what better subject to propel us towards much 
needed ‘imaginative reflection’? There is thus good reason to assume that in their 
mutual relationships we might well find cogent notions that can instil within us pre-
cisely that imagination so necessary to contend with global environmental problems.
For our current purposes, one such environmental problem is that of space debris 
and the methods with which to comprehensively attend to it. Space debris has 
gained unparalleled prominence on scientific, technical, legal and political agendas 
in connection with the future sustainability of mankind’s activities in outer space. 
Hence, we turn our attention in this chapter to space debris in general, and active 
debris removal (ADR) in particular, for the latter is not only a space activity but is 
also intrinsically connected to solving the problem of space debris. In so doing, 
international environmental law may teach us something concerning the manner in 
which to organise and regulate mankind’s activities in outer space—albeit circum- 
terrestrial space4—while the purported “fabulous”5 nature of these activities may, in 
1 E. Fisher, Environmental Law: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, 51. 
2 P.C. Jessup and H.J. Taubenfeld, “Outer Space, Antarctica, and the United Nations”, International 
Organization 1959, Vol. 13, No.3, 363. 
3 Doctrinal debate on whether “there existed a corpus of international rules that might be described as 
‘International Environmental Law’” continued up until the early 21st century, on which see the discus-
sion between Sands and Brownlie, as referenced in P. Sands, “Climate Change and the Rule of Law: 
Adjudicating the Future in International Law”, Journal of Environmental Law 2016, 26, note 30. 
4 The analysis in this chapter mostly concerns the near-Earth orbits and the accumulation of space 
debris in that circum-terrestrial region of outer space. The conclusions with regard to circum-ter-
restrial space debris might not necessarily be applicable to other areas of outer space or to activities 
on or around other celestial bodies. 
5 P.C. Jessup and H.J. Taubenfeld, supra note 3, 363. 
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turn, enable us to imagine a collective way forward with regard to international 
environmental law itself.
In what follows, I mean to distil from such juxtaposition a number of fundamen-
tal inferences concerning the construction of a future general framework for 
 international space governance6 in light of the sustainability of mankind’s space 
activities. Tentatively, I posit the view that irrespective of the precise form, nature or 
substance of any international space governance regime yet to be constructed, such 
a regime will need to be predicated upon at least one determinative pillar: risk and 
the collective management thereof. In this view, it would thus appear indispensable 
for the international community to arrive at a common construction of the risk 
attending space activities.
To that end, I first explore three distinct ways in which ‘legal imagination’ with 
regard to international space and environmental law may take form and what we 
might learn therefrom. In the subsequent section, I briefly situate space debris and 
active debris removal in the context of obligations to prevent transboundary harm—
an area of international environmental law notably concerned with risk and its col-
lective management—before finally concluding with a view as to the future.
8.2  Three Layers of Legal Imagination
An appeal to ‘imagination’ is rather indeterminate from the outset. The concept can 
denote a great many things to equally as many interpreters. We will therefore adopt 
for our purposes three subtly distinct but mutually delineated definitions of the 
term,7 as follows.
8.2.1  A Vivid Imagination
For one, imagination is said to be ‘the ability to form pictures in the mind’. First, let 
us picture here the image of a game of golf being played on the Moon.8 As is well 
known, the Moon is considerably less massive than is the Earth, such that
6 Proposals for a comprehensive system for ‘Space Traffic Management’ (STM) are especially 
notable in this regard. We can expect an updated version by the International Academy of 
Astronautics (IAA) of their original 2006 Cosmic Study on STM. On the former see the website of 
the IAA, available at https://iaaweb.org/content/view/615/809/ (‘Space Traffic Management  – 
Towards a Roadmap for Implementation’), last accessed on 4 April 2018. On the latter see 
C.  Constant-Jorgenson, P.  Lala and K.-U.  Schrogl (Eds.), Cosmic Study on Space Traffic 
Management, Paris, The International Academy of Astronautics (IAA), 2006, 96p.; C. Constant-
Jorgenson, P. Lala and K.-U. Schrogl, “The IAA Cosmic Study on space traffic management”, 
Space Policy 2006, 283–288.
7 The definitions of ‘imagination’ in the online Cambridge English Dictionary are used, available 
at http://dictionary.cambridge.org, last accessed on 4 April 2018.
8 This particular game of golf need not remain relegated to our imagination; the film of Alan 
Shepard’s famous golf swing on the Moon during the Apollo 14 mission is readily available on the 
Internet.
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the earth exerts a stronger pull on an object placed on its surface than that which the object 
experiences on the surface of the moon, which explains why the astronauts get to bounce so 
high when they are on the moon, and how Alan Shepard managed to set a galactic record in 
1971 for driving a golf ball – by his account ‘miles and miles’ – with a six-iron attached to 
a sampling rod.9
We might then ask ourselves a deceptively simple question: would it be logical, 
or even fair, to impose the same rules on a game of Lunar golf as are applied on 
Earth, or vice versa?
Intuitively and emphatically, the answer is ‘no’. Firstly, it would not be logical, 
for the absence of an atmosphere on the Moon in combination with its diminished 
gravitational pull changes the very nature of the game. The ‘physical realities’10 as 
well as the factual circumstances surrounding activities in the Lunar environment—
or, mutatis mutandis, in outer space—differ so radically from those of everyday life 
on Earth as to compel us to at least consider introducing a set of rules more specifi-
cally tailored to this new environment.11 Secondly, neither would it be fair; or 
equitable,12 in a more legally precise sense. From the opposite perspective,  for 
example, the most prodigiously talented golf players on Earth could never hope to 
surpass Shepard’s ‘galactic record’, and we would be justified in expecting them to 
voice their disagreement in protest to being held to the same standards under wholly 
different circumstances.
9 L.  Tribe, “The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern 
Physics”, Harvard Law Review 1989, Vol. 103, No. 1, 3.
10 A. Soucek, “Perspectives on Future Space Traffic Management”, presentation for the 10th UN 
Space Law Workshop, 5 September 2016, Vienna, Austria, available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/
SLW2016/Panel1/3._Soucek_Future_perspectives_of_space_traffic_management_Soucek_final.
pdf, last accessed on 4 April 2018.
11 The general idea that the law should be based on the relevant facts is expressed by the adage ‘ex 
facto sequitur lex’, on which in regard to space activities see, e.g., E. Vitt, “Space debris: Physical 
and legal considerations”, Space Policy 1989, 129–137; L. Perek, “Planetary protection: lessons 
learned”, Advances in Space Research 2004, Vol. 34, 2369. 
12 Equity concerns in connection with current and future international regulation of space activities, 
as well as the mitigation and remediation of space debris, also appear as highly relevant in the 
context of the application to space activities of the principle of ‘common but differentiated respon-
sibilities’ (CBDRs), on which see P. De Man and W. Munters, “Reciprocal Limits to the Freedom 
to Use Outer Space by All States: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities?”, Air & Space Law 
2018, Vol. 43, 21–51. For example, we might reasonably anticipate the principle continuing to 
infuse discussions on the equitable allocation between (spacefaring) nations of responsibilities 
concerning space debris and, thus, the common management of risks attending space activities that 
arguably resides at the heart of the issue. There is obvious potential for divisiveness regarding the 
perceived equity in the apportionment of responsibilities—e.g., differentiated thresholds of risk 
that can be actively undertaken, must be passively tolerated, or shall be actively mitigated—in the 
light of increasingly entrenched positions taken by states, relative to historical contributions and 
current capabilities with regard to space debris and its management. This may impede the crystal-
lisation of a more common construction of risk: One that takes into proper account the absolute 
threshold, indiscriminately looming, above which the utility of valuable orbital bands is signifi-




Therefore, a first lesson to be drawn from legal imagination is that we must take 
care not to simply transplant outright the whole, or even facets, of international 
environmental law, with its decidedly terrestrial origins, to activities in outer space, 
on the Moon or on celestial bodies.13 That is not to say that environmental law or its 
precepts are inappropriate or inapplicable with regard to outer space ab initio. On 
the contrary, we bear the onus to carefully consider when and how environmental 
rules apply or are to be crafted, precisely to ensure that Article III of the Outer Space 
Treaty (OST) receives due consideration. Concerning such application solely 
beyond Earth, we will need to take similar account, for example, of the variable 
spatiotemporal exigencies at different times, at various altitudes or between differ-
ent orbital eccentricities14—to say nothing of the unique environments of disparate 
areas of outer space or the multitude of celestial bodies. Of course, neither do these 
factual circumstances remain immutable in the face of expanding human activity. 
Regulations will have to adaptively accommodate environmental variations of an 
anthropogenic nature as well.
In sum, it is probable that any system intended to effectively and equitably govern 
the conduct of entities in space will require adaptive mechanisms that allow for the 
imposition and enforcement of finely tuned, interconnected and appropriately read-
justed regulation according to the variable environmental exigencies that circum-
scribe any particular space activity or permeate any particular area of outer space.
8.2.2  An Imagination at Odds with Reality
Secondly, imagination can signify ‘something that you think exists or is true, 
although in fact it is not real or true’. Here, let us enumerate a number of things the 
existence or ‘truth’ of which is corroborated by a growing corpus of technical and 
scientific literature on space activities and space debris, in order to determine what 
exactly constitutes legal imagination with this more negative connotation.
13 We might express this in the well-known adage of ‘mutatis mutandis’. 
14 As an example, consider that “[t]he extra energy dumped into the Earth’s upper atmosphere dur-
ing solar maximum causes the Earth’s atmosphere to bloom outward as compared with solar mini-
mum. This effect increases the density in LEO by a factor of 1–3 orders of magnitude, depending 
on altitude, and about a factor of 3 compared with the long-time average. As a result, atmospheric 
drag deorbit devices are much more efficient during solar maximum, pose a lower risk to operating 
satellites, and have a lower chance of creating new, large debris objects. Permitting a satellite to use 
a smaller drag device over 25 years, which will average about two solar cycles, means it will incur 
about three times the risk compared with a larger device selectively operated near solar maximum 
(including the time taken waiting for solar maximum). As a result, it is recommended that drag-
augmentation devices be sized and timed to complete their deorbit function only during solar 
maximum to further reduce the risk of creating new debris.” K.T.  Nock, K.M.  Aaron and 
D.  McKnight, “Removing Orbital Debris with Less Risk”, Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 
2013, Vol. 50, No. 2, 379. For another analysis of how variations in these parameters can lead to 
considerably dissimilar effects on, and from, space activities, see J.  Radtke, C.  Kebschull and 
E. Stoll, “Interactions of the space debris environment with mega constellations – Using the exam-
ple of the OneWeb constellation”, Acta Astronautica 2017, Vol 131, 55–68.
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To begin, if we define ‘risk’ for our current purposes in simplified terms of prob-
ability times consequence (probability × consequence),15 then the total risk posed by 
a space object16 or a space activity—be it either directly through collision or 
 indirectly through potential creation of debris—to other space objects or space 
 activities, is naturally amplified as space actors, space activities, and space objects 
grow more numerous. The result is the evident intensification of the ‘risk’ attending 
any space activity, expressed by the growing probability of a space activity or space 
object affecting another space activity or space object, and multiplied by the con-
comitant expansion of potential consequences arising from the space activity on the 
latter ever-growing group—for example, through collisions between space objects 
or further collisions with resultant debris. That is to say, more actors, objects and 
activities lead to augmentation of both the probability and thus frequency of them 
affecting each other, as well as of the enormity of any consequences arising there-
from. Given enough time and some arbitrary degree of unregulated growth, the risk 
so expressed would ostensibly tend towards absolute certainty.17
If that notion of risk seems rather abstract it is perhaps necessarily so, for there 
exists no sufficiently harmonised international conception of what precisely consti-
tutes risk attending space activities, let alone of the sustainable threshold or man-
agement of further activity to be inferred therefrom. Even so, establishing a more 
abstract normative notion of risk may enable us to meaningfully capture some of the 
more elusive factors that cannot be a priori derived from scientific calculation and 
that therefore remain fundamentally uncertain,18 or that go beyond what can be 
practically established through case-by-case impact assessments concerning a sin-
gular space activity.
For example, we can only estimate the precise threshold above which the accu-
mulation of space debris in regions of circum-terrestrial space will trigger a run-
away collisional cascade effect that will render those regions largely inhospitable to 
15 D.  McKnight, “Massive Collision Monitoring Activity (MCMA): Examining Urgency and 
Options for Debris Remediation”, Presentation for UN COPUOS, 8 June 2017, Vienna, Austria, 
available at http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/2017/copuos2017tech04E.pdf, last 
accessed on 4 April 2018.
16 Space objects in the broadest possible sense, comprising ‘space debris’ as well as operational 
spacecraft.
17 For example, “[w]hile the probability of accidental collision with a ‘live’ space object is yet 
statistically small, it does exist, and a continuation of present practices insures that this probability 
will increase to unacceptable levels”. Excerpt from the UNISPACE 82 report, as quoted in 
W.B. Wirin, “Space Debris 1989”, Proc. On L. Outer Space 1989, Vol. 32, 184.
18 Apart from scientific uncertainty related to the limited resolution of current debris models, inter 
alia, more generally we might also bear in mind that “[t]o search the sciences for authoritative 
answers to legal questions, or any questions for that matter, is misguided. The formalist philosophy 
which views science as a ‘collection’ of the ‘proven’ or even of the ‘provable’ is based upon an 
inappropriate reification. The better vision of science is as a continual and, above all, critical explo-
ration of fruitful insights; the better metaphor is that of a journey. Science is not so much about 
proving as it is about improving. To look to the natural sciences for authority—that is, for cer-
tainty—is to look for what is not there.” L. Tribe, supra note 10, 2.
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further human activity—i.e. the Kessler Syndrome.19 Nevertheless, we can reason-
ably postulate in a more abstract sense that the prevention of that scenario, and thus 
the mitigation of the aggregate ‘risk’ of its occurrence, is a universally acceptable 
end to be absolutely achieved, for the alternative would be unjustifiable by any 
stretch of the imagination. Although scope precludes an exhaustive examination of 
how to manage the risk attending space activities against that looming horizon,20 at 
the very least we can explore the manner in which we should definitely not.
In connection with the chain of consequence arising from a space activity, for 
example when a space object disintegrates following a collision with another space 
object, the distribution of generated debris fragments changes over several months 
so as to
[…] evolve into a uniformly distributed band. Such a distribution state of the debris cloud 
is the so called “chaotic motion” of debris cloud [sic], which means that the debris has lost 
reference to its specific initial conditions.21
The legal implications of this physical process should be clear to ‘serious stu-
dents’ of international space and environmental law. Firstly, traditional legal notions 
of liability are largely rendered irrelevant with regard to such fragmentary and irre-
mediable debris,22 if only because the loss of reference to specific initial conditions 
would ostensibly prevent a claimant from adducing the evidence necessary to estab-
lish causation or to identify the responsible actor, a fortiori in the absence of any 
capability to continuously track the fragments from the moment of their creation. 
This holds true even for proposed regimes of strict liability for space activities. 
Secondly, the group of entities potentially affected by the disintegration of a space 
object is not limited to those entities who at the relevant time are immediately sub-, 
super- or adjacent to the fragmentation event,23 but encompasses all entities residing 
19 For example, Klinkrad estimates “that cascading debris generation, otherwise referred to as the 
Kessler Syndrome, will begin within the next 20 years unless action is taken to reduce the existing 
population.” As noted in P.A. Slann, “Space debris and the need for space traffic control”, Space 
Policy 2014, 41.
20 The institution of a global system for STM would appear especially apt in this regard, see supra 
note 7.
21 For the quoted text and further references related to ‘chaotic motion’ in the distribution of debris 
fragments, see B. Zhang, Z. Wang and Y. Zhang, “An analytic method of space debris cloud evolu-
tion and its collision evaluation for constellation satellites”, Advances in Space Research 2016, 
Vol. 58, 907–909.
22 For a more complete overview of the fundamental deficiency of a liability or reparation regime 
for damage caused by, or harm arising from, space debris in connection with the sustainability of 
space activities and the protection of the space environment, see W. Munters, “Small satellites, 
large constellations and space debris: in dubio pro LEO?”, in J. Wouters, P. De Man and R. Hansen 
(Eds.), Commercial Uses of Space and Space Tourism: Legal and Policy Aspects, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017, 75–110. 
23 In the same vein, consider: “If a collision were to occur in heavily populated orbital regimes, such 
as the sun-synchronous orbits or GEO, this would have even greater effect. A collision in GEO will 
distribute debris throughout the entire belt within a day. […] A collision in the commercially popu-
lar sun-synchronous orbits could result in costly direct costs to locally operating satellites, and 
make future operation in such sun-synchronous orbits more challenging. Both of these narrow orbit 
regimes are special in that the operators are flying there to take advantage of particularly favourable 
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within or traversing the affected orbital bands.24 Thus, the consequences of a calam-
itous event in circum-terrestrial space25 are far from limited to a particular location 
or to a narrowly predefined group of entities and, proportional to the altitude, might 
last for a very long time.
As pertains to the probability of the occurrence of an event negatively impacting 
the safety and sustainability of space activities in the above manner, let us briefly 
examine the recent Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization by the United 
States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding a proposed constel-
lation of 4425 non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) satellites.26 Of particular note are 
the comments filed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
to the FCC, stating that
(1) the reliability of the design and fabrication of the spacecraft and the reliability that the 
spacecraft can accomplish the post-mission disposal are of particular interest from the per-
spective of keeping the orbital environment safe, and that currently, no consensus exists on 
what the two reliability numbers should be, and (2) a design and fabrication reliability on 
the order of 0.999 or better per spacecraft may be prudent to mitigate the risk of malfunc-
tion in a 4,000+ spacecraft constellation.27
On the one hand, the absence of consensus on prerequisite reliability underscores 
precisely the absence of a harmonised construction of risk attending space activi-
ties, be it at the domestic or international level. On the other, while the admittedly 
provisional reliability factor of 0.999 essentially amounts to a recommendation of 
near-perfect reliability for the spacecraft and its functions,28 there remain inescap-
able exogenous factors of a nature to influence that reliability, and of which proper 
orbital physics. These mission types are not possible by simply moving the GEO satellite to a lower 
orbit, or changing the plane of the sun-synchronous spacecraft.” H.  Schaub, L.E.Z.  Jasper, 
P.V. Anderson and D.S. McKnight, “Cost and risk assessment for spacecraft operation decisions 
caused by the space debris environment”, Acta Astronautica 2015, Vol. 113, 73.
24 If we expand the scope of his argument to encompass the near-Earth environment, Brownlie was 
undoubtedly correct when noting of activities in space that “[s]ome activities may cause, or create 
the risk of, harmful and perhaps irreversible changes in the earth’s environment. The threat here is 
not in personam but to mankind and the community of States as a whole.” (emphasis in original). 
I.  Brownlie, “The Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Outer Space”, British 
Yearbook of International Law 1964, Vol. 40, 30.
25 Precisely in this area does the traditional language of international law falter, largely based, as it 
still is, on concepts of territorial sovereignty that present difficulty when attempting to construe 
these into ‘machinery’ to regulate novel problems of a mostly extra-territorial nature.
26 FCC, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization concerning Application For Approval for 
Orbital Deployment and Operating Authority for the SpaceX NGSO Satellite System, FCC 18–38, 
adopted on 28 March 2018, released on 29 March 2018, available at https://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0329/FCC-18-38A1.pdf, last accessed on 10 April 2018.
27 Ibid., 8, note 54 (‘NASA Comments’).
28 The need for a dramatic increase in reliability of deorbiting and control systems for constellation 
spacecraft has also been noted by the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), on 
which see IADC, Statement on Large Constellations of Satellites in Low Earth Orbit, IADC-15-
03, September 2017, available at https://www.iadc-online.org, last accessed on 10 April 2018. For 
a more detailed legal analysis of these reliability concerns in light of a precautionary approach and 
the impact on the space environment, see W. Munters, supra note 23.
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account cannot be taken by sole reference to the operator or the spacecraft of the 
constellation. Indeed, whereas debate continues in legal doctrine on, for example, 
de facto appropriation of orbits by means of certain space activities in possible con-
travention of Article II OST, or on the precise substance and scope of the reciprocal 
rights and obligations emanating from the principles of cooperation and mutual 
assistance or of due regard in Article IX OST, for the time being we can plausibly 
foresee at least more than one otherwise unrelated entity legitimately conducting 
space activities in the vicinity of such a constellation.
Hence, a further lesson is revealed: the ‘risk’ posed by, and to, a space activity 
cannot be assessed in vacuo—in ‘splendid isolation’ from the unfolding space 
activities of other entities. Moreover, insofar as some forms of minute coordination 
between otherwise unrelated space activities would be required in order to mitigate 
the aggregate risk to other entities or to the sustainability of mankind’s space 
 activities so as to remain below acceptable thresholds, it would appear that neither 
can the operational management of that risk be undertaken in an insular fashion. It 
is  therefore submitted that the future construction of any space governance regime, 
be it national or international, that proceeds from the assumption that such manage-
ment can be effectively undertaken ad hoc, in a unilateral manner, or without an 
enduring cooperative framework under which to coordinate space activities,29 would 
amount to ‘legal imagination’ of the least redeemable kind.
This lesson is not merely an academic abstraction, as is evidenced, for example, 
by recent legislative developments in connection with commercial space activities 
in the United States House of Representatives. The American Space Commerce 
Free Enterprise Act of 2017,30 though not yet enacted into domestic law at the time 
of writing, contains disconcerting language and provisional stipulations in connec-
tion with the risk posed by space activities. After noting that the primary role to 
authorise and supervise new private space activities would be assigned under the 
Act to the Office of the Secretary of Commerce—an office without traditional expe-
rience in such matters—Liu and Tronchetti continue, that while
[i]t is certainly true that safety is still a matter of primary importance, as demonstrated by 
the requirement to assess the risk that the certified operation poses to space objects operated 
by the Federal Government. It is, nevertheless notable that such an assessment takes place 
after the operation has already started (one would assume that such an evaluation would be 
done prior to the mission) and that the risk is evaluated only in relation to U.S. space 
objects, regardless of their potential hazardous impact on the long-term sustainability of 
space activities broadly considered (including those undertaken by foreign entities). It is 
also notable that the bill never addresses concerns over issues like space situational aware-
ness and traffic management.31
29 See supra, note 7.
30 Bill, American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, available at https://science.house.
gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/2017%2006%2001%20232%20
Free%20Enterprise%20Act%20HR%20Blank.pdf, last accessed on 10 April 2018.
31 H. Liu and F. Tronchetti, “The American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017: The 
latest step in regulating the space resources utilization industry or something more?”, Space Policy 
2018 [ARTICLE IN PRESS], available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2018.02.004, last 
accessed on 10 April 2018.
8 Active Debris Removal, International Environmental Law, and the Collective…
140
Further, we may also briefly consider the indications of an altogether meagre rate 
of international compliance with current mitigation measures as contained in the 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (SDM Guidelines) of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) or the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination 
Committee (IADC).32 It would appear that the effectiveness of non-binding interna-
tional guidelines concerning the sustainability of space activities is, in fact, rather 
imaginary.33 Let us not forget either that the validity and robustness of the SDM 
Guidelines is being thoroughly questioned by the IADC.34 In this sense, legal imagi-
nation is to contend that such guidelines, including the recent Guidelines on the 
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTSSA Guidelines), while 
valuable, would amount to anything beyond a preliminary and political consensus- 
seeking exercise in preparation of a more effective, and effected, collective system 
for space governance. A system, moreover, we can reasonably assume is to be 
founded on the legitimate rule of law.35
8.2.3  A Creative Imagination
Finally, let us define imagination in its third sense as ‘the ability to think of new 
ideas’. From this, I continue in two ways. First, I establish a general frame of refer-
ence for further debate, based on the future role of international environmental law 
32 Notably, recent studies “have shown that disposal operations to meet a 25-year post-mission limit 
in the LEO protected zone is followed only by approximately 20% of space systems today.” 
B. Bastida Virgili et al., “Risk to space sustainability from large constellations of satellites”, Acta 
Astronautica 2016, Vol. 126, 155. See also V.  Morand, J.C.  Dolado-Perez, T.  Philippe and 
D.A. Handschuh, “Mitigation Rules Compliance in Low Earth Orbit”, Journal of Space Safety 
Engineering 2014, Vol. 1, No. 2, 84–92.
33 The diminutive degree of compliance must of course also be taken as evidence of the reluctance 
of spacefaring States and operators to implement costly mitigation measures. That reluctance will 
naturally frustrate attempts to arrive at a legally binding framework despite ongoing deterioration 
of near-Earth space. For an extensive analysis of the various risks and costs in connection with 
space debris, its mitigation and its remediation, see H. Schaub et al., supra note 24, 66–79.
34 IADC, supra note 29. 
35 In this respect, consider the following non-binding but authoritative paragraphs in the Declaration 
of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels: “We agree that our collective response to the challenges and opportunities 
arising from the many complex political, social and economic transformations before us must be 
guided by the rule of law, as it is the foundation of friendly and equitable relations between States 
and the basis on which just and fair societies are built”, as further strengthened by the recognition 
“that the rule of law applies to all States equally, and to international organizations, including the 
United Nations and its principal organs, and that respect for and promotion of the rule of law and 
justice should guide all of their activities and accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions. 
We also recognize that all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State 
itself, are accountable to just, fair and equitable laws and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law.” Resolution 67/1 of the United Nations General Assembly (30 
November 2012), UN Doc. A/RES/67/1 (2012), 1.
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and the rule of law in global society. Secondly, I look at the state of the rule of law 
in the context of mankind’s activities in outer space.
8.2.3.1  Environmental Law: A Proper Frame of Reference
Fisher is correct in her contention that legal imagination is required to confront the 
environmental problems of today36  and it can be said with some confidence that 
international environmental law concerning (the prevention of) transboundary 
harm in particular has a seminal role to play on the world stage. This is hardly sur-
prising. One of the effects of the gradual erosion of the traditional boundaries divid-
ing states, in favour of a more interconnected and interdependent international 
community, has been to force our collective awareness to encompass the inescap-
able fact that consequences, arising from certain activities, permeate the geographi-
cal boundaries otherwise neatly dividing the Earth into parcels of sovereign territory. 
We may use particular terminology—for example, ‘transnational’ or ‘extra-
territorial ’—to denote that these issues transcend “the classical structure”37 of the 
international legal order. But we must also recognise that the legal language of 
which international lawyers, institutions and states avail themselves has lagged 
behind the very real and very pressing factual developments confronting global 
society—for example, climate change or the proliferation of space debris.
Arguably, the deliberate and precise nature of the law—esteemed qualities as 
well of the scholars that study it and the lawyers that practice it—is such as to 
require adherence to fundamental principles of predictability, equity and legitimacy, 
among others. This makes the law into a powerful construct that is, however, slow 
to evolve. Be that as it may, the uncomfortable and often understated truth of the 
matter is that the global problems now facing mankind, in any number of domains, 
are absolutely unprecedented in their scope and urgency as well as in their ability 
to impede mankind’s future progress. To call upon the rule of law to form part of the 
solution under these conditions—and I take for granted that we must—is therefore 
to require nothing less of the rule of law than to profoundly transform itself in an 
equally unprecedented manner. In short, we will simply have to imagine a way 
forward.
8.2.3.2  A Creative Imagination: Towards International Space Traffic 
Management?
Under our third definition of imagination, international initiatives aiming to institute 
a global system for space traffic management (STM),38 rooted in public interna-
tional law, emerge as highly imaginative, for they precisely seek to provide novel 
36 E. Fisher, supra note 2.
37 P. Sands, supra note 4, 22.
38 See supra, note 7.
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‘machinery’ for the control and regulation of potentially harmful activities in outer 
space. All the more, given that “the language in which we still tend to ask legal 
questions and express legal doctrine has yet to reflect the shift in our perceptions”,39 
and that the institution of such a system would beneficially correspond with our 
above determination of the tenuous connection between present tendencies in inter-
national space governance and the modern realities surrounding space activities. Let 
us explore that tenuous connection a little further.
Ever since its codification into a conventional norm in 1967, Article III OST 
stipulates in certain terms that States Parties shall carry on space activities in 
accordance with international law. The preceding general endorsement of that pre-
cept by the community of states40 motivated Brownlie to posit in 1964 that “[it] 
follows from this position that there is no legal vacuum waiting to be filled with a 
composite body of rules having a special nature, a new legal entity, ‘space law’.”41 
In retrospect, however, we must perhaps recognise that international law in gen-
eral, and international environmental law in particular, have only marginally suc-
ceeded in piercing the normative veil that has long appeared to imperceptibly 
separate activities in outer space as somehow distinct from those on Earth.
Without examining the matter here in detail, it is plausible that this circumstance 
can more generally be attributed to the ostensibly feeble position held by the inter-
national rule of law in regard to activities carried on in outer space by states or by 
the actors under their supervision. Indeed, rare must be those areas of international 
law wherein commentators can cite literature from the middle of the previous cen-
tury as if it were contemporary legal doctrine—intentional references in the current 
chapter included—or in whose acquis not a single noteworthy pronouncement from 
an international judicial body can be found. As to the underlying reasons, we might 
look to the provisions in the space treaties, often purported to be of lacunal character 
and therefore to offer ample scope for divergent conduct. Even so, the general nature 
of the provisions precisely extends so far as to cover “all activities by public and 
private entities that can be characterised as exploration or use. The lack of detailed 
rules regulating every conceivable activity in space should thus not be taken as an 
indication that there are forms of exploration or use of outer space that escape the 
application of the fundamental principles of international space law.”42 Above all, 
however, it is the politically and strategically expedient reticence by spacefaring 
states to submit themselves to detailed international rules that appears most likely to 
perpetuate the veil.
Yet, as we have seen, there are pressing reasons, empirical or otherwise, to 
insist that “the conduct of States in regard to outer space must be submitted to the 
39 L. Tribe, supra note 10, 2.
40 See, for example, Resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961 and Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 1963 of the 
United Nations General Assembly.
41 I. Brownlie, supra note 25, 2.
42 P. De Man, “State practice, domestic legislation and the interpretation of fundamental principles 
of international space law”, Space Policy 2017, 92.
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rule of law”,43 properly established, and thus to forcefully insist on reviving what 
appears to be the dead letter of Article III OST. Similar reasons apply to the need 
to renew efforts towards the appropriate application of international environmen-
tal law to mankind’s activities in outer space.44 To that end, I propose to fully 
subscribe to the incisive analysis by Brownlie, as relevant today for our environ-
mental purposes as they were for his own reasons more than half a century ago, 
namely that:
[I]n working on the assumption that rules already exist which apply to activities in space it 
will be borne in mind that the precise manner of their application will not infrequently 
remain the subject of debate and that in some spheres one is dealing quite simply with the 
progressive development of the law and not merely the refinement of existing rules. The line 
between lex lata and lex ferenda is often difficult to draw […] the optimum conditions for 
peace and security in this field, as in others, are created by political understanding and more 
especially by the conclusion of agreements […] providing machinery for the control of 
harmful activities. The general law normally should contribute to the solution of these large 
issues by providing the technical framework for particular arrangements. However, in con-
ditions of political distrust, it is as well to point out that the paucity of special agreements 
does not leave States to shape their policies in complete freedom.45
Following this line of argument, it will be fruitful to cast a glance at space debris 
and active debris removal in the light of international environmental law—not only 
for the lessons it may hold for the common construction of risk attending space 
activities, and thus for an effective and equitable space traffic management regime 
but, crucially, to accentuate that “[l]egality does not wait upon perfection”,46 nor do 
spacefaring states enjoy boundless freedom in anticipation of a more expansive sui 
generis space governance regime.
To be sure, much of the ‘current spate of writing’ and international adjudication 
on transnational and extra-territorial environmental problems appears, however 
slowly or incrementally, to be developing along a normative axis pointing towards 
intensified international cooperation and coordination. If we concede to the likeli-
hood that due to the unique physical realities in circum-terrestrial space and the 
immediate, indiscriminate consequences of space activities on any entity active 
therein, the international community will be compelled sooner, rather than later, to 
arrive at a novel framework for effective international space governance, then we 
might hope that valuable lessons might be drawn therefrom for creating ‘legal 
machinery’ to collectively overcome the many other global challenges closer to 
home. From this perspective, it might be equally fruitful somewhere in the near 
future for serious students of international law and organization to study interna-
43 M.  Lachs, The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law-Making, Leiden, 
Sijthoff, 1972, 6–7.
44 In this respect, note that “environmental space law is simply a specialized area of environmental 
law”. F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise, Surrey, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009, 
275.
45 I. Brownlie, supra note 25, 2–3.
46 Ibid., 2.
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tional law in light of space debris and active debris removal. For this might help us 
to imagine.
8.3  Active Debris Removal, Space Activities and Prevention 
Obligations: de lege ferenda
The purpose of this cursory analysis is both to raise fundamental questions in con-
nection with the progressive development of international law, as well as to bring to 
the foreground the common element of risk and its collective management. There 
remain many more questions than there are answers concerning such progressive 
development or an appropriate conception of risk attending space activities, of 
which I will especially take note in the hope of promoting more extensive debate 
thereon.
8.3.1  General International Environmental Law
To begin, we may refer to the general literature on international environmental law 
to trace the history, and to arrive at the lex lata, of obligations to prevent transbound-
ary harm throughout various declarations, legal instruments and judgments by inter-
national courts and tribunals.47 To continue, arguably the most notable modern 
development in this field was the pronouncement from the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ; Court) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, when the 
Court stated that
[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their juris-
diction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national 
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.48
The contentious issue of nuclear weapons aside, “with the Court’s decision, it 
was no longer possible to argue that the protection of the environment was not gov-
erned by the rules of general international law.”49
Indeed, Article III OST renders operative the rules of general international law 
with regard to space activities, but it is clear that any such general obligation will 
need to be applicable as well on the basis of its proper substantive scope. To deter-
mine the scope of the above general obligation in relation to ADR and space activi-
ties, let us examine its constituent parts individually, as follows: (1) ‘activities 
47 For example, see P.  Sands, J.  Peel, A.  Fabra and R.  MacKenzie, Principles of International 
Environmental Law, 3rd Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
48 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 241–
242, para. 29.
49 P. Sands, supra note 4, 26.
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within the jurisdiction and control of a State’; (2) ‘the environment of other States 
or of areas beyond national control’; (3) ‘respect the environment’.
As to (1), ‘activities within the jurisdiction and control of a State’, the central 
question generally pertains to the appropriate attribution of particular conduct on 
the basis of the relevant facts in order to discern the responsible state. Straightforward 
attribution results from Article VI OST, pursuant to which a State Party to the OST 
bears international responsibility for national ‘activities in outer space’ by govern-
mental agencies and non-governmental entities. Regarding especially ADR, the 
qualification of, for example, a ‘laser’50 or a ‘sounding rocket’51 as an ‘activity in 
outer space’ presents some difficulty, as do states not having acceded to the 
OST. However, in any case, recourse to generally established rules in international 
law for the attribution of conduct to a state52 will render these issues largely 
irrelevant.53
As to (2): outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not sub-
ject to national appropriation pursuant to Article II OST. This ‘non-appropriation 
principle’ extends in reach beyond its codified form as a principle of customary 
international law.54 Circum-terrestrial space is thus indisputably ‘an area beyond 
national control’.
As to (3), we can now reliably assert that there exists a general obligation under 
international environmental law incumbent upon every state to ‘respect the environ-
ment’ of outer space when undertaking space activities. Breach of this substantive 
rule, consisting of harm caused to the environment, would constitute a wrongful act 
establishing international responsibility. This obligation carries significant and spe-
cific importance. Whereas doctrinal debate on environmental protection of outer 
space against space debris often preoccupies itself with the wording, interpretation 
or role of Article IX OST, the scope of the present obligation is so expansive as to 
potentially obviate the need to resort almost exclusively  to Article IX OST.  For 
50 A number of schemes proposed to remove space debris involve the firing of a sufficiently power-
ful laser that ablates the leading edge of a piece of debris so as to alter its trajectory and make it 
re-enter the atmosphere.
51 So-called ‘just-in-time active debris removal’ would utilise sounding rockets to inject certain 
substances in the path of a piece of debris so as to alter its trajectory at the last minute, known as 
‘just-in-time active debris removal’ (JADR) or ‘just-in-time collision avoidance’ (JCA), on which 
see H. Schaub et al., supra note 24, 74.
52 See, generally, the 2001 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, by the International Law Commission.
53 Speculatively, more troublesome may be those cases in which the object to be removed might 
also engage the responsibility of its State of registry via attribution through, inter alia, Article VIII 
on the basis of the latter’s terms ‘shall retain jurisdiction and control’. Insofar as the space object 
is seen as an ‘effective link’ with the State of registry, its responsibility might be engaged in certain 
circumstances.
54 Some authors characterise the principle in Article II OST as jus cogens, while others see it as a 
customary rule of international law of elevated status, a ‘structural norm’ of international space 
law, on which see F.  Tronchetti, “The Non-Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of 
International Law: A New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty”, Air & Space 
Law 2008, Vol. 33, No. 3, 277–305.
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example, while Article IX OST operates on the central determination of prejudice to 
the interests of a State Party to the OST, or of harmful interference with activities of 
other States Parties, the object enjoying the protective mandate in the general obli-
gation is the space environment itself. That is not to say that the importance of 
Article IX OST for environmental purposes is in any way diminished. Much to the 
opposite: it is complemented and reinforced.55 However, many questions endure and 
the proper interpretation of ‘harmful interference’, ‘harmful contamination’56 and 
‘due regard’ in Article IX OST is likely to have some influence on the manner in 
which we interpret and qualify ‘respect’ for the outer space environment if the gen-
eral obligation is to be properly understood, and vice versa.57
Secondly, the Court has over time developed a closely related but distinct line of 
reasoning on customary and general international law with regard to procedural and 
due diligence obligations to prevent transboundary harm,58 that may have relevance 
in relation to space activities and ADR59:
[T]o fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant transboundary 
environmental harm, a State must, before embarking on an activity having the potential 
adversely to affect the environment of another State, [i] ascertain if there is a risk of signifi-
cant transboundary harm, which would trigger [ii] the requirement to carry out an environ-
mental impact assessment. […] If the environmental impact assessment confirms that there 
is a risk of significant transboundary harm, the State planning to undertake the activity is 
required, in conformity with its due diligence obligation, [iii] to notify and consult in good 
faith with the potentially affected State, where that is necessary to determine the appropri-
ate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.60
I will not dwell here on whether this exact procedural sequence is applicable to 
space activities or active debris removal—as we have seen, outer space is a unique 
environment that requires uniquely tailored rules. Rather, let us derive from the 
55 The relationship between a treaty norm and norms extraneous to the treaty is a matter of consid-
erable legal complexity, for which a matrix of rules for the resolution of conflict between norms 
may need to be invoked, on which see D. French, “Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of 
Extraneous Legal Rules”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2006, Vol. 55, 281–314.
56 For example, debate continues in the literature on whether ‘harmful contamination’ is limited to 
microparticulate matter of a more intangible nature and therefore would exclude space debris.
57 “[T]here are situations in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of the treaty was, or may be 
presumed to have been, to give the terms used—or some of them—a meaning or content capable 
of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other things, devel-
opments in international law”. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, 242, para. 64.
58 For example, see Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, 22; 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, 55–56, 
para. 101 and 83, para. 204; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa 
Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua 
v. Costa Rica), Judgement, ICJ Reports 2015, 706–707, para. 104 (hereinafter: ICJ, San Juan 
River).
59 On which in connection with space debris and large constellations, see W. Munters, supra note 
23.
60 San Juan River, ICJ, see supra, note 59.
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underlying logic a measure of support for the implementation of a legal ‘technical 
framework for particular arrangements’ in regard to space activities, i.e. ADR and 
STM. In so doing, an international system can be constructed on a legal basis that 
incorporates both the interests of states and operators ex Article IX OST and the 
general obligation owed to the space environment itself. The following matters 
deserve a closer look.
8.3.2  Prevention of Harm to the Space Environment Arising 
from Space Activities
Firstly, the cardinal risk to the future amenity of the circum-terrestrial space envi-
ronment consists of collisions and fragmentation events resulting in critical levels of 
fragmentary and irremediable debris.61 These events can have any number of causes 
such as ‘lethal but nontrackable debris’, accidental collisions, explosions or anoma-
lies. If many of these causes elude our scientific methods of prediction and therefore 
our ability to prevent them, the onus to prevent the events that we can foresee ines-
capably becomes all the more exacting.62 Such prevention mostly entails the avoid-
ance of collisions between ‘controllable’ space objects sensu stricto, and between 
space objects sensu lato—and, of course, between both of these groups.
Sensu stricto, we might think of manoeuvrable satellites whose operator may be 
compelled to exert coordinated control so as to avoid collision. Sensu lato, we face 
a very broad category that encompasses any space object that can be tracked, includ-
ing a wide variety of non-functional space objects (‘space debris’), but also ‘func-
tional’ space objects that lack any form of active or propulsive control. As to the 
latter, there are evident questions concerning the untenability, and thus the tenuous 
legality, of the utilisation of spacecraft lacking any form of propulsive means of 
active control, as this will, for example, force other entities to expend valuable 
means of propulsion in order to avoid collision.63 As to space debris, at least the 
pieces carrying the largest risk of collision will have to be removed, or their trajec-
61 “The future hazard from orbital debris will be largely driven by the lethal debris population (any 
fragment greater than 5 mm in diameter) that will be created in the thousands from hard-body-to-
hard-body collisions of large objects. Therefore, although it is desirable to control the growth of 
the small debris population, this is best done by removing large derelict objects that might later 
spawn the lethal fragments through collisions.” K.T. Nock et al., supra note 15, 369.
62 Especially when considering “that years of successful mitigation can be negated by one colli-
sion.” H. Schaub et al., supra note 24, 73.
63 Consider that “[t]here is a growing population of small- and nano-satellite missions that have no 
propulsion capability. These missions are often high-risk technically and designed for a short mis-
sion duration. When considering all the risks that might terminate their operation, the probability 
of being hit by debris is not a driving consideration.” H. Schaub et al., supra note 24, 74.
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tory altered in some way,64 in order to avoid inducing insupportable fragmentation 
events.
Secondly, the ‘ultrahazardous’ nature of space activities cannot—or should no 
longer—be regarded as synonymous with silent acquiescence to the significant risk 
that inheres in all space activities. On the contrary, it should lead to recognition of 
an unrebuttable presumption that space activities exceed a de minimis level of risk 
that is, ipso facto, to be assessed prior to, as well as for the entire duration of, a space 
activity on the basis of the due diligence required of every state.65 Moreover, as I 
have argued, such an environmental impact assessment (EIA) cannot be undertaken 
effectively in a unilateral manner or without a combinatory international frame-
work66 that encompasses notification, consultation and coordination, dissemination 
of space situational awareness (SSA) data, coordinated collision avoidance manoeu-
vres (CAM), emergency procedures, harmonisation of models, ontologies and 
typologies, implementation of active debris removal (ADR), etc.
Thirdly, the facts of the matter are straightforward but daunting. Varying with 
orbital altitudes, we face a number of absolute thresholds that when exceeded, while 
difficult to precisely determine such moment a priori,67 will lead to the significant 
impairment of utilisation of entire bands of circum-terrestrial space.68 Proportional 
to orbital altitude, utility will be impaired by irremediable debris for periods span-
ning from days to millennia, or longer. Although the space treaties do not them-
selves contain an ‘innovative’ legal provision comparable to Article 2(1)(a) of the 
2015 Paris Climate Agreement and its enumerated temperature thresholds,69 useful 
64 For example, an ‘on-orbit servicing’ solution may consist of a specialised spacecraft attaching 
itself to the object in order to impart a continuous means of movement and control over it. 
Alternatively, the use of sounding rockets to inject certain substances in the path of a piece of 
debris so as to alter its trajectory at the last minute may be utilised—so called ‘just-in-time active 
debris removal’ (JADR) on which see supra, note 52.
65 Corfu Channel, ICJ, supra note 59.
66 Pulp Mills, ICJ, supra note 59, 83, para. 205: “it is the view of the Court that it is for each State 
to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for the project, the specific 
content of the environmental impact assessment required in each case, having regard to the nature 
and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as 
well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment. The Court also 
considers that an environmental impact assessment must be conducted prior to the implementation 
of a project. Moreover, once operations have started and, where necessary, throughout the life of 
the project, continuous monitoring of its effects on the environment shall be undertaken.” The 
authorization and continuous supervision incumbent upon the relevant state of nationality pursuant 
to Article VI OST bears obvious relevance here.
67 For example, see supra, note 20.
68 See quote, supra note 24.
69 Article 2(1)(a) of the 2015 Paris Agreement reads: “This Agreement, in enhancing the implemen-
tation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the 
threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, 
including by: (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-




analogies can be drawn from the latter in light of the prevention of irreparable harm 
to the space environment.
Notably, much of the difficulty surrounding the creation of effective environmen-
tal law, the adjudication of disputes arising from catastrophic environmental 
damage,70 and the transformation of the rule of law itself, is to be found in the tem-
poral tension that manifests itself in this domain and to which the machinery of 
international law has only a limited response. As the Court emphasised in Gabčíkovo- 
Nagymaros, “in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are 
required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment 
and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of 
damage”.71 The Court has nevertheless been quite reticent in developing this strand 
of thought more decisively, arguably because it cannot, or does not wish to, place 
itself in the position of an international legislator or of the body politic comprising 
sovereign states.
In particular, the temporal tension we face is one between an ‘ex post facto’ ret-
rospective and an ‘ex ante’ preventive perspective in connection with the avoidance 
of a fait accompli. It is the tension between (1) the ex post facto determination of a 
breach of a substantive obligation—for example, having caused an irreparable envi-
ronmental harm—and (2) an ex ante insistence on compliance with obligations that 
aim to prevent such harm from occurring through an articulated system of proce-
dural rules to be observed prior to, and for the duration of, an activity. To be sure, if 
temperatures increase above a certain threshold, then human civilization will strug-
gle. If debris accumulates in excess of a particular threshold, then Kessler Syndrome 
will manifest itself. These evidently are problems of such importance that allowing 
for even the possibility of them becoming a fait accompli is wholly unconscionable. 
So, how are we to make the rule of law operable on these problems in any meaning-
ful sense before they occur and thus before traditional systems of law and adjudica-
tion can apply their hitherto largely ex post facto logic?
70 For example, see the panel discussion on international liability for catastrophic environmental 
damage, following A. Boyle, “International Law and the Liability for Catastrophic Environmental 
Damage”, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 2011, Vol. 105, 423–430, et 
seq.
71 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 78, para. 
140. In the same vein, consider: “that [the Court] has to take a forward-looking, prospective 
approach, engage in a comprehensive risk assessment and embrace a preventive rather than com-
pensatory logic when determining what this risk might entail. This logic carries with it particular 
cogency in the realm of environmental law. […] the Court must remain aware, when confronted 
with challenges of risk of environmental pollution and endangerment of ecosystems, of the inher-
ent weaknesses and flaws of the traditional retrospective judicial process and its compensatory 
logic.” Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma, Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, 118, para. 22 and 119, para. 24.
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8.3.3  Legal Foundations for a Common Construction 
to Manage Risks Attending Space Activities 
and to Remove Debris: ‘Respect for the Space 
Environment’
In an attempt to provide an answer, I move here partially into speculative and firmly 
into abstract territory, de lege ferenda. Let us return to one of the arguments above. 
Namely, that we might reasonably postulate that the prevention of the initiating 
conditions of a collisional cascade that would render entire orbital  bands 
largely inhospitable to further human activity is a universally acceptable end to be 
absolutely achieved—for the alternative not only is indefensible, but arguably, for a 
large part, would defeat the very object and purpose of the corpus iuris spatialis 
itself. In an analogous vein, if in the future we were to collectively transgress the 
temperature thresholds in Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Climate Agreement, much of 
the world would find itself in dire straits. This, as well, can be said to embody an 
‘absolute’ standard against which conduct is to be assessed.
If we were to subsequently consider our postulated absolute and universal end as 
the ratio legis underlying a singular substantive norm—for example, expressed as 
‘respect the space environment’—then the latter must be an ‘intransgressible’ norm 
by its very nature, for transgression would defeat the absolute object and purpose of 
the norm. This ‘intransgressibility’ does not signify in any sense that it is impossi-
ble, in fact, to carry on those activities that would be in contravention of, or deroga-
tory to, the substantive norm. Rather, it leads to the conclusion that the activities 
necessarily must be somehow rendered incapable of transgression or derogation. 
The law would thus be required to shape future conduct before, and without, having 
ability to retrospectively determine that the conduct had totally defeated our sub-
stantive norm, the absolute standard—that is, before the manifestation of a fait 
accompli. Therefore, the right moment to determine breach of the substantive norm 
must necessarily lie at a point in time before the norm has been defeated. The man-
ner in which the law may legitimately do this is by demanding compliance with 
procedural legal obligations that aim to preventively safeguard the substantive norm 
and its object and purpose before they are defeated—inter alia on the basis of the 
due diligence and good faith required of every state. In terms of space debris and 
Kessler Syndrome, the attribution of wrongful conduct to a particular state will only 
be an effective legal means to safeguard the amenity of circum-terrestrial space 
when such wrongful conduct, as well as any secondary obligations of reparation 
emanating therefrom—for example, a secondary obligation to remove defunct 
space objects—is established to exist before such conduct has generated additional 
irremediable debris. In the simplest of terms, we may express this in an epigram 
stating that ‘prevention is not better than the cure; prevention is the cure.’
The scathing joint dissenting opinion by judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma in 
the Pulp Mills case lends some credence to the above analysis and is especially 
relevant in the light of the ‘elasticity’ of current notions of risk attending space 
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activities and the concomitant absence of a common construction of that risk and its 
management:
[I]n matters related to the use of shared natural resources and the possibility of transbound-
ary harm, the most notable feature that one observes is the extreme elasticity and generality 
of the substantive principles involved. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, equi-
table and rational utilization of these resources, the duty not to cause significant or appre-
ciable harm, the principle of sustainable development, etc., all reflect this generality. […] 
Clearly in such situations, respect for procedural obligations assumes considerable impor-
tance and comes to the forefront as being an essential indicator of whether, in a concrete 
case, substantive obligations were or were not breached. Thus, the conclusion whereby 
non-compliance with the pertinent procedural obligations has eventually had no effect on 
compliance with the substantive obligations is a proposition that cannot be easily 
accepted.72
Our desired result of absolutely avoiding the Kessler Syndrome might then be 
achieved by mitigating the risk attending space activities to a sufficient degree 
through preventively ensuring compliant conduct in an articulated system of prior 
and continuous procedural regulation that is responsive to the variable factual cir-
cumstances surrounding space activities. That is to say, a comprehensive interna-
tional procedural system founded on the legitimate rule of law, and of a level of 
sophistication and coordination sufficient to manage the risks to the space environ-
ment posed by space activities: an effective system for space traffic management. 
However, so long as such a sui generis system or alternative means of collectively 
managing that risk remain absent, states are not free to comport themselves as they 
see fit. Resort may be had in the first order to Article IX OST and to the substan-
tive  general obligation required of states to ‘respect the space environment’, 
expressed also in the procedural due diligence obligations ‘to notify and consult in 
good faith with the potentially affected State, where that is necessary to determine 
the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk’.73 Indeed, it might not be 
a stretch of our imagination to suspect that ‘respect for the space environment’ 
would at least entail ‘respect for procedural obligations’.74
As discussed, the risk attending space activities (expressed here as ‘probability 
times consequence’) is of such a nature that it behoves envisioning the scope of 
these obligations so as to include a considerable number of affected entities to be 
consulted, and to coordinate with, in order to effectively mitigate the risk.75 Any of 
these entities may then opt to bring proceedings against a state whose conduct 
appears to be in breach of its due diligence obligations, and thus the substantive 
obligation to respect the space environment, even prior to the contentious activity 
72 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma, supra note 72, 120, para. 26.
73 San Juan River, ICJ, supra note 59.
74 See supra, note 73.
75 Crucially, the fact that Article IX OST may be considered lex specialis in regard to space activi-
ties and “may contain limited obligations concerning notification or consultation in specific situa-
tions does not exclude any other procedural obligations with regard to transboundary harm which 
may exist in treaty or customary international law.” San Juan River, ICJ, supra note 59, 708, para. 
108.
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having been commenced in space. This is a two-way street, however. On the oppo-
site side, an entity wishing to conduct space activities must also demand of other 
relevant entities, carrying on activities in space of a character to influence the risk, 
to enter into consultations so as to arrive at satisfactory coordinative measures, in 
order to effectively mitigate the aggregate risk posed to the space environment by 
their combined activities. If the number of consultative and coordinative relation-
ships between entities, legally required to be established in this ad hoc manner for 
each relevant space activity, appears in any way as incalculable, we may consider it 
proven that an institutional space traffic management system is urgently required.
Furthermore, the official stance adopted by the United States Air Force Science 
Advisory Board in 1986 that “[d]ebris represents a growing problem whose serious-
ness depends on future traffic and debris management”,76 indicates the close correla-
tion and complementary relationship between STM and ADR.  This is hardly 
surprising, for the telos of both STM and ADR arguably is the mitigation of risk 
through the prevention of collisions between space objects that will produce irremedi-
able debris—the ultimate harm to the space environment. So far as the common ele-
ment of ‘risk’ attending space activities and its collective management are concerned, 
ADR and STM are simply two sides to the same coin. Indeed, not only is the above 
procedural constellation of legal obligations directly applicable to removal activities, 
removal activities themselves would appear to emerge therefrom as compulsory.
Tentatively, any state that retains jurisdiction and control over a defunct space 
object pursuant to Article VIII OST or responsibility for national space activities on 
the basis of Article VI OST—alternatively, the state that is internationally respon-
sible pursuant to general rules for the attribution of particular conduct—will act in 
breach of the substantive obligation to respect the space environment so long as it 
neglects to remove that object77 ipso facto carrying a risk of collision. Insofar as it 
is impossible to precisely predict when a collision might occur, inter alia due to 
collisional hazards posed by nontrackable debris or due to the imprecision of statis-
tical models of the space object population for the calculation of collisional risk, the 
breach must be assumed to occur after passage of a reasonable yet brief period of 
time, commencing from the moment a space object becomes defunct—or, by exten-
sion, uncontrollable. Once that period has elapsed, the international responsibility 
of the relevant state will have been engaged, whereupon the secondary obligation of 
reparation ideally will entail rapid compulsory removal of the object or the reestab-
lishment of effective control through on-orbit servicing.78 Once more, we might 
76 As quoted in W.B. Wirin, supra note 18, 184.
77 It is widely accepted that wrongful conduct by a state can consist of an act or of an omission, on 
which see supra, note 53.
78 It is doubtful whether such a form of reparation is technically possible at present or not too dis-
proportionately costly in any case, thereby precluding application of an obligation of restoration to 
the status quo ante, on which see W. Munters, supra note 23. This will heighten the importance of 
adherence to mitigative measures such as post-mission disposal and also should entail, at a very 
minimum, a more stringent obligation to update the status of the space object in the registry held by 
the United Nations Secretary General and UNOOSA. Under this legal construction, compensation 
may likely also be claimed under the Liability Convention by any entity having to expend propul-
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look to 50-year old space law doctrine, stating that “[b]efore long it will become 
mandatory for states to remove from orbit unmanned space vehicles and debris that 
pose a hazard to spacecraft navigation”.79
Finally, if space activities sensu lato are beset by significant risks, then active 
removal constitutes an especially risky activity. The relevant obligations to notify, 
consult and coordinate are thus engaged in an arguably even stricter manner. This 
adds considerable weight to proposals in the literature for an international organisa-
tion related to ADR.80 Moreover, some proposed means by which to perform 
removal activities carry an increased risk over others, and obligations may have 
some role to play as to circumscribing the reasonable choice of the technology to be 
employed. In addition, we might expect the high level of risk inherent in ADR to 
necessitate an extremely precautious approach to removal activities;81 one that 
extends in ambit well beyond the risk to the space environment. The recent example 
of the re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere by the Chinese Tiangong-1 spacecraft serves 
to remind us of the risk posed on Earth by the wholesale removal of objects from space 
into the atmosphere in the near future. An impressive international coalition of 
space agencies and the IADC closely monitored the object’s re-entry. Apart from 
the obvious argument for increased international cooperation and coordination, it 
will be borne in mind that removal activities can and will fail to adhere to best-case 
scenarios for their successful completion. As a result of possible failure, additional 
debris might either be created in orbit, or pieces of debris might survive re-entry 
over populated areas.82 Therefore, let us fully accept that a plethora of fundamental 
questions related to the many risks attending space activities and its collective man-
agement are still to be resolved. Perhaps now is the time for us to start answering 
them.
sive means—placing considerable cost on the entity—for acting in breach of a substantive obliga-
tion will lead to the establishment of fault on the part of the state acting in a wrongful manner.
79 C.R.  Hall, “Comments on Salvage and Removal of Man-made Objects from Outer Space”, 
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 1967, Vol. 33, 288. See also W.B. Wirin, supra note 18, 184.
80 On which see W. Munters and J. Wouters, “The Road Not Yet Taken for Defusing Conflict in 
Active Debris Removal: a Multilateral Organisation”, in M.  Manoli and S.B.  Habchi (Eds.), 
Monograph Series IV: Conflicts in Space and the Rule of Law, Montreal, McGill Centre for 
Research in Air and Space Law, 2017, 145–171.
81 Although this might have been understated in the current chapter due to a lack of scope, the tenta-
tive application of a precautionary approach or a legal precautionary principle to space activities 
bears consideration and should not be summarily dismissed on the basis of a ‘sound science’ 
approach to risk. We can foresee considerable difficulty, however, since “while scientific method-
ologies can be employed in order to disclose uncertainties and value judgments in a transparent 
fashion, they also lend themselves to misuse for political ends.” On competing risk regulatory para-
digms and the distinction, or otherwise, between “sound science and precautionary principle risk 
regulatory paradigms”, as well as for quotes herein, see J. Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in 
International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 151, et seq. See also supra, 
note 19.
82 Consider that “if falling debris causes a death, it may significantly alter the discussion about 
liability, especially in the effected [sic] country. As a result, operators must consider the risk and 
political cost of deorbiting an object and the risk of doing terrestrial damage, versus the risk of 
leaving the object in space for many decades.” H. Schaub et al., supra note 24, 72.
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8.4  Concluding Remarks
Over the course of the preceding pages I have attempted to demonstrate, and legally 
motivate, the urgent need for the international community to arrive at a common 
construction of the risk attending space activities and of the manner in which to col-
lectively manage it.
How to precisely define, calculate, manage or even just conceptualise such an 
abstract notion of risk so as to render it operable to a sufficient degree is an alto-
gether different matter of staggering complexity. It requires simultaneous and con-
tinuous input from a host of different disciplines and spacefaring entities. But it 
would appear to be self-evident that it will prove difficult not to improperly discount 
the role of risk in connection with mankind’s activities in outer space so long as dif-
ferent entities wield divergent, and perhaps incommensurable, notions of risk, of its 
sustainable thresholds, or of the effective process for the management thereof.
As concerns the management of that risk, I have noted the especially close rela-
tionship between space traffic management (STM) and active debris removal 
(ADR). They are simply two sides to the same coin, and they are inseparable insofar 
as they aim to prevent the cardinal risk posed by collisions between space objects—
and thereby to prevent irreparable harm to the space environment. Although it is 
difficult to draw the line between lex lata and lex ferenda in international environ-
mental and space law, at present it is plausible that legal obligations can be said to 
exist that not only (1) compel states to closely consult and coordinate with each 
other when carrying on space activities—much more closely than is the case 
today—but that also (2) impose a duty to remove defunct or uncontrollable objects. 
Perhaps the time has come for those interested in preserving the utility of the most 
valuable, and therefore most populous parts, of circum-terrestrial space to seek to 
enforce those obligations. At least, one can imagine.
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Chapter 9
United States Law and Policy on Space  
Debris
Zhuang Tian
Abstract The purpose of this article is to analyze how the problem of space debris 
is dealt with on the national level. The law and policy of the U.S. will serve as an 
example for such analysis. The U.S. has established a comprehensive legal regime 
and has promulgated several national policies to confront the space debris chal-
lenge. The function of implementation and regulation of space activities is divided 
among several national agencies in the U.S. Each agency has developed its own 
rules and standards on space debris. These rules and standards conform to the best 
practices as contained in the space debris mitigation guidelines. On the policy level, 
it has been three decades since the issue of space debris was first mentioned in U.S. 
national space policy, and there has been a constant concern over space debris ever 
since. The evolution of U.S. national space policy on space debris can be summa-
rized as from interior to exterior, from general to elaborate, and from debris mitiga-
tion to debris remediation.
9.1  Introduction
With the growing number of space activities and space actors, the problem of space 
debris may further deteriorate. At the 56th session of the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 2013, the Committee urged states to implement 
space debris mitigation measures consistent with the IADC Guidelines1 and 
1 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 
referred to in this note as the IADC Guidelines.
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COPUOS Guidelines2 or to develop their own space debris mitigation standards 
based on those guidelines.3 An analysis of national space law and policy may illus-
trate to what extent these guidelines are implemented. As commented by Gunnar 
Leinberg, any international resolution regarding space debris should consider the 
current space policies of various spacefaring nations.4 An analysis of those policies 
will help recognize the various interests that need to be recognized and will help 
focus any international discussions.5 This note aims to analyze how the issue of 
space debris is addressed on the national level. To this end, the case of the U.S. will 
be used as an example.
9.2  Agency Responsible for the Regulation of Space 
Activities
The U.S. has divided the function of implementation and regulation of space activi-
ties among several governmental agencies, as follows:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which is the leading 
federal agency performing research, technology, and development of aeronauti-
cal and space science, exploration, and application;
The Department of Transportation (DOT), which licenses and promotes commer-
cial launch operations, issues launch and payload approvals in conjunction with 
other agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which 
regulates radio frequencies for telecommunications, broadcasting and other 
purposes;
The Department of Commerce (DOC), whose National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) engages in remote sensing, gathers data, conducts 
research, and makes predictions about the Earth’s environment, and whose Office 
of Space Commercialization coordinates space-related issues and programs 
within DOC; and
The Department of Defense (DOD), which uses space for intelligence gathering, 
communications, and potentially, for missile defense.6
2 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
referred to in this note as the COPUOS Guidelines.
3 UN Doc. A/68/20, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Fifty-sixth ses-
sion (12–21 June 2013).
4 Gunnar Leinberg, “Orbital Space Debris.” JL & Tech. 4 (1989): 94.
5 Id.
6 Paul Stephen Dempsey. “Overview of the United States Space Policy and Law.” National 
Regulation of Space Activities. Space Regulations Library; Vol. 5. 238232972. New York, NY 
[etc.]: Springer (2010): 373–374.
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9.3  U.S. Policy on Space Debris
Policies of the U.S. government regarding space can be found in both the language 
of statutes promulgated by Congress (wherein the Congress declares national pol-
icy), and in directives, executive orders and other communications of the President.7
Beginning in 1984 with the Commercial Space Launch Act, and continuing 
through the present with NASA and DOD efforts to reduce debris and move inop-
erative satellites out of high-demand orbits, the U.S. has made debris reduction an 
important objective of its space policy.8 In 1988, the issue of space debris was first 
mentioned in the national space policy of the Reagan Administration, which stated 
that,
[A]ll space sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space debris. Design and opera-
tions of space tests, experiments and systems will strive to minimize or reduce accumula-
tion of space debris consistent with mission requirements and cost-effectiveness.9
Noting the lack of good measurements of the orbital debris environment, the 
U.S. government issued a report on orbital debris in the following year, calling for 
the NASA and the DOD to develop a plan to monitor the debris environment.10 This 
report was updated in 1995, issuing five recommendations for the mitigation of 
space debris.11
Reiterating what had been mentioned in the previous national space policy, the 
national space policy issued by the Bush Administration in 1989 added that,
The United States government will encourage other spacefaring nations to adopt policies 
and practices aimed at debris minimization.12
The mitigation of space debris was also identified as one of the priority inter- 
sector guidances to support major U.S. space policy objectives in the national space 
policy issued by President Clinton in 1996.13 In addition to reaffirming the earlier 
policy by calling for U.S. government agencies to minimize the creation of space 
debris, the 1996 Policy also required NASA, the intelligence community, and DOD, 
in cooperation with the private sector, to develop design guidelines for future 
Government procurements of spacecraft, launch vehicles, and services. Moreover, 
7 Id. at 373.
8 NASA Policy Directive 8710, Policy to Limit Orbital Debris Generation; U.S. Space Command 
(USSPACECOM) Regulation 57-2, Minimization and Mitigation of Space Debris (Jun. 6, 1991). 
Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, “Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and 
National Security Implications.” 55 A.F. L. Rev. 157, 232 (2004): 212.
9 Presidential Directive on National Space Policy, dated 11 February 1988 (Reagan era).
10 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “Launch Activity and Orbital Debris Mitigation”. 
Second Quarter 2002 Quarterly Launch Report, at 11.
11 Id.
12 National Space Policy Directives and Executive Charter, NSPD-1, dated 2 November 1989 
(G.H.W. Bush era).
13 Presidential Decision Directive, National Space Policy, NSTC-8, dated 19 September 1996 
(Clinton era).
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the 1996 Policy mentioned that the U.S. Government would take a leadership role 
in international forums to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris 
minimization.14
On 31 August 2006, President Bush authorized a new national space policy that 
established an overarching national policy to govern the conduct of U.S. space 
activities, which superseded the previous national policy of 1996.15
In recognizing the risks imposed by space debris, the 2006 policy stated that the 
U.S. should seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non- 
government operations in space to preserve the space environment for future gen-
erations.16 Towards that end:
Departments and agencies shall continue to follow the United States Government Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, consistent with mission requirements and cost effec-
tiveness, in the procurement and operation of spacecraft, launch services, and the operation 
of tests and experiments in space;
The Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation, in coordination with the Chairman of 
the Federal Communications Commission, shall continue to address orbital debris issues 
through their respective licensing procedures; and
The United States shall take a leadership role in international fora to encourage foreign 
nations and international organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris mini-
mization and shall cooperate in the exchange of information on debris research and the 
identification of improved debris mitigation practices.17
The latest National Space Policy was issued by the Obama Administration on 28 
June 2010, which provided comprehensive guidance for all government activities in 
space, including the commercial, civil, and national security space sectors.18
In its introduction, the policy states that “decades of space activity have littered 
Earth’s orbit with debris,” which “can have damaging consequences for all of us,” 
owing to “the now ubiquitous and interconnected nature of space capabilities and 
the world’s growing dependence on them.”19 It further states that,
As the leading space-faring nation, the United States is committed to addressing these chal-
lenges. But this cannot be the responsibility of the United States alone. All nations have the 
right to use and explore space, but with this right also comes responsibility. The United 
States, therefore, calls on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible 
activity in space to preserve this right for the benefit of future generations.20
One of the goals the U.S. would pursue in its national space program as set in the 
2010 Policy is the strengthening of measures to mitigate orbital debris.21 Moreover, 
14 FAA, supra note 11, at 10.
15 National Space Policy, dated 31 August 2006 (G. W. Bush era).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 National Space Policy of the Unite States of America, dated 28 June 2010 (Obama era). See 
http://www.space.commerce.gov/policy/national-space-policy.
19 Id. at 1.
20 Id. at 2.
21 Id. at 4.
Z. Tian
159
the Policy identifies space surveillance for debris monitoring and awareness as an 
area for potential international cooperation.22 The most relevant guideline concerns 
the preservation of the space environment, which stated that,
For the purposes of minimizing debris and preserving the space environment for the respon-
sible, peaceful, and safe use of all users, the United States shall:
Lead the continued development and adoption of international and industry standards 
and policies to minimize debris, such as the United Nations Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines;
Develop, maintain, and use space situational awareness (SSA) information from com-
mercial, civil, and national security sources to detect, identify, and attribute actions in space 
that are contrary to responsible use and the long-term sustainability of the space 
environment;
Continue to follow the United States Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices, consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness, in the procurement 
and operation of spacecraft, launch services, and the conduct of tests and experiments in 
space;
Pursue research and development of technologies and techniques, through the 
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the 
Secretary of Defense, to mitigate and remove on-orbit debris, reduce hazards, and increase 
understanding of the current and future debris environment; and
Require the head of the sponsoring department or agency to approve exceptions to the 
United States Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices and notify the 
Secretary of State.23
It was the first time that the removal of space debris was addressed on the 
national space policy level. The 2010 Policy reveals an increasing concern of the 
U.S. about debris remediation. In fact, the concept of debris removal has already 
been mentioned in another U.S. policy in 2005. The Transportation Policy of 2005 
stated that “the United States shall … pursue research and development of in-space 
transportation capabilities … including but not limited to: automated rendezvous 
and docking, and the ability to deploy, service, and retrieve payloads or spacecraft 
in orbit”.24
To foster the development of space collision warning measures, the 2010 Policy 
further stated that,
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Administrator of NASA, and other departments and agencies, may collaborate with indus-
try and foreign nations to: maintain and improve space object databases; pursue common 
international data standards and data integrity measures; and provide services and 
22 Id. at 7.
23 Id. at 7–8.
24 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16, “Active Debris Removal — An Essential Mechanism for 
Ensuring the Safety and Sustainability of Outer Space, A Report of the International Interdisciplinary 
Congress on Space Debris Remediation and On-Orbit Satellite Servicing.” (27 January 2012) 
(hereinafter referred to as the Report on ADR and OOS) at 37. See http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/
limited/c1/AC105_C1_2012_CRP16E.pdf.
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 disseminate orbital tracking information to commercial and international entities, including 
predictions of space object conjunction.25
From a broader picture, there is a great difference between the 2006 Policy and 
the 2010 Policy, which concerns Anti-Satellite weapons (ASAT) and is thus relevant 
to space debris. The 2006 Policy stated that the U.S. government “rejects any limita-
tions on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data 
from space,” a phrase that was interpreted as giving the green light to the develop-
ment and use of anti-satellite weapons.26 The 2006 Policy also stated that Washington 
would “oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek 
to prohibit or limit U.S. access or use of space,” a phrase that effectively ruled out 
arms control.27
According to an administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonym-
ity, “this policy is not about developing or deploying weapons in space.”28 The offi-
cial further said that new arms control agreements were not needed because there is 
no space arms race.29 Nevertheless, skepticism remains.30 In fact, there are some 
allegations that, in secret, the Bush administration engaged in research that critics 
said could produce a powerful ground-based laser, among other potential weapons 
meant to shatter enemy satellites in orbit.31
By contrast, the 2010 policy renounced the unilateral stance of the Bush admin-
istration and instead emphasized international cooperation, including the possibility 
of an arms control treaty that would limit the development of space weapons.32 In its 
principles, the new policy stated that,
It is the shared interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, 
misperceptions, and mistrust. The United States considers the sustainability, stability, and 
free access to, and use of, space vital to its national interests. Space operations should be 
conducted in ways that emphasize openness and transparency to improve public awareness 
of the activities of government, and enable others to share in the benefits provided by the 
use of space.33
This principle focuses on the transparency and confidence-building, as well as 
the sustainability and stability of space, both of which will contribute to the mitiga-
tion of space debris.
25 National Space Policy of the Unite States of America (2010), supra note 19, at 8.
26 William J. Broad and Kenneth Chang, “Obama Reverses Bush’s Space Policy”. 28 June 2010. 
See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/science/space/29orbit.html.
27 Id.
28 Joan Johnson-Freese, “Space as a Strategic Asset.” Columbia University Press (2007): 237.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 William J. Broad and Kenneth Chang, “Obama Reverses Bush’s Space Policy”. 28 June 2010. 
See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/science/space/29orbit.html.
32 Id.
33 National Space Policy of the Unite States of America (2010), supra note 19, at 3.
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9.4  U.S. Law on Space Debris
With the division of regulatory authority of space activities among several agencies, 
the function of regulating space debris is divided accordingly. The rules, standards, 
and guidelines of NASA and DOD has been examined extensively by Michael 
W. Taylor.34 Moreover, NASA and DOD are in charge of civil and military space 
activities respectively, which are not the focus of this paper. Hence, emphasis will 
be put on the rules and requirements of DOT, DOC, and FCC, the three agencies 
that are authorized to license commercial space activity.35
9.4.1  Debris Mitigation Under FCC
The FCC is the U.S. agency responsible for licensing radio transmissions by private 
entities, including transmissions by satellite.36 In June of 2004, the FCC adopted a 
comprehensive set of regulations concerning mitigation of orbital debris, which 
applies to the licensing of commercial U.S. satellites and to the use of non-U.S. 
satellites to provide service in the U.S.37 The rules require submission, prior to 
authorization, of a description of the design and operational strategies the satellite 
system will use to mitigate orbital debris.38 This information will be examined by 
the FCC to determine whether “the public interest, convenience, and necessity will 
be served by the granting of such application” before issuance of any license.39 FCC 
regulations also require that geostationary satellites be relocated at end-of-mission 
in accordance with the IADC guideline, and all satellites must discharge stored 
energy sources at end-of-mission.40
The above-mentioned disclosure and operational requirements can be roughly 
classified into three categories: (a) disclosure concerning collision avoidance mea-
sures with other large objects during normal operations; (b) disclosure and opera-
tional requirements concerning post-mission disposal, including the de-orbiting of 
34 Michael W. Taylor, “Orbital Debris: Technical and Legal Issues and Solutions.” Thesis submit-
ted to Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Montreal, August 2006: 52–59.
35 Mark K. Sundahl, “Regulating Non-traditional Space Activities in the United States in the Wake 
of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act.” Air and Space Law 42, No. 1 (2017): 31.
36 K.  Kensinger, S.  Duall, and S.  Persaud, “The United States Federal Communications 
Commission’s Regulations Concerning Mitigation of Orbital Debris.” Proceedings of the 4th 
European Conference on Space Debris (ESA SP-587), at 571.
37 Id.
38 47 CFR § 5.64(b), § 25.114(c)(14), § 97.207(g)(1).
39 47 U.S.C. § 309—Application for license. See also “the United States of America - UNOOSA 
Compendium of space debris mitigation standards adopted by States and international organiza-
tions (UNOOSA Compendium).” http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-debris/
compendium.html.
40 47 CFR § 25.283 End-of-life disposal. See also the United States of America—UNOOSA 
Compendium, id.
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geostationary satellites and the discharge of stored energy sources; and, (c) 
 disclosure concerning assessment and analyses designed to prevent the space 
objects from becoming a source of debris, either through planned operations or 
through system failure during normal operations,41 as well as spacecraft shielding to 
prevent loss of control due to collision with small debris, efforts to minimize explo-
sions, and control of debris released during normal operations.42
All the seven UN Guidelines can find their origins in the above requirements 
which reflect the “best practice” nature of these guidelines. Indeed, the FCC’s rules 
and policies incorporate the latest recommendations of the IADC and ITU and thus 
provide a comprehensive framework for review and regulation of the debris mitiga-
tion practices of commercial spacecraft operations.43
9.4.2  Debris Mitigation Under NOAA
On 18 December 2010, President Barack Obama signed PL 111-34 (H.R.) 3237 into 
law, which promulgated Title 51 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), entitled 
National and Commercial Space Programs, and is the compilation of the general 
laws governing space programs.44
Subtitle VI of the National and Commercial Space Programs law, titled Earth 
Observations (referred to this note as the Earth Observations Act) applies to all U.S. 
operators of commercial remote sensing satellites. According to the Earth 
Observations Act, a license is a prerequisite for the operation of private remote sens-
ing spacecraft.45 To obtain such a license, one of the conditions is that the licensee 
shall, upon termination of operations under the license, make disposition of any 
satellites in space in a manner satisfactory to the President.46 Moreover, written 
compliance with U.S. orbital debris and disposal policies and best practices is also 
a prerequisite for obtaining a license.47
NOAA issues regulations establishing the agency’s requirements for the licensing, 
monitoring and compliance of operators of private Earth remote sensing space sys-
tems under the Earth Observations Act.48 These regulations implement the provisions 
of the Earth Observations Act and the 2003 U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy.49
Under these requirements, space debris is defined as all human-generated debris 
in Earth orbit, which includes, but is not limited to, payloads that can no longer 
41 Kensinger, supra note 37, at 572.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 575.
44 Rupert W. Anderson. “The Cosmic Compendium: Space Law.” Lulu. com (2015): 94.
45 51 U.S.C. § 60122 (2012).
46 Id.





perform their mission, rocket bodies and other hardware (e.g., bolt fragments and 
covers) left in orbit as a result of normal launch and operational activities, and frag-
mentation debris produced by failure or collision.50 Gases and liquids in free state 
are not considered orbital debris.51
The licensing requirement that the licensee shall, upon termination of operations 
under the license, make disposition of any satellites in space in a manner satisfac-
tory to the President, is interpreted by NOAA as meaning that a licensee shall assess 
and minimize the amount of orbital debris released during the post-mission disposal 
of its satellite.52 Applicants are required to provide at the time of application a plan 
for post-mission disposition of remote sensing satellites.53 NOAA will review an 
applicant’s plan for post-mission disposal on a case-by-case basis, to assess whether 
the plan, including satellite design and components, provides an acceptable post- 
mission disposal method to mitigate orbital debris and minimize any potential 
adverse effects.54 Applicants are specifically required to submit a casualty risk 
assessment if planned post-mission disposal involves atmospheric re-entry of the 
spacecraft.55
9.4.3  Debris Mitigation Under DOT
The FAA, under the purview of the DOT, is responsible for issuing licenses to per-
sons launching a launch vehicle from U.S. launch sites, reentering a reentry vehicle 
to U.S. sites, or operating a launch or reentry site within the U.S.56 The FAA issues 
licenses to commercial launch vehicles after a rigorous evaluation of the safety of 
the launch system, and revokes licenses or imposes a fine if at any time the license 
holder does not comply with the conditions of the license and the FAA orbital debris 
mitigation regulations.57
The current FAA orbital debris mitigation regulations focus on safety at the end 
of launch, which is defined by the FAA as the last exercise of control over the launch 
vehicle.58 In Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 415.39, the FAA 
requires expendable launch vehicle (ELV) launch license applicants to demonstrate 
that: (1) there will be no unplanned contact between the vehicle, its components, 
50 NOAA. 15 CFR Part 960 Licensing of Private Land Remote-Sensing Space Systems; Final Rule, 
at 24483. See http://library.blountsfolly.com/space/files/original/43aef50ff3d49db534edb230ede8
179e.pdf.
51 Id.




56 14 CFR § 413.3 (b).
57 The United States of America—UNOOSA Compendium, supra note 40.
58 Id.
9 United States Law and Policy on Space Debris
164
and payload after payload separation; (2) no debris will be generated from the con-
version of chemical, pressure, and kinetic energy sources into energy that fragments 
the vehicle or its components; and (3) stored energy must be removed by depleting 
residual fuel and leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system, 
leaving all batteries in permanent discharge state, and removing any remaining 
source of stored energy.59 While § 415.39 applies to ELVs, 14 CFR § 431.43 speci-
fies that the first two of the above stipulations apply to reusable launch and re-entry 
vehicles, and also requires a reusable vehicle operator to perform a collision avoid-
ance analysis to ensure a 200-km separation between the vehicle and an inhabitable 
orbiting object during launch and re-entry.60
In sum, the FAA requires the limitation of space debris released during launch, 
the use of safe energy, and the minimization of potential for post-mission break-ups 
resulting from stored energy. However, the FAA does not require the de-orbit or re- 
orbit of upper stages.
9.4.4  Debris Mitigation Under NASA
NASA has developed a framework of requirements for limiting debris creation by 
NASA-related payloads, instruments, launch vehicles, and mission-related debris.61 
An update to the NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) for Limiting Orbital 
Debris and Evaluating the Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Environment, NPR 
8715.6B, became official on 15 February 2017.62 NPR 8715.6B replaced the previ-
ous version, NPR 8715.6A with Change 1, which was released on 25 May 2012.63
The purpose of the NPR is to define various roles, responsibilities, and require-
ments to ensure that NASA, including its mission partners, providers, and contrac-
tors, takes steps to preserve the near-Earth space environment, in accordance with 
the U.S. National Space Policy and the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Standard Practices to mitigate the risk to space missions and human life due to 
orbital debris and meteoroids.64 The new NPR contains several key changes, among 
which two require particular attention. First, concerning its applicability, “this NPR 
is applicable to programs and projects responsible for NASA or NASA-sponsored 
objects launched into space to the extent that Federal authority to oversee the miti-
gation of orbital debris for those missions or portions thereof does not reside with 
another Federal department or agency.”65 In other words, its applicability is limited 
59 FAA, supra note 11, at 11.
60 Id.




65 Art. 2(b), NPR 8715.6B.
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to missions that do not fall under the regulatory authority of another U.S. federal 
department or agency.66 Second, this new NPR establishes a process to notify the 
Secretary of State for any non-compliance with the U.S. Government Orbital Debris 
Mitigation Standard Practices, as required by the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy.67 
Such Standard Practices will be discussed below.
9.5  U.S. Space Debris Mitigation Standard
In 1997, an interagency working group led by NASA and DOD created a set of 
U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (referred to in this 
note as the “Standard Practices”).68 The Standard Practices were presented to U.S. 
industry in 1998, and after further consultation with industry, the Standard Practices 
were adopted in February 2001.69 Based on a NASA safety standard of procedures 
for limiting debris, the Standard Practices are intended for government-operated or 
procured space systems, including satellites as well as launch vehicles.70 The inter-
agency working group has shared the guidelines with the aerospace industry to 
encourage voluntary compliance.71
The Standard Practices cover all program phases, from initial concept develop-
ment to space hardware disposal, focusing on: the minimization of intentional 
debris releases and the occurrence of accidental explosions; the avoidance of haz-
ardous collisions; and, responsible disposal of space hardware.72 They serve as the 
overall U.S.  Government space debris mitigation technical guidance and as the 
foundation for specific orbital debris mitigation requirements issued by individual 
U.S. government departments and agencies.73
9.6  Conclusion
At the 53rd session of the UN COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, 
many Member States expressed concern at the challenges presented by space 
debris.74 The U.S. statement on Space Debris emphasized the importance of the UN 
66 NASA, supra note 62, at 1.
67 Id.
68 FAA, supra note 11, at 10.
69 The United State of America—UNOOSA Compendium, supra note 40.
70 FAA, supra note 11, at 10.
71 Id.
72 The United State of America—UNOOSA Compendium, supra note 40.
73 Id.
74 NASA, “Orbital Debris Quarterly News.” Volume 20, Issues 1 & 2 April 2016, at 5.
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Guidelines and called on all space-faring nations and organizations to implement 
these guidelines to limit the generation of space debris.75
As a reflection of the U.S. position at international level, the U.S. has issued 
several policies and established a comprehensive legal regime to confront the space 
debris challenge. The evolution of the national space policy concerning space debris 
can be summarized as from interior to exterior, from general to elaborate, and from 
debris mitigation to debris remediation.
From interior to exterior means that, in the beginning, the policy only required 
all space sectors to seek to minimize the creation of space debris. Subsequently, a 
policy was added which required the U.S. government to encourage other spacefar-
ing nations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization. These two 
policies, with some slight adjustment made in the following policies, constitute two 
cornerstones of U.S. policy concerning space debris.
From general to elaborate means that, at the outset, only some general require-
ments were stated, e.g., requirements to “seek to minimize” or “strive to minimize” 
the generation of space debris, without specifying how these shall be fulfilled. 
Those general requirements are elaborated in the following policies, especially the 
2010 Policy. From an administrative perspective, the 2010 Policy requires that the 
head of a sponsoring department or agency must specifically approve any excep-
tions to the Standard Practices and notify the Secretary of State.76 From a technical 
perspective, the 2010 Policy emphasized on the development, maintenance and use 
of space situational awareness (SSA) information, as well as the development of 
space collision warning measures.77
From debris mitigation to debris remediation means that the concept of debris 
removal now appears on the national space policy level. According to the 2010 
National Space Policy, the United States shall pursue research and development of 
technologies and techniques, through the Administrator of NASA and the Secretary 
of Defense, to mitigate and remove on-orbit debris.78
The impetus for the U.S. to play a leading role in space debris mitigation may be 
originated from its national interests. By possessing the most mature commercial 
space industry as well as the most advanced space technology in the world, the U.S. 
is the most capable nation to reap economic, political and social benefits from space 
applications, and the most technologically enabled state to carry out space debris 
mitigation maneuvers. Indeed, what the U.S. does in this regard is consistent with 
the overall interests of the international community. To slow down and even to 
reverse the growth trends of space debris, the whole world shall make efforts in this 
direction.
Licensing procedures are the main tool used by the U.S. to regulate and super-
vise the creation of space debris in commercial space activities. Several agencies are 
75 Id.
76 National Space Policy of the Unite States of America (2010), supra note 19, at 8.
77 Id. at 7–8.
78 Id. at 7.
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involved in this regulation: the FCC authorizes the use of radio spectrum for 
 telecommunications as well as the use of orbital slots by satellites; the DOT (through 
the FAA) exercises authority over the launch and reentry of spacecraft, but its 
authority does not extend to activities in orbit or beyond; and the DOC (through 
NOAA) exercises authority over remote sensing of the Earth from space.79 These 
agencies have established their licensing requirements for commercial space activi-
ties respectively, with space debris mitigation being one of these requirements.
Zhuang Tian was born and raised in Guangzhou, China. He is now a Ph.D. candidate at Leiden 
University. His research interest is in space law, specifically the legal aspects of space debris miti-
gation and remediation. He has obtained his LL.M. degree in Air and Space Law at Leiden 
University and LL.B. degree at Sun Yat-sen University.
79 Sundahl, supra note 36, at 31.
9 United States Law and Policy on Space Debris
169© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 
A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Security and Legal Aspects of Active Debris Removal, 
Studies in Space Policy 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90338-5_10
Chapter 10
The Finnish Space Activities Act and Active 
Debris Removal
Maija Lönnqvist
Abstract The Finnish Act on Space Activities entered into force on 23 January 
2018. The Act was signed by the President the same day as the first commercial 
Finnish satellite was launched to outer space. The objective of the new Act is to cre-
ate a predictable and legally transparent environment for national space activities 
and to ensure the safety of the activities as well as the sustainable use of outer space.
10.1  Introduction
Finland has just enacted the national Act on Space Activities.1 The Act was pro-
posed by the Government to the Parliament at the end of October, accepted by the 
Parliament at the end of December 2017 and, following confirmation by the 
President, entered into force on 23 January 2018. The Act is complemented by a 
Decree of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, which entered into 
force the same day. Before the new Act and Decree, there was no legislation to regu-
late activities related to the launching and operating of satellites.
The development of the Finnish space sector made it important to define precon-
ditions for space activities at the level of legislation. The first Finnish nanosatellite, 
AALTO I,2 by Aalto University, was launched in June 2017 and there are several 
plans for other nanosatellites, also on a commercial basis. By coincidence, the first 
commercial Finnish satellite, Iceye X-1 by Iceye Ltd,3 was launched on 12 January 
2018, the same day as the President of Finland signed the new Act on Space 
Activities.
1 More information on Finnish space law and space policy in http://tem.fi/en/space.
2 http://aalto1.fi/aalto1_in_english.html.
3 https://www.iceye.com/. See also http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-42648391#.
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Finland has been a state party to three of the five UN space treaties4 since the 
1970s: the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, and the Rescue Agreement. 
In parallel to the new Act, Finland acceded to the UN Registration Convention in 
January 2018. There is no intention currently to accede to the Moon Agreement. 
Through the new Act, the obligations of UN treaties are among the responsibilities 
of operators of space activities.
The objective of the new legislation is to define the rights, obligations and 
responsibilities of different actors, to create a predictable and legally transparent 
environment for national space activities, and to ensure that the state is kept aware 
of all space activities practised in its territory and by its nationals. The intention is 
to create a flexible authorization process that enhances the development of new 
technologies and business opportunities.
The Act follows the established international practice and is built on the so-called 
building blocks as introduced in UN resolution 68/74 of 2013, “Recommendations 
on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space as well as the ILA Sofia Guidelines for a Model Law on National Space 
Legislation”.5 Thus it contains provisions on authorization of space activities and 
conditions for authorization, registration of space objects, liability and regress right, 
transfers, and supervision as well as space debris.
The Act was prepared by a working group established by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment.6 The members of the working group represented the rele-
vant ministries and governmental agencies, universities and industry—their expertise 
ranging from space technology and research to law and business.
10.2  Summary of the Provisions of the Act
The scope of the Finnish act on space activities is space activities within the terri-
tory of Finland or on vessels or aircraft registered in Finland, as well as space activi-
ties by Finnish citizens or by legal persons incorporated in Finland.7 The Act applies 
to both governmental and non-governmental space activities. However, provisions 
4 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty); Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue 
Agreement); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability 
Convention); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration 
Convention); Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (Moon Agreement).
5 UN document A/AC.105/C.2/2013/CRP.6  in http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_
C2_2013_CRP06E.pdf (22.1.2018).
6 Press release: https://tem.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/tyoryhma- valmistelemaan- kansallista- 
avaruuslainsaadantoa?_101_INSTANCE_KbgSvtizPgsM_languageId=en_US.
7 Section 1 of the Act on Space Activities.
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on authorization, insurance and supervision are not applied to space activities by the 
national defence forces.8
According to the Act, space activities means launching space objects into outer 
space, operation and control of space objects in outer space, and returning space 
objects to the Earth. Space object means any object launched or intended to be 
launched into outer space, including the component parts of such an object, and any 
device and its component parts used or intended to be used for launching an object 
into outer space. Operator means a natural or legal person who is responsible for the 
carrying out of space activities.9
Space activities may only be carried out subject to prior authorization by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment.10 The authorization may be issued 
on condition that the operator has the necessary technical and financial qualifica-
tions for carrying on space activities and that, according to a risk assessment, the 
space activity does not pose any particular danger to persons, property or public 
safety. Moreover, it is required that the operator strives to prevent the generation of 
space debris and adverse environmental impacts on the Earth, in the atmosphere, 
and in outer space, including a plan for terminating the activities in outer space; that 
the activities in outer space are compatible with national security interests, Finland’s 
international obligations and Finland’s foreign policy interests; that the operator 
meets the possible requirements for insurance; and that the operator complies with 
the rules of the International Telecommunications Union and export control legisla-
tion. Transfer of the space activity to another operator is subject to prior authoriza-
tion by the Ministry and the same conditions for authorization.11
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment maintains a registry of space 
objects.12 The basic information on a space object is recorded in the registry and 
includes: the launching states, the name of the operator, the designator or registra-
tion number of the space object, the general function of the space object, the date 
and place of launch and the launch vehicle, and the basic orbital parameters, includ-
ing nodal period, inclination, apogee and perigee. Besides space objects whose state 
of registration is Finland, in accordance with the Registration Convention, the reg-
ister will contain information on space objects that are transferred to Finnish opera-
tors in cases where Finland is not considered a launching state.
The state has the right to recover from the operator compensation paid to an 
injured party.13 For damages caused on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight 
or its passengers or crew, the state has the right to recover the paid compensation 
from the operator even if the operator had not caused the damage deliberately or 
negligently. The maximum amount of the state’s right of recourse in these cases is 
8 Section 3 of the Act on Space Activities.
9 Section 4 of the Act on Space Activities.
10 Section 5 of the Act on Space Activities.
11 Section 11 of the Act on Space Activities.
12 Section 6 of the Act on Space Activities.
13 Section 7 of the Act on Space Activities.
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60 million euros, unless the operator has failed to comply with the Act or the condi-
tions attached to the authorization. For damages in outer space, the state has the 
right to recover the paid compensation to the extent that the operator would have 
been liable for the damage to the injured party under the national Tort Liability Act. 
In these cases, there is no limitation on the maximum liability.
The operator shall take out insurance against damage caused by the space activi-
ties to third parties.14 The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment may 
refrain from requiring the insurance if the insurance of the launching company cov-
ers the operator’s liability for damage caused by the space activities to third parties, 
or if, on the basis of the risk assessment of the space activities, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment can accept the risk of damages on Earth, in the 
airspace and in outer space.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment supervises space activities 
through operators’ obligation to inform the ministry of any changes in the space 
activities15 and to report to the ministry annually on the status of the space activi-
ties.16 The ministry has the right to obtain any information necessary for the 
supervision,17 it can conduct necessary inspections of the premises and documents18 
and it can amend or withdraw the authorization if the operator has violated the pro-
visions of the act or the conditions attached to the authorization.19 A fine may be 
imposed to an operator carrying out space activities without authorization or 
neglecting certain obligations of the Act.20
The Act includes an obligation on the operator to ensure the safety of its space 
activities in all phases and to ensure that the persons responsible for space activities 
have the required knowledge and experience.21 Even though there are no launch 
operations yet nor planned from the territory of Finland, it is stated that the safety 
of air traffic must be ensured if a space object is in the airspace of Finland.22 
Provisions on space objects found on Finnish territory are also included in the Act. 
Any found space object must be reported to the authorities and must not to be 
removed without permit.23
Provisions regulating space debris and environmental harm are described below.
The decree of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment contains in 
particular provisions on what documents and other information must be submitted 
by the operator in the application for authorization and for supervision. The Act also 
14 Section 8 of the Act on Space Activities.
15 Section 11 of the Act on Space Activities.
16 Section 14 of the Act on Space Activities.
17 Section 14 of the Act on Space Activities.
18 Section 15 of the Act on Space Activities.
19 Section 13 of the Act on Space Activities.
20 Section 21 of the Act on Space Activities.
21 Section 9 of the Act on Space Activities.
22 Section 1, sub-section 3 of the Act on Space Activities.
23 Section 16 of the Act on Space Activities.
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specifies the level of risk that is considered acceptable when considering the need 
for third party liability insurance.
10.3  Obligation to Avoid Space Debris and Environmental 
Harm
When the Act was prepared, it was considered important to emphasise the sustain-
able use of outer space and avoidance of space debris.24 Avoidance of unnecessary 
environmental harm and space debris is one of the conditions for authorization, 
which is then complemented by a specific section on the topic.
According to Section 5 of the Act, space activities may only be carried on subject 
to prior authorization by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. The 
Ministry may authorize space activities if the conditions specified in the section are 
met. One of the conditions is that the operator strives to prevent the generation of 
space debris and adverse environmental impacts on the Earth, in the atmosphere and 
in outer space in accordance with section 10. Furthermore, it is provided that the 
operator must have a plan for terminating the activities in outer space and for the 
related measures.
Section 10 of the Act contains provisions for environmental protection and space 
debris.
The first sub-section applies to the environmental impacts of the space activity. 
According to the paragraph, space activities shall be carried out in a manner that is 
environmentally sustainable and promotes the sustainable use of outer space. In its 
application for authorization, the operator shall assess the environmental impacts of 
the activity on the Earth, in the airspace and in outer space, and present a plan for 
measures to counter or reduce any possible adverse environmental impacts. Any 
nuclear or other radioactive materials used in the space object shall be specified in 
the application for authorization.
The second sub-section applies to space debris and states that the operator shall, 
in accordance with the recognised international guidelines, seek to ensure that the 
activities in outer space do not generate space debris. It is further specified in the 
paragraph that the operator shall in particular restrict the generation of space debris 
during the normal function of the space object, reduce the risks of breakage and 
collision of the space object in outer space, and strive to remove the space object 
from its orbit to a less crowded orbit or to atmosphere after it has completed its 
mission.
Space debris is not defined in the Act. In the explanatory memorandum for the 
Government proposal it is explained that space debris means, in accordance with 
24 This is also in accordance with the draft UN guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer 
space activities. The latest version for the upcoming session of the Scientific and Technical Sub-
Committee of COPUOS is available as UN-document A/AC.105/C.1/L.362/Rev.1.
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general international definition, any non-functional space object and its parts, 
including non-functional satellites, upper-stages of launch vehicles and other loose 
particles in outer space.25
Recognised international guidelines refer to the Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS), the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and the European Code of Conduct for Space 
Debris Mitigation, as well as relevant standards by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO). These are not specified in the Act or in the Decree but are 
mentioned in the explanatory memorandum. It was seen as important that the provi-
sion would cover also possible new international guidelines or other legal instru-
ments. During the authorisation process, particular attention is paid to these 
guidelines by the Ministry. If measures to mitigate space debris are not considered 
adequate, authorization may be denied.
Even though the provisions on authorization, insurance and supervision are not 
applied to satellites of the Finnish defence forces, the provisions on environmental 
protection and mitigation of space debris apply to their satellites as well.
Further provisions on the environmental impact assessment and the measures 
necessary to avoid the generation of space debris may be given by a decree of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. Currently, the Decree states only 
that an operator shall seek to remove the space object to a non-crowded orbit or to 
atmosphere in 25 years after the end of its functional operating period.26 It is to be 
noted that this provision is somewhat wider than for example the IADC space debris 
mitigation guidelines, which state that space objects should be removed from Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) into atmosphere in 25 years but there are no specific post mission 
disposal measures from the geostationary orbit (GEO).27 The working group, how-
ever, considered important that the same time limit is applied to removal of space 
objects from all orbits, if needed.
10.4  Active Space Debris Removal
The Finnish Act does not contain any provisions on active space debris removal. 
However, the intention of the working group was to enhance all possible measures 
to prevent, control and reduce the generation of space debris. As it was anticipated 
that most Finnish satellites would be small satellites operated on the crowded low 
orbits, the space debris issue was seen as especially critical.
25 This is similar to for example IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and COPUOS space 
debris guidelines.
26 Section 3 of the decree of Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment on space activities.
27 IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines Section 5.3.
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The working group recognized that, according to many recent studies, the popu-
lation of space debris in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) would continue to grow even under 
strict implementation of all mitigation measures. Thus, even more active measures 
may be needed in the near future. As technology is still developing and there are no 
binding international rules concerning active removal measures, it was not yet pos-
sible to include in the Act any provisions on active space debris removal.
It was seen as important however, that when the technology develops and inter-
national rules progress, Finnish legislation would entitle the authorizing and super-
vising authority to require the operator to take measures that were not anticipated 
when then Act was drafted. Therefore, it is stated in Section 5 of the Act on Space 
Activities that an authorization for space activities may be made subject to condi-
tions necessary for the safety or supervision of the activities. These could include 
measures needed to avoid and remove space debris.28 If such conditions were not 
complied with, the authorization could be amended or withdrawn in accordance 
with Section 13 of the Act. Naturally, there is no licensing practice or examples of 
such conditions yet. Furthermore, as all current Finnish satellites are small satellites 
in LEO, they should return to atmosphere in due time without the need for active 
removal measures.
According to Section 5, point 4 of the second sub-section, in its application for 
authorization the operator must provide a plan for terminating the activities in outer 
space and for the related measures. Such plan should demonstrate that the space 
object will be safely removed from its orbit to re-enter the atmosphere, or trans-
ferred to a graveyard orbit after it has completed its mission. The re-entry or transfer 
may be done by the satellite itself or through a removal service.
Further provisions on measures needed for the control of space debris may be 
given by a Decree of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. Such pro-
visions could include obligations or recommendations to undertake measures to 
actively remove space debris according to technological progress or international 
practice recommendations or guidance.
The intention of the working group was to define the scope of the Finnish Space 
Act so that it could also cover new types of space activities developed in the future 
including, for example, in-orbit servicing and active space debris removal. The pres-
ent definition can therefore encompass launching and operation of a space object on 
orbit with the purpose of removing space debris. Such activity would be subject to 
authorization and supervision by the Ministry. It should also be noted that transfer-
ring space activities to another operator, which might be necessary for the purposes 
of debris removal, is subject to prior authorization by the Ministry and the new 
28 This was also one of the recommendations of “Active Debris Removal – An Essential Mechanism 
fro Ensuring the Safety and Sustainability of Outer Space, a Report of the International 
Interdisciplinary Congress on Space Debris Remediation and On-Orbit Satellite Servicing”, 
pp. 44–45. UN document A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16  in http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c1/
AC105_C1_2012_CRP16E.pdf (22.1.18).
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operator must meet the conditions for authorization in accordance with section 5 of 
the Act.29
Sustainable use of space is one of the main research areas of the Finnish space 
sector. In particular, the Centre of Excellence on sustainable space30 combines 
expertise from the Universities of Helsinki and Turku, Aalto University and the 
Finnish Meteorological Institute. The focus of its research is on radiation-tolerance 
for micro-satellites and containment of space debris. One of the missions of the first 
Finnish satellite Aalto 1 by Aalto University is to test the electrostatic plasma brake 
to bring down the satellite, and to demonstrate the usefulness of the plasma brake as 
a satellite deorbiting device.31
Any measure to actively remove space debris would probably entail further dis-
cussions on issues concerning, for example, the definitions of space object and 
operator, liability, insurance obligations and safety provisions. This might require 
amendments to and fine-tuning of the present Act and Decree.
10.5  Conclusion
One of the objectives of the Finnish Space Act was to draw attention to the impor-
tance of environmental issues in space activities. Operators are therefore obliged to 
avoid both environmental harm and the generation of space debris. It is also seen as 
important that the Ministry and other relevant authorities follow closely technologi-
cal and legal developments so that the use of new measures not anticipated or regu-
lated in the present Act and Decree can be taken into consideration and enhanced. 
Much of this work will be done in the COPUOS where Finland has applied for 
membership this year.
Another objective of the Act was to promote new business opportunities through 
space activities by new actors, especially small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
technical development of new measures to actively remove space debris might pro-
vide new possibilities for innovations to be used in debris removal, and even new 
businesses providing active debris removal services.32
29 Section 11 of the Act on Space Activities.
30 https://www.helsinki.fi/en/researchgroups/finnish-centre-of-excellence-in-research-of- 
sustainable-space.
31 See more in http://aalto1.fi/aalto1_in_english.html and http://www.electric-sailing.fi/.
32 Business Finland, the national innovation funding agency (formerly known as Tekes), is prepar-
ing a programme for New Space Economy. The New Space Economy programme will help start-
ups to renew the space sector and manufacturing companies to seek growth, as well as enhance 
businesses that utilise space data. The programme aims to double the exports of participating 
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Chapter 11
French Law Approach Around the Topic 
“Legal Implications/Aspects of Active Debris 
Removal (ADR”)
Philippe Clerc
Abstract Active debris removal (ADR), which is broadly defined as an on-orbit 
service consisting in of removing space debris into a graveyard orbit or to an Earth 
return trajectory, is considered as a Space Operation under the French Space 
Operations Act of 3 June 2008 (“Loi n° 2008 -518 du 3 juin 2008 relatives aux 
opérations Spatiales” published in the French official gazette (JORF) on the 4th of 
June 2008.) (herein FSOA) which came into force on 10 December 2010.
As a preliminary remark, this legislation has been subject to a thorough analysis 
by Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Isabelle Arnold (DLR) in a paper published under the 
ageis of ESPI, “The French Act relating to Space activities. From international law 
idealism to national industrial pragmatism” (ESPI Perspectives N° 11, August 2008. 
Available for free downloading from the ESPI website www.espi.or.at.).
11.1  Active Debris Removal Is a Space Operation 
Under the Scope of FSOA
ADR falls under the scope Article 1.3 of the FSOA, which provides that a “Space 
Operation” means “any activity consisting in launching or attempting to launch an 
Object in Outer Space, or in ensuring the command of a Space Object during its 
journey in Outer Space […], as well as during its return on Earth”.
In its first Article, the FSOA defines Space activities and Space Operators sub-
ject to the French Government’s acceptance and supervision.
In addition, for the legal purpose of establishing a clear hand-over of responsibil-
ity and attribution of potential liability towards third parties between successive 
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operations, this legislation introduces definitions of “Launching Phase”, “Command 
Phase” (on-orbit) and “Return to Earth Phase”.
In the “Launching Phase” the responsibility of the Launch Operator starts at the 
instant the launch operations become irreversible and ends with the separation 
between the launcher and the satellite, subject to more specific provisions contained, 
if necessary, in the authorization issued to the Operator (FSOA Art. 1 §4).
The “Command Phase” (FSOA Art. 1 §5) starts from the moment when the 
object to be put in outer space is separated from its launch vehicle and ends when 
the first of the following events occurs:
 – when the final manoeuvres for de-orbiting and the passivation activities have 
been completed;
 – when the operator has lost control over the space object;
 – the return to Earth or the full disintegration of the space object into the 
atmosphere.
Thus, it is clear that an ADR operation takes place during the “Command Phase”.
11.2  Determination of the ADR’s Space Operator 
Under FSOA
Taking now into consideration the relevant person or legal body governed by the 
law, in other words the ratione personae criterion, this act provides that the autho-
rization process only applies to a Space Operator. This status is, ratione materiae, 
reserved to any individual or corporate entity carrying out a Space Operation under 
its own responsibility and in an independent manner (FSOA Art. 1-2°).
Thus, the characterization of who is a Space Operator under this Act goes back 
to the assessment of its actual responsibilities in the achievement of a Space 
Operation. This qualification is the responsibility of the “Administrative Authority” 
issuing the relevant authorisation or license,1 under the judicial and final control of 
the Council of State, as for any administrative or regulatory decision.
Basically, this definition of the Operator, resulted from extensive discussions 
during the preparatory work within the Council of State.2 This led to the adoption of 
1 An authorisation is the basic title awarded for each single operation (launch or commanding a 
space object) while a license may cover common terms and conditions applied to several opera-
tions carried out by the same operator and/or using the same space system.
The licence regime is introduced in FSOA’s Article 4, paragraph 3 as follows: “Licenses certi-
fying for a determined time period that a space operator satisfies moral, financial and professional 
guarantees may be granted by the administrative authority competent for issuing authorizations. 
These licenses may also attest the compliance of the systems and procedures referred to in the first 
paragraph with the technical regulations set forth. Lastly, these licenses may be equivalent to 
authorizations for certain operations”.
2 Council of State report, from its Reports and Studies Section named “For a legal policy for Space 
activities”, an appraisal study adopted by the General Assembly of the Council of State on 6 April 
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a short definition,3 with an interpretation that has proven to be widely shared by all 
the stakeholders.
Accordingly, the designation of Operator applies to those who, at a given time, 
have effective control or command and the power to dispose of the spacecraft, in 
other words, the one who acts as the real decision maker, even if not being the 
owner, in particular when it comes to engaging the spacecraft’s end-of-life manoeu-
vres. As a result, there can be only one Operator at a time, who shall be the only 
party responsible as the Authorization holder and, eventually, liable for damages 
caused to third parties by the space object under his control.
Based on the same logic, the Act has retained the possibility of multiple Operators 
acting “in series” in the command of the same space object. For instance, the trans-
fer of command of a satellite to another Operator can be formally authorized, in a 
final or a reversible manner, once nominally positioned in-orbit. The successor 
Operator will be then solely and fully responsible in controlling all Operations 
under the Act authorization.
For instance, the Administrative Authority, namely the Minister in Charge of 
Research and Space affairs, supported by CNES as technical arm, may grant, sub-
ject to a prior compliant application by the prime Operator, an authorization or a 
global license allowing a transfer of responsibilities between a “routine Operator” 
(“nominal Operator”) to a “specialized Operator” for the achievement of certain 
critical or hazardous maneuver(s), i.e. change of orbit positioning, docking, repara-
tion, end of life… Such an authorization or license is reversible in allowing a real-
location of responsibilities, and associated third party liability, to the nominal or 
routine Operator once such critical manoeuvers have been properly achieved by the 
specialized Operator, according to the Administrative Authority’s decision based on 
a CNES technical review.
This application procedure for the bilateral transfer of command, in all circum-
stances, affords the French government the opportunity: (i) to obtain from the 
Operator the necessary guaranties regarding the national and international commit-
ments made by that foreign state as well as its legislation and practices regarding the 
safety of persons and property, the protection of public health and the environment, 
and liability indemnification , and/or (ii) to enter into negotiations direct with the 
appropriate state in order to agree on a specific solution.
Basically, in its 2006 report, the Council of State was mainly inspired by a con-
tract law approach based on “contract of enterprise or of service”4 under which a 
party (prime contractor or service provider or maître d’oeuvre or prestataire de 
2006, published by La Documentation Française, 29–31 Quai Voltaire, www.ladocumentationfran-
caise.fr, ISBN 2-11-0062005-3, see on the concept of Space Operator § 2.1.1.3.1, page 72 and 73.
3 Ibid. footnote n° 4, Article 1.2° and 1.3° of the first draft legislation its Annexe 4, page 139.
4 In French “contrat d’entreprise” or “contrat de louage de service” or “contrat de louage d’ouvrage 
d’ouvrage” as defined in the French Civil Code in article 1710 on “louage d’ouvrage” (contract for 
works) and specified on article 1779 et seq. “louage d’ouvrage et d’industrie” (contracts for works 
and services), including “louage de service” referred to in Art. 1779. 1° (service provision con-
tract), “voituriers” (contracts of carriage by land and water) referred to in Art. 1779. 2° and 
“marchés et devis” (contracts for works and estimates) referred to in Art. 1779. 3°.
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service) agrees to do something in consideration for a remuneration agreed by the 
other party (contracting authority, client or customer). Citing the definition of Alain 
Bénabent,5 the Council of State underlined that such a contract means that the con-
tractor acts independently, without representing of its client, in other words without 
a subordinate relationship.
In this respect, FSOA does not affect subcontractors who do not have autonomy 
of action or decision-making powers at critical moments, or owners such as finan-
cial or capital structures that are not involved in the Operations.
Consultations between the French Government, the Parliament and representa-
tives of Space Operators and manufacturers during the law-making process (2007–
2008), and later for the drawing-up of application rules (2008–2010), helped to 
develop the criterion of “independent manner”. It resulted from such discussions 
that the characterization of Space Operator was to be reserved for the sole “effective 
and final decision maker” and, further, to the one having the real (or delegated) 
“animus domini” referring to a concept of property law that confers the right to have 
the thing, for example by alienation or by destruction.
It appeared indeed that from the administrative perspective, the owner of the 
satellite would be ultimately presumed to be the Operator in case of a confusing 
situation in the contractual or operational scheme or chain, whether arising or not 
from a deliberate willingness among the different stakeholders.
Basically, the difficulty of identifying the genuine Space Operator may arise with 
regard to the satellite’s end-of-life period, at the time when decisions are made about 
starting disposal manoeuvres, or not. A conflict of interest may arise between the 
economic user or owner of the satellite, wishing to extend the working life of its 
asset, and the effective technical Operator that remains accountable to FSOA regu-
lations and associated penalties. The question then is one of determining who will 
make independently the final decision.
Accordingly, following the same pragmatic approach, a subcontractor who 
unequivocally acts independently as an Operator may be qualified as such. For 
example, a satellite manufacturer that carries out the satellite in-orbit positioning 
manoeuvers pursuant to an “In-Orbit delivery contract” may be characterized as 
the actual Operator on behalf of its contractor; the latter may be the future satellite 
owner or its final nominal Operator.
From a private sector point of view, it is worth underlining that acting as an 
FSOA Space Operator without holding a prior authorization or licence may be 
heavily sanctioned, by:
 – a fine of € 200,000 pursuant to FSOA Article 11.3°, it being understood that this 
sanction may be applied either to a natural person having French nationality or a 
juridical person (limited company) having its headquarters in France;
 – an obligation to bear, if any, the expenses resulting from the appropriate mea-
sures taken by the administrative authority, or CNES, to limit the risks of  damage 




due to that unauthorized Operation (FSOA Art. 9 second paragraph, Art. 8 and 
Art. 21 III);
 – the refusal of any guarantee (FSOA, Art. 14) or limitation of recourse action 
(FSOA, Art. 15) from the French government with regard to indemnification of 
third parties in case of damage caused by such unauthorized Operation (i.e. the 
famous governmental coverage for damages over € 60 Million).
 – the associate loss of 1/3 party insurance coverage for the same risks, between 
zero to € 60 M of damages.
 – The risk of being unable to be further authorized as a Space Operator due to the 
lack of “moral, financial and professional guarantees of the applicant” with 
respect to the conditions provided for in FSOA Art. 4.
Thus, this criterion of “independent manner” proves to be the stumbling block of 
the FSOA’s regime for the allocation of responsibility and liability. Such a condition 
is a prerequisite for the grant of a governmental authorization or licence, and to 
identify the person potentially liable for any damage caused by the Space Object as 
well as the beneficiary of the state guarantee.
Consequently, this criterion dramatically affects the organization of the contrac-
tual and financial framework between all stakeholders involved in a Space venture, 
particularly in an ADR Operation as discussed below.
11.3  Liability Toward Third Parties Resulting from ADR’s 
Operations
The liability burden according to French law is set on the shoulders of the Space 
Operator who is responsible at the time of the generation of the damage.
Indeed, Article 13 FSOA provides that the Operator shall be solely liable for 
damages caused to third parties by the Space Operations which it conducts, as 
stated in the following conditions:
1° He shall be absolutely liable for damages caused on the ground or in airspace;
2° He shall be liable only due to his fault for damages caused elsewhere than on the 
ground or in airspace.
This distinction between liability fordamage on the ground and in airspace, and 
damage in-orbit is consistent with the UN Convention on International Liability for 
Damage caused by Space Objects of 29 March 1972. It is also rather similar to that 
of the French Civil Code.6
However, the FSOA adds that the Operator’ liability may (only) be reduced or set 
aside if the fault of the victim is proven.
6 Between Article 1240 on “fault liability” (old numbering, before 2016: Art. 1982) corresponding 
to FSOA’s article 13.2°, and Art. 1242 on “liability for the actions of things” (old numbering, 
before 2016: Art. 1984) corresponding to FSOA’s article 13.1°.
11 French Law Approach Around the Topic “Legal Implications/Aspects of Active…
184
In addition, except in case of willful misconduct, the Space Operator’s special 
liability under FSOA Art. 13 ends when all the obligations set out in the authoriza-
tion or the licence as to its own phase of responsibilities are fulfilled, or at the latest 
1 year after the date on which these obligations should have been fulfilled. The 
government shall be liable in the Operator’s place for damages occurring after this 
period.
In practice, the determination of Operator liability toward third parties in an 
ADR does not present any particular difficulty since the removed Space Object is a 
debris, or a satellite fully out of control or passive when transported by the 
“remover”. In this case, the liability burden, as it relates to third party compensation 
will be sought first against the “remover Space Operator”(and not against the other 
eligible persons tied with the “removed” or “displaced” Space Object) and shall be 
based on the latter’s “fault” (FSOA art 13. 2°), provided that it was acting indepen-
dently and under its sole responsibility as discussed above.
The “remover” does not benefit from the French State guarantee for damage 
caused in orbit (FSOA art 15.2). However, the “remover” may benefit from a limita-
tion of the recourse action from the French government (FSOA, Art 14.2°—capped 
at € 60 M€ actually) when the victim obtained compensation from this government 
under the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space 
Objects.
The pursuit of the effective Operator who is liable to third parties may be more 
difficult in a situation where the Space Object to be displaced is not yet a Space 
debris and where its own guardian or Operator, and a fortiori the owner of the 
removed space object has the capacity and the willingness to participate partly in 
its ADR in conjunction with the “remover”. Such extra-routine manoeuvers by 
nature were not included in the original authorization or license regarding such 
“displaced” Objects, and require specific amendment to be obtained previously 
from the administrative authority. It is thus advisable for the parties to set out clear 
terms and conditions for the ADR Operation in their own agreement, and to submit 
their implementation plan to the relevant administrative authority for prior 
authorization.
In the case of an ADR between French and foreign Operators having their Space 
Objects registered in different jurisdictions, the issue with regard to FSOA is to 
obtain the right authorization on transfer of command according to Article 3.7
7 Article 3 (Authorization for transferring command of Space objects or “Autorisation des trans-
ferts d’objets spatiaux”).
 – The transfer to a third party of the commanding of a Space object which has been authorized 
pursuant to the terms of the present act is subject to prior authorization from the administrative 
authority.
 – Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 2, any French operator intending to take the 
control of a Space object whose launching or control has not been authorized under the present 
act shall obtain to this end a prior authorization from the administrative authority.
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Indeed, this article has expressely achnowledged the possibility of transferring 
command between French and foreign Operators relating to systems already placed 
in orbit. This transfer shall be subject in both cases to a dedicated authorization and 
license under FSOA:
 – Paragraph 1 of Article 3 refers to the transfer of command from a French 
Operator, holding an authorization under FSOA, to a foreign Operator intending 
to work under foreign jurisdiction, with the issue of transferring or not, all or 
part, of the launching state’s liability compensation to the recipient state, as pro-
vided in Article V.2 of the 1972 UN liability convention, without prejudice to the 
rights of third party victims under Article IV.
 – The second paragraph applies to a French Operator intending to take the control 
of a (foreign) Space Object whose launching or control was not authorized under 
FSOA, in other words, the takeover of a space system previously subject to a 
foreign jurisdiction.
11.4  Liability of Persons Taking Part in the ADR’ Space 
Operation or in the Production of a Space Object
The liability regime in case of damage among participants in an ADR operation is 
defined in FSOA Art. 20. This article set up, by defaut, a systematic waiver of claim 
global system, or exclusion of guarantee expanded by a hold harmless regime 
between all participants taking part in an authorized Space Operation (FSOA, 
Art.20). Actually, despite the reciprocal application of this clause among partici-
pants, it ultimately protects the effective Space Operator liable for the damage 
caused. However, parties may expressly stipulate contrary provisions but only with 
respect to a damage caused on commanding a Space Object in-orbit. Insofar, such 
exception to the common regime of waiver of claim may be acknoledged in an 
ADR’s service contract between the “remover Space Operator” and the “removed 
eligible party”.
Regarding the question of identifying who are the “persons taking part in the 
Space Operation” reference is made to Article 1.6° which clearly defines “third par-
ties”. Indeed, the term “third party to a Space Operation” means any natural or 
juridical person other than those taking part in the Space Operation or in the pro-
duction of the Space Object(s) the launch or command of which is part of the 
Operation. In particular, the Space Operator, its contractors, its subcontractors and 
its customers, as the contractors and subcontractors of its customers, are not regarded 
as third parties”. The latter are therefore considered as taking part in the authorized 
operation.
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11.5  Conclusion and Perspectives
We may assess that the FSOA provides a solution to legally secure ADRs provided 
that such Operations involve at least a French Space Operator or a registrated Space 
Object.
An issue that remains is to assess the extent to which Article 20s exclusion of 
liability could extend, on the one hand, to persons involved in quasi-contracts, as 
provided for in the traditional theory of “negotiorum gestio” (or “gestion d’affaire” 
or “quasi-contrat”)8 or, on the other hand, to persons acting as occasional or volun-
teer contributors to a public service mission9 on behalf of related governments.
This issue, however, exceeds the scope of this paper which is devoted to positive 
law in France as concerns ADR’s. We may conclude that it is food for thought about 
the future direction and work of law-makers, either on national legislation or on new 
international instruments.10
8 The legal regime of “negotiorum gestio”, is derived from “Roman law”, and was codified under 
the French Code Civil. It can be defined as a willful interference, by an intervener (or manager or 
in French “gérant”), in the management of business or private affairs of others made in the interest 
of the latter (the beneficiary or business master, or in French “maître de l’affaire”) and without the 
beneficiary’s knowledge or without opposition from him or her, obliging such beneficiary to honor 
(or accept) the commitments made by the intervener and to cover the latter’s costs, expenses or 
disbursements, provided that the management was useful.
This “negotiorum gestio” situation may arise when somebody, without express contract or 
mandate, ensure protection of property and human safety of others, for instance on firefighting, 
victim’s aid or any rescue but also to prevent ordinary material damage as fixing water leaks, or 
initiating conservative repairs or protection shields against hazards.
9 The French Administrative Law, provides a similar framework than negotiorum gestio on behalf 
of “occasional or volunteer contributors to a public service’s mission”. Such public service’s ini-
tiatives, also consists in property’s protection, human safety of others, but also of general interest 
services provisions, such as public works in organizing public celebration, sports, cultural or edu-
cational events, academic lectures… as services usually under the responsibility of civil servants 
or public officers.
Indeed, according to the well-established Council of State case-law such volunteer contributors 
to a public service’s mission, may be compensated for accident damage that may happen to them 
while accomplishing their general interest mission. They may also be reimbursed of their mission 
expenses. In addition, these private contributors may engage directly the State liability for damage 
caused to third parties during their voluntary mission of general interest.
10 Potential application of “negotiorum gestio” theory to ADR’s operation within a new dedicated 
international framework has been envisaged by Doctor Guoyu Wang in a well-founded paper 
named “Legal Challenges to On-orbit Servicing and a China’s perspective” presented on September 
2017 during the International Astronautical Congress (IAC) held in Adelaide, Australia.
Dr. Guoyu Wang, Beijing Institute of technology(BIT), China. Co-author Mr. JIE YUAN, 
China. “Legal Challenges to On-orbit Servicing and a China’s perspective”, IAF/IISL/IAC 2018, 
Adelaide, Australia, on 25–29 September, n°IAC-17, E7,6-E3.5,4, x41849….
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